Modelling and verifying dynamic access control policies using knowledge-based model checking by Qunoo, Hasan Najib Yousif
MODELLING AND VERIFYING
DYNAMIC ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES
USING KNOWLEDGE-BASED MODEL
CHECKING
by
HASAN NAJIB YOUSIF QUNOO
A thesis submitted to
The University of Birmingham
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
School of Computer Science
College of Engineering and Physical Sciences
The University of Birmingham
March 2012
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
To my grandmother
Mariam Mohamad Qunoo
1932–2009
Abstract
The purpose of access control policies in computing is to guarantee that access to resources
is solely restricted to legitimate users. This clarity of purpose does not make the design of
these policies any easier. Today’s systems are large in size, have many users with diﬀerent
roles and can be accessed from anywhere and at any time. Systems often allowed users
to perform actions and read data so that users can do their job. Such a reality made it
inherently diﬃcult to get access control policies right.
Recently, failure to get these policies right has resulted in breach of privacy laws,
caused ﬁnancial loss and threatened the integrity of critical systems. This thesis aims at
providing and developing methods and tools to address this issue.
The error-prone process of designing access control policies can be aided greatly by the
right tools and methods. A modelling language that can express these complex policies
and an automated framework to analyse those policies for security ﬂaws can help mitigate
this issue. It allows the policy designers to simplify and reason about the access control
policy automatically.
This thesis advances the modelling and veriﬁcation of access control policies by using
automated knowledge-based symbolic model checking techniques. The key contributions
of this thesis are threefold: ﬁrstly, a modelling language that expresses dynamic ac-
cess control policies with compound actions that update multiple variables; secondly, a
knowledge-based veriﬁcation algorithm that veriﬁes properties over an access control pol-
icy that has compound actions; and ﬁnally, an automated tool, called X-Policy, which
implements the algorithm.
This research enables us to model and verify access control policies for web-based col-
laborative systems. We model and analyse a number of conference management systems
and their security properties. We propose the appropriate modiﬁcations to rectify the
policies when possible. Ultimately, this research will allow us to model and verify more
systems and help avoid the current situation.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Motivation
Social forces are changing the role of computing in our society. Wikipedia, a crowd-
sourcing encyclopaedia, is the largest of its kind [41]. Wikileaks, a crowd-sourcing-inspired
whistle blowing website, was behind the biggest leak in military history [24, 84, 81, 86].
Social networks like Facebook and Twitter have been the catalyst for wide-spread multi-
nation revolutions [48]. Access to collaborative document development tools like Google
docs has been the subject of high-proﬁle international and corporation conﬂicts [60].
Cloud-based conference management systems like EasyChair and EDAS are changing the
way we manage academic research and conferences [95]. Our society as a result is increas-
ingly dependent on these systems for their transformational empowerment, eﬃciency and
accessibility. Thus, we are sharing our personal information and trusting computer sys-
tems with them like never before. Failure to meet the security objectives of software
systems increasingly result in grave dangers, to individuals, corporations and societies at
large.
Replacing paper-based systems with software systems has introduced new security
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challenges. Software systems do not enjoy the built-in social control mechanisms that
paper-based systems have. The accessibility of software systems makes them vulnerable
to automated attacks. The portability of those systems’ data makes them a valuable
target. Security breaches often result in global eﬀects on the system’s end users. It
comes as no surprise then, that designing eﬃcient and secure software systems remains a
daunting task
What is it that makes the development of secure software systems a challenging task?
First, software engineers almost solely focus on the end-user features aspect of the software
system without developing the proper software security requirement. Second, developers
tend not to consider the full extent of any attacker’s knowledge, imagination, skills and
abilities. Third, there is a lack of tools and conventions that can help developers model,
deﬁne and assess non-functional security requirements for software systems. We therefore
need to provide software developers with the right languages, theories and tools to bridge
the gap.
Taken together, these issues illustrate an interesting and current research problem
in security engineering: that of dynamic access control policies in web-based collabora-
tive systems; Social networking websites, conference management systems, collaborative
document development tools, and application processing systems are all examples of web-
based access control systems. Web-based collaborative systems are central systems that
give users the ability to create and control access to their data. Access to data in these
systems is dynamic; it depends on the state of the system and its conﬁguration. Users
with the right permissions and in the right system state can acquire information about
the system state or execute actions that causes the system state to evolve into another
state.
The size and the complexity of the system policy makes it diﬃcult to analyse its
security and correctness properties by hand. These systems are designed to preserve
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the system integrity and serve their desired purpose. Systems might not always succeed;
users can circumvent the system to gain illegitimate access usually by interactions of rules,
co-operations between agents and multi-step actions.
The more accurate and precise a modelling language is, the more it can capture and
analyse the real behaviour of the system. Developing an expressive and powerful access
control policy veriﬁcation framework that can capture large and intricate systems will
help us understand policies, verify the ﬁtness of the policies and discover possible security
holes in the system. Fitness of policy in this context is deﬁned by the ability of individual
policy rules working together to preserve the system integrity against attacks that use
interactions of rules, co-operations between agents and multi-step actions. Security holes
such as allowing a reviewer to read another reviewer’s review of a certain paper before she
submits her own review or an author to review her own paper as explained in [121, 91].
Managers and decision makers at the moment are prevented from reasoning eﬀectively
about the actual access control process. The traditional way of using Access Control Lists
(ACLs), XML-based policy ﬁles, or machine readable code for access control obstructs
eﬀective reasoning about access control policies at the enterprise scale. This process also
requires a high level of technical skill.
It is also evidently important in the case of multi-agent collaborative systems to rea-
son about user’s knowledge about the state of the system. It allows us to model the
user’s allowed behaviour. As the access to the system is dynamic and depends on its
state, the attacker needs to gather information about the system to be able to evaluate
whether or not she can perform a certain action. Such a method allows the attacker to
avoid being logged and/or ﬂagged by the system monitor/administrator in the case of
requesting prohibited information. Note that we consider attacker(s) to be the legitimate
(authenticated) users of the system and the coalitions to be sets of authenticated users.
Our method also allows us to reason about situations in which attackers form a coalition
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where they share knowledge about the system. One of the beneﬁt of knowledge-based
reasoning is that the produced strategy derive the system to undesirable states without
allowing situations where the user cannot backtrack from or unintentionally destroy a
certain piece of information while carrying on the strategy.
Most academic conferences are managed using software systems. These software sys-
tems allow authors to submit their papers and the PC chair to manage users and download,
assign and evaluate these papers with the other PC members. The system permissions
are set based on the combination between the users roles, system conﬁgurations and state.
Thus, the access to the data is dynamic, complex and hard to understand. It also impor-
tant to ensure the integrity of the system. One might want to verify properties like “a
single user cannot review the same paper twice”. or “an author cannot review her own
paper”. It is also desirable that in the case where the system policy fails the property,
the tool outputs a counterexample strategy to help the policy designers to identify and
ﬁx the problem.
The main thesis of this research is that a knowledge-based model checking veriﬁcation
framework can be developed to model and verify dynamic access control policies for real-
life web-based collaborative systems automatically.
We propose X-Policy, a knowledge-based veriﬁcation tool for dynamic access control
policies. X-Policy’s modelling language with its corresponding query language and ver-
iﬁcation algorithm are based on concepts of RW [121], but extends it with the ability
to express and analyse compound actions. X-Policy’s modelling language allows us to
describe access control system as two sets of rules: read permission rules and action ex-
ecution rules. A read permission rule allows us to specify the permission conditions that
a user needs to satisfy to be able to read the value of a certain system variable. An ac-
tion execution rule allow us to specify the system operation and its execution permissions
where the user can change one or more of the system variables as a compound action (all
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or none). We assume that the user has knowledge of a system variable if she or any other
member of her coalition has previously read that variable. Users can share information
with the coalition as they can communicate with each other using an outside channel.
We also assume that the user will maintain that knowledge of the variable if the user has
performed an action that changed the value of that variable, and that the coalition has an
exclusive access to the system. While carrying out the strategy, the agents are assumed
to completely know the policy of the system. A common principle in secure system design
is to avoid relying on “security by obscurity”. Thus, we must assume that the attacker
knows any information about the design of the system that she could know. Therefore
the attacker is aware of the system policy while executing the attack (strategy). While
such assumptions give the attackers what seem as an unfair advantage, it is certainly
desired that the system be tested in the most rigorous way. It also covers scenarios where
attackers automate their attack by simulating access requests to the system. Such attacks
are common in web-based collaborative systems and very important to model.
One of the most important features of X-Policy is its ability to express compound
actions that update multiple variables. This is crucial for modelling collaborative systems.
For example, when a user responds to an invitation to take a certain role, the system
updates the status of that invitation and then update the user’s role according to her
answer. Similarly, once a user account is deleted from the system all the user’s roles will
be consequently deactivated.
X-Policy implements a knowledge-based algorithm where a user can input a system
policy speciﬁcation and a property (query). X-Policy then veriﬁes whether or not the
system satisﬁes the properties. If the system fails, it outputs a strategy that shows how
the attacker or the coalition of attackers can achieve the goal. The remainder of this
chapter is structured as follows. A detailed description of the contribution made by this
thesis will be presented in Section 1.2. A summary of publications will be presented in
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Section 1.3 and ﬁnally, the thesis structure will be summarised in Section 1.4.
1.2 Our Contribution
We have explored, studied and classiﬁed the ﬁeld of access control policies both in terms
of the type of systems that are being targeted, expressiveness and analysis capability
of these languages, frameworks and tools. We have developed X-Policy, a knowledge-
based veriﬁcation tool that can express and analyse dynamic access control policies for
vulnerabilities. The tool is available at: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/˜hxq/xpolicy.
The X-Policy tool can be used to detect attacks where the attacker can act as a coalition
of users, use the system, share knowledge and collaborate with each other to achieve the
attack.
First, a modelling language that speciﬁes dynamic access control policies. X-Policy’s
modelling language can express: read permission where users read the modelled system
variables and compound actions where the user can update multiple variables. The simple
syntax of X-Policy’s modelling language allows us to build simple yet expressive models
of the access control policies. Intentionally, the resulting models are easy to build and
understand by policy developers.
Secondly, a knowledge-based veriﬁcation algorithm that veriﬁes properties over an
access control policy that has compound actions. We extend the method used by RW [121]
to maintain the integrity constraints of the system and to handle the system behaviour
resulting of the execution of compound actions. The ability for this algorithm to factor
user’s knowledge allow us to reason about coalition of users and the ability of users to
share knowledge of the system. We also provide the proof of correctness and complexity
analysis of the algorithm
Third, a case study in which we analyse a number of security properties of EC model,
which is based on EasyChair conference management system. we address the issue of the
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lack of real life examples and case studies in the ﬁeld of access control policies. We
also provide a number of conventions that can be adopted to model other web-based
collaborative systems and similar conference management system like HotCRP and iChair.
Finally, a software implementation of the model checking algorithm. We apply the
software implementation X-Policy in analysing EC . We present our results and discuss
the possible solutions based on the generated strategy. We also strengthen our algorithm
complexity analysis by comparing practical performance results with similar tools and we
discuss our ﬁndings.
1.3 List of Publications
Most of this thesis have been published in a number of papers and reports as detailed
below:
• Hasan Qunoo, Masoud Koleini, and Mark Ryan. Towards modelling and verifying
dynamic access control policies for web-based collaborative systems. W3CWorkshop
on Access Control Application Scenarios, November 2009
This paper provides the contexts and the motivation behind X-Policy.
• Hasan Qunoo and Mark Ryan. Modelling dynamic access control policies for web-
based collaborative systems. In Sara Foresti and Sushil Jajodia, editors, DBSec,
volume 6166 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 295–302. Springer, 2010
• Hasan Qunoo and Mark Ryan. Modelling dynamic access control policies for web-
based collaborative systems. Technical Report CSR-11-08, University of Birming-
ham, School of Computer Science, August 2011
This paper and technical report provides the content of Chapter 3 and 5.
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• Hasan Qunoo. X-Policy: Knowledge-based veriﬁcation tool for dynamic access con-
trol policies. Technical Report CSR-11-09, University of Birmingham, School of
Computer Science, December 2011
This technical report provides the content of Chapter 4 and 3.
1.4 Thesis structure
The rest of this dissertation is structured as following:
• Chapter 2 review research related to access control policies, with particular focus on
veriﬁcation frameworks and the dynamic aspects of policies. We try to classify the
research done in the ﬁeld based on the type of systems and the diﬀerent problems
they attack. We provide gap analysis of the current literature in access control
policies. We explore the limitations of current approaches. We use the appropriate
examples to illustrate both the capability and limitations of each framework.
It should be noted here that Chapter 2 serves as a scene-setting survey which we
use to clarify the research problem we are address in this dissertation.
• Chapter 3 present the X-Policy modelling language. We begin by providing the
language syntax and informal semantics. We illustrate how we can express reading
and compound actions using X-Policy. We also introduce the query language and
we provide a number of examples to illustrate the use of X-Policy query language
to write security properties.
• The model checking algorithm is explained in details in Chapter 4. This includes
arguments about correctness and complexity analysis.
• Chapter 5 presents the process of modelling and verifying the access control policy of
EasyChair conference management system. We give some background information
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of conference management systems and overview of the conventions used in the
constructing the model. We then describe the access control policy in X-Policy and
provide an analysis of number of security properties. We also suggest a number of
changes to the access control policy when appropriate. We conclude this section by
our observations and survey of security properties of similar conference manganese
systems.
• Chapter 6 brieﬂy describe our implementation of the tool. This includes the usage
information and system requirements, a discussion of the X-Policy tool. It compares
the performance, results and analysis of X-Policy framework against other similar
tools as applicable.
• Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by a summary of main contributions, lesson learned
and an outline of future work.
9
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CHAPTER 2
Background and gap research
Access control theory has been the focus of an intensive research in the past decades.
In the past few years, a mixture of theory and software engineering techniques has been
developed. This chapter provides an introduction to the problem of modelling and ver-
ifying dynamic access control systems and a review of relevant work. After providing a
background to the research problems in access control, we explore the various languages,
systems and frameworks developed to solve these problems and we try to classify them
based on their purpose, technique and expressibility. This chapter sets the scene from
which the Chapters 3 and 4 extend the RW [121] framework and provides the link between
them and the case studies discussed in Chapter 4, where we model and verify the access
control policy of a number of web-based collaborative systems.
This Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 introduces and motivates the problem
in access control with the introduction with the early models. Section 2.2 describes
the problems and proposed solutions for access control in distributed systems. We then
discuss the issue of dynamic access policy analysis and the various proposed solutions
with a special focus on model checking based access control frameworks including RW in
Section 2.3. We then summarise and classify these solutions based on their contexts and
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try to set the scene for the following chapters in Section 2.4.
2.1 Access Control: Background
The process of mediating every request to resources and data maintained by a system and
determining whether the request should be granted or denied is called access control [33].
Access control policy, the set of regulations that can be speciﬁed in an appropriate
language and then enforced by the access control mechanism, needs to be deﬁned properly.
Access Control Policies allow us to reason about the security properties of these policy as a
whole. This can facilitate, in the case of an eﬃcient implementation, powerful enforcement
of rules authorising access to resources.
2.1.1 Access Control Models
Access control has been a signiﬁcant research interest. The control of access to ﬁles and
resources, has appeared for long time as a crucial part of operating systems [49, 66].
Access Control Models like MAC [17], DAC [100, 50] and RBAC [99] has been developed
to organise access to resources.
In the mandatory access control (MAC) model, ﬁrst formalised by Bell and La-
Padula [17], access to data is based ﬁrstly on the data as sensitivity or classiﬁcation,
represented by a security label, and secondly on the clearance of the user, represented
also by a security label. Security labels forms a lattice. One common set of labels used
is unclassified 6 confidential 6 secret 6 top-secret. The systems, known as multilevel se-
curity systems using MAC are based two principles; First, all users can read information
with classiﬁcation no higher that the one they are granted. Second, no user can write
to a lower classiﬁcation. As MAC was designed for military systems, the administration
is centralised and delegation is forbidden. Such speciﬁcation does not suit well other
purposes, especially commercial organisations due to its inﬂexibility.
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Discretionary access control model (DAC), less constrained model, where the
owner of an object is trusted to manage access permissions to other users of the system.
Users also can delegate control over an object to another user [100, 50]. An Access
Control List (ACL) attached to each ﬁle is a classical approach used in operating systems
like Windows, Linux and Unix to restrict users’ access to the ﬁle system. Permissions are
speciﬁed in rwx triple for the owner, group and others specify the rights to read, write,
or execute the ﬁle. Figure 2.1 shows the ACL of a ﬁle which belongs to Bob, who is a
member of the group Staﬀ. Access control matrices [49, 66] will be stored in columns.
The DAC model is hard to administer as organisations grow. Any change to the policy
can be an expensive and tedious process.
r w x r - x - - x Bob Staﬀ
Figure 2.1: An access control list.
To ﬁll the gap between MAC and DAC, role-based access control (RBAC) has
been proposed to compromise between MAC, which is too rigid, and DAC, which is hard
to administer.
Figure 2.2: The RBAC0 model.
As in real organisations, users are assigned roles or job functions. each role is associated
with access permissions. Many diﬀerent RBAC models have been proposed over the past
few years but RBAC0 [99] is often considered the core model. If we consider the set of
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users (u), roles (r) and permissions (p) as key components, the RBAC0 policy can be
expressed as user assignment (UA) relations with roles and permission assignments (PA)
to roles as shown in Figure 2.2. RBAC1 has extended RBAC0 with role hierarchies, within
senior roles inherit permissions held by junior roles. RBAC2 has introduced constraints
on relations to RBAC0. RBAC3 integrates constraints and role-hierarchies.
Other models has been proposed in the area of access control [39, 85, 83, 30]. [39]
deﬁnes a language for specifying authorization and obligation policies of an intelligent
agent acting in a changing environment. However, it does not allow the deﬁnition of
actions and their side eﬀects. UCON [85] propose a conceptual framework that covers
traditional access control, trust management, or DRM areas in a systematic manner to
provide a general-purpose, uniﬁed framework for protecting digital resources. However,
UCON proposed framework is orthogonal to the scope of this thesis which is verifying
dynamic access control policies. [83] proposes the use of D-algebra for composing access
control policy decisions while [30] present a formal, logical framework for the represen-
tation and analysis of authorization and obligation policies. Halpern and Weissman [47]
have demonstrated how a fragment of ﬁrst-order logic can be used to represent and rea-
son about access control policies. Barker [8] proposed Status-Based Access Control which
is more expressive than RBAC. These proposals diﬀer from X-Policy; X-Policy focuses
on expressing and analysing access control policies with atomic actions using automated
model checking analysis using agent’s knowledge while these frameworks are concerned
with the speciﬁcation of authorisation and obligation policies.
2.2 Access Control in Distributed Systems
As systems expand, the concept of systems evolve as well to include large-scale, hetero-
geneous and decentralised systems; and so do the access control concepts.
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2.2.1 Authentication and Authorisation in distributed Systems
The way the access control systems were ﬁrst developed did not consider today’s envi-
ronments. Today millions people all over the world are online, with whose introduction
a new set of challenges is introduced [65]: attack from any where, sharing with anyone,
automated infection, and hostile code, environment, and hosts. These factors make the
design and analysis of system security a complex task.
Access control theory and practice provides mechanism to implement security in the
modern systems. Figure 2.3 shows Lampson’s model. The guard needs to know two piece
of informations to reply to a request:
Authentication information which identiﬁes the principal who made the request. This
information often consist of some statements digitally signed to ensure their integrity
and authenticity; these are called credentials [70].
Authorization information which says who is allowed to do what to the object. This
information varies from an access model to another as we can see in section 2.1.1.
Separating the guard from the object makes reasoning about the access control policies
simpler [2, 65, 67]. Even so, access control seems hard to get right.
Figure 2.3: Lampson’s access-control model.[67]
Over the years, many theories and systems for access control systems were developed.
Many logics and calculus like [1, 9, 2] were proposed. The main approach is to study
the concepts, protocols and algorithms of access control system and develop a notation
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for representing principals and their statements [1, 2]. Fournet [38] uses Spi calculus and
applies it to a Conference Management System to check whether a distributed imple-
mentation based on communication channels and cryptography complies with a logical
authorization policy. Swamy [109] which presents FINE, a new source-level security-typed
language, focuses on the enforcement of dynamic security policies. However, the FINE
policy language is an ML-level language and is concerned with the enforcement of the
policy rather than analysing security properties. FINE also does not express high-level
actions like the one considered by X-Policy.
2.2.2 Decentralised Trust Management
In recent years, there have been many proposals to develop a high-level access control
policy language with the appropriate mechanisms to address the problems of decentralised
administration, uniﬁed expressive and abstract languages to express policies, credentials,
and relationships collectively. Recent researchers refer to these problems collectively as
the “trust management problem” which was ﬁrst mentioned in [20].
Soon after early proposals to solve trust management problems like PolicyMaker [20]
and KeyNote [19], the complexity of analysing the web of trust has produced the need for
a more attractive foundation. DeTreville was ﬁrst to propose Binder [32], a Datalog based
security language. Since then Datalog has become the foundation of recent trust manage-
ment systems. Researchers are mainly attracted to Datalog [77] as they can start from
a tractable and expressive language with the advantage of deducing trust relations eﬀec-
tively based on well developed logic programming concepts and deductive databases [21].
In most of those languages, we express policy rules in the form if〈conditions〉then〈goal〉.
Note that while QCM [43] and its successor SD3 [58] are earlier than Binder in using
Datalog, they focus on building secure DNS servers, public key directory and distributed
repository. SD3 is the ﬁrst trust management system to consider automated credential
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retrieval. However, the fact that SD3 does not have an access control decision engine
and focuses on the law level handling of the certiﬁcate retrieval, highly level authorisation
languages like Cassandra and SecPAL. Cassandra and SecPAL seem to be inﬂuenced more
by Binder and RT as [11], for example, classiﬁes it with KeyNote and PolicyMaker as a
low-level trust management system.
Recent languages like the RT family [70, 73, 72, 71, 69], Cassandra [16, 11, 15], SecPAL
[13, 10, 34] have developed methods and solutions to high level authorisation problems
problems, by adopting concepts mainly from Programming with Constraints [76] or De-
ductive Database [114], to improve the expressiveness of the languages and maintain their
tractability. Such an expressiveness has enabled researchers like Moritz Becker [16] to for-
malise and express the UK National Health Service’s National Programme for Information
Technology (NPfIT) policy in the Cassandra framework.
The trust management problem refers to decentralised administration, uniﬁed ex-
pressive and abstract language to express policies, credentials, and relationships collec-
tively.
Services available on the network are accessed from everywhere where resource owner
and requester do not know each other. Therefore, there is a need to have a trust man-
agement framework to maintain the security of the system by ensuring that access to
resources is restricted to legitimate users. Trust management framework must accom-
modate appropriate notions of users security policies, their credentials and their complex
trust relationship where each service in the system has to maintain locally its own belief
and notion of trust.
Many languages like Binder [32], PolicyMaker [20] and KeyNote [20], SPKI [7], SDSI
and RT [72], XrML, Cassandra [16] and SecPAL [13] are examples of trust management
languages. We can classify those proposals by their ideas and techniques. Noticeably,
recent languages are based on ideas and techniques from logic programming. As a result,
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those languages have inherited logic programming features like:
• Negation as failure: This happens due to the closed world assumption which is
the presumption that what is not currently known to be true is false; i.e. if we can
not prove a positive literal in the role conditions to be true then its false.
• Function symbol free: Datalog is function symbol free which gives tractabil-
ity. On way to overcome such a limitation is by using Datalog with constraints
(DatalogC) [70].
• Quantifiers and roles negation: Datalog does not allow negation or quantiﬁers
on roles; for example we can not express roles like:
∀x(Permitted (x, apply-for-driving-license())←− ¬Underage(x)).
We highlight those frameworks in the following sections and we discuss the concepts
and methods they use.
2.2.2.1 PolicyMaker and KeyNote
PolicyMaker [20] is a service that acts as part of the resource guard or as an independent
daemon. It inputs the request, the collection of credential and the local policy rules and
outputs a the answer to the request as we can see in the Figure 2.4. The process of
answering the question “Do the access rules and credentials authorize the request?” is
called “proof-of-compliance”. PolicyMaker provides a simple language to specify trusted
actions and relationships. The PolicyMaker language enables two operations: assertion
and query in the following form:
Assertion : source ASSERTS authstruct WHERE filter ;
Query : keylist REQUESTS string condition ;
We might like to set a policy rule: trust Daﬀy (whose key is pgp: “4D DA 09 36 73 1D
C5 33 BB 93 EB 4B 35 02 24 7E”) to act as an agent on behalf of BigCo.:
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Figure 2.4: A trust management scenario
Policy ASSERTS
pgp: "4DDA0936731DC533BB93EB4B3502247E"
WHERE
PREDICATE=regexp:"Organisation: BigCo.",
As you can see, the entities are identiﬁed by there public key. Then we can write the
query from Daﬀy:
pgp: "4DDA0936731DC533BB93EB4B3502247E"
REQUESTS "From Daffy
Organisation: BigCo.";
KeyNote, PolicyMaker’s successor, shares the same semantics and spirit of PolicyMaker
with small diﬀerences. KeyNote act as an fully programmable policy language written in
C-like expressions. KeyNote responds to requests with “accept” or “deny” and is devised
with a credential signature veriﬁcation algorithm built in it. PolicyMaker and KeyNote
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has a limited expressiveness and evaluation power as it is focused on the handling of
public keys management rules that fail to express high-level policies with user roles and
permissions.
2.2.3 Logic-based Access Control Policy Languages
2.2.3.1 RT
RT family [70, 73, 72, 71, 69] of attribute-based access control (ABAC) languages where
authorisation in collaborative environments should be based on authenticated attributes
of the entity was ﬁrst proposed by Li, Mitchell and Winsborough. It uses Delegation
Logic (LP) proposed by [69], a monotonic logic that extends Datalog.
For example we can express the following conference management concept to its equiv-
alent RT rules:
• Chair asserts that Alice is a PC member:
Assertion: Chair says isPCmember(Alice).
• Chair trusts any PC member to assign a subreviewer:
Delegation: X delegates isSubreviewer(?Y) to Z
if Chair says isPCmember(?X).
Where isSubreviewer(?Y) means that any arbitrary entity Y can become Subre-
viewer if an entity X assigned Y to be become a subreviewer, given that X is a PC
member.
• A PC chair requires a threshold of 3 positive reviews of a paper to be able to make
a decision as to whether to accept or reject that paper. This rule can allow the set
of reviewers to be speciﬁed:
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dynamically: Chair delegates PaperApproved(?P)
to threshold(3, ?X,Chair says isPCmember(?X).
or statically: Chair delegates PaperApproved(?P)
to threshold(3, [Alice,Bob,Eve]).
Where we specify the set of reviewers to be Alice, Bob and Eve. The threshold
here means that the maximum number of approval of a papers is three. Where the
ﬁrst one allow any three PC members to approve the paper while in the second
statement it has to be Alice,Bob and Eve who approve it.
Policy rules are called credentials in RT1 [71]. In RT1, we write A.R to express that the
principal A controls the role term R. There are four statement types that can be used to
deﬁne an RT1 credential (translatable to Datalog):
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Type1 : A.R←− B A says B is a member of role R
which is translated to the delegation
logic equivalent of: isMember(B,A.R)
Type2 : A.R0 ←− B.R1 A says X is a member of role R0
if B says X is a member of role R1
which is translated to the delegation
logic equivalent of:
isMember(?X,A.R0)←−
isMember(?X,B.R1)
Type3 : A.R0 ←− A.R1.R2 A says X is a member of role R0
if a member of role R1 Z says
X is a member of role R2
which is translated to the delegation
logic equivalent of:
isMember(?X,A.R0)←−
isMember(?Z,A.R1),
isMember(?X, ?Z.R2)
Type4 : A.R0 ←− A1.R1 ∩ A2.R2 ∩ ... ∩ Ak.Rk A says X is a member of role R0
if X is a member of
A1.R1 ∩ A2.R2 ∩ ... ∩ Ak.Rk
which is translated to the delegation
logic equivalent of::
isMember(?X,A.R0)←−
isMember(?X,A.R1)
...
isMember(?X, ?A.R2)
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where R = r(h1, ..., hn) where h1, ..., hn are the role attributes. RTC1 [70] share the same
semantics and logic of RT1 but allows tree and discrete constraints domains on the roles
(credentials) attributes. It translates its roles to Datalog with constraints: DatalogC [70].
DatalogC [70] uses a least ﬁxed point algorithm to apply the constraints and deduce facts.
Although those constrains contributed to it’s expressiveness, It is considered limited as
constraints on rules or entities are not allowed to maintain the language tractability. RT
is stateless and cannot express the dynamic aspect of access control policies.
2.2.3.2 Cassandra
Motivated by NHS Electronic Health Records (EHR) [35], Cassandra [16, 11, 15] extends
on the above trust management systems and languages. It proposes a framework where
each entity in the network runs a Cassandra agent with a local policy to control access to
its resources as a set of rules based on DatalogC . Rules have the form:
p0(~e0)←− loc1 ⋄ iss1.p1(~e1), ..., locn ⋄ issn.pn(~en), c.
where loci and issi are the name of the entity which assert the predicate and its issuer,
respectively. c is a constraint from constraint domain. loc ⋄ iss can be interpreted as
loc says iss says p(~e). The predicate name p can refer to an arbitrary user-deﬁned names
or one of the six special predeﬁned predicates:
1. canActivate(e, r): expresses the fact that entity e can activate the role r.
2. hasActivated(e, r): expresses the fact that entity e has activated the role r.
3. permits(e, a): the entity e can perform the action a.
4. canDeactivate(e1, e2, r): the entity e1 has the power to de-activate the victim entity
e2 from the role r.
5. isDeactivated(e, r): Cassandra supports cascade revocation where the deactivation
of one role will trigger the deactivations of other (local) roles.
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6. canReqCred(e1, e2.p(~e)) the entity e1 is allowed to request credentials issued by the
entity e2 and asserting the predicate p(~e).
Cassandra also supports a number of constraints domains and aggregation rules to express
negation like “entity has not activated a role r” or “no entity has activated a role r”. The
use of aggregation has the beneﬁt of expressing grouping and cardinality constraints, e.g.
a patient can not assign more than three agents at once. Cassandra is a state aware
access control policy language which depend on past events, or the system state like: “a
reviewer may access other reviewers’ reviews for a paper if he is assigned to this paper
and he has submitted his review of that paper” or “a reviewer can be assigned to review
a paper if he is not the author of that paper”. We can express such a policy in Cassandra
as the following policy rules:
canActivate (chair, Assign-for-reviewing(pcmember, paper) ) ←−
hasActivated(chair, Chair()),
canActivate(pcmember, PCMember()),
paper-author-regs(0, paper, pcmember),
currenttime() > deadline.
Cassandra uses a SLGC resolution [94, 111] which is a top-down, goal oriented eval-
uation algorithm for DatalogC to evaluate queries. It also support cascaded revocation
using canDeactivate and isDeactivated(e, r) request:
isDeactivated ( pcmember , reviewer( paper)) ←−
isDeactivated(chair, assign-for-reviewing(pcmember, paper)).
2.2.3.3 SecPAL
Security PolicyAuthorization Language (SecPAL) [13, 10, 34] is stateless DatalogC based
decentralised authorisation policy language which focuses on controlled delegation
24
and principal aliasing which can not be expressed by Cassandra, RT and other trust
management languages. However, It does not handle state-aware policies and revocations.
SecPAL Authorisation policies are speciﬁed as sets of assertions of the form:
A says fact if fact1,...,factn,c.
Where A is the issuer; the facti are the conditional facts; and c is the constraint. SecPAL
does not place any restriction on the choice of constraints domain, as in Cassandra.
Instead, it enforces syntactic assertion safety conditions to ensure that all facts are ﬂat
(ie. all vars(fact) are safe and can be deduced from within the same assertion rule where
a variable x ∈ vars(fact) is safe iﬀ x ∈ vars(fact1) ∪ · · · ∪ vars(factn) ). SecPAL
supports the following idioms:
• Controlled delegation SecPAL uses the primitive “can say” e.g. “Chair can
delegate to Daﬀy the ability to say who is a PC member.” can be expressed as:
Chair says Daﬀy can sayD x is a PC member. sayD can be say0 to prevent Daﬀy
from re-delegate capability of saying who is the PC member which they call “depth-
bounded delegation”, or say∞ to indicate that the capability is re-delegate-able.
• Principal aliasing where we can use “can act as” to express role hierarchies like:
BigConference says PCmember can read ﬁle://conference/forum/
BigConference says PCmember can act as Subreviewer.
BigConference says Chair can act as PCmember.
BigConference says Taz can act as Chair.
In this scenario, Taz can access ﬁle://conference/forum/.
• Parametrised Attributes to encode parametrised roles, attributes and privi-
leges. SecPAL introduces verb phrases like can write a review of [-] and is a
reviewer of [-].
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BigConference says x can write a review of paper if
x is a is a reviewer of paper
• Domain Specific Constraints with safety conditions. We can classify the
constraint domains it support to:
Basic Constraints which include linear constraints (e.g. numerical inequalities),
hierarchical constraints (e.g. path constraints) and regular expression (e.g.
email address ﬁltering).
Additional Constraints SecPAL supports negation with safety conditions mainly
using groundness analysis to ensure the constraints tractability. Constraints
with depth-bounded delegation can be combined to provide a width-bounded
delegation rules like:
Chair says Daﬀy can sayD x is a PCmember if
x possesses Email email,
email matches *@*.edu.
In that case Daﬀy can not delegate to any principal unless his email address
belong to .edu domain.
SecPAL supports Attributes Based Delegation like in RT, Cassandra and Delegation logic
where there is a need to assert subject as a student and threshold-constraint trust. The
controlled delegation allows SecPAL to enforce depth-bounded and width-bounded dele-
gation which is not expressible in other languages.
On the other hand, SecPAL does not have the ability to model state-aware polices
which require the dynamic insertion and deletion of facts to the database. Although Sec-
PAL support static revocation assertion, It does not allow nested or dynamic revocation.
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With such limitations, we found it hard to model RBAC policies like the conference and
EHR systems.
2.3 Analysing Dynamic Access Control Policies
Shaﬁq et. al. [105] uses a Petri-Net based framework for verifying the correctness of
event-driven RBAC policies. Schaad and Moﬀett [102, 101] use Alloy [55, 53, 54, 56] to
specify a RBAC models and separation of duty properties [97]. Model checking tools
[78, 79, 25, 4] have the advantage of being more exhaustive than previous approaches.
This alas can not be done using general purpose model checkers like SMV [78, 79, 25] and
Mocha [4] as discussed in [119]. These model checkers can not capture the concepts of
access control like permissions about permissions [98]. This has motivated the research
towards more domain speciﬁc model-checking based frameworks [119]. The access control
veriﬁcation software suit Margrave [37] addresses the policy change-impact problem using
Model-Checking techniques. Margrave allow the users to compute the changes between
two policy ﬁles written in XACML and calculates the diﬀerences between the two policies.
RW [121, 122, 120] answers the question of whether there is a strategy for a coalition of
agents to achieve a given goal given an access control policy written in the RW formalism.
RW uses a ﬁxed point algorithm [42] to model the agents knowledge of the state of the
system. It extracts strategies which make the goal achievable.
2.3.1 RW
RW is a framework for evaluating and generating access control systems. It analyses and
detects the security holes caused by interactions of rules, co-operations between
agents and multi-step actions. It argues that:
• While individual policy rules could be enforced properly, the using a combination
of a number of these rules in a dynamic system can circumvent the policy rules and
27
still achieve an attack the system.
• An attack can be achieved by a set of agents through co-operation.
• An agent can achieve an attack using a sequence of actions.
RW propose a solution for those problems. RW’s solution is a composite of the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Build a model M for the access control policy using the RW formalism.
2. Express the model M in the machine-readable RW specification language.
3. Specify a property of the framework to be veriﬁed. The property deﬁnes a goal,
a coalition of agents and some conditions to serve as a pre-requirements for the
checking to be performed.
4. If, as is ideal, the policy is immune to the malicious goals and guarantees the achiev-
ability of the legitimate goals, The framework implements a tool to convert the policy
from the RW language into a policy ﬁle in XACML. In case the goal is achievable,
RW , using a model checking algorithm, outputs a strategy the agent(s) may use to
achieve the goal. The output strategy can be used to amend the policy.
Using RW syntax we can deﬁne an example access control system S = 〈Σ, P, r, w〉,
where the set of propositional variables P = {u(p), x(p), y(p), z(p), t(p)} and the set of
agents Σ = {a}. For each p ∈ P , the read permission rule r(p, a) and the write permission
rule w(p, a) is detailed in the RW formalism as following:
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r(u(p), a)⇋ ⊥ w(u(p), a)⇋ ⊥
r(x(p), a)⇋ ⊤ w(x(p), a)⇋ ¬u(p)
r(y(p), a)⇋ ⊤ w(y(p), a)⇋ u(p)
r(z(p), a)⇋ ⊤ w(z(p), a)⇋ x(p) ∨ y(p)
r(t(p), a)⇋ ⊤ w(t(p), a)⇋ x(p)
To perform model-checking, a concrete instance based on the template needs to be
constructed and a query has to be speciﬁed. We now can write a query to ask the question
whether there is a strategy or guessing strategy for a to set z’s value to false:
run for 1 P, 1 Agent
check{E p: P, a: Agent || {a}:{˜z(p)}}
AcPeg (Access Control Policy Evaluator and Generator) is a Java implementation
for RW framework. We can use AcPeg to model-check access control policy written in
RW speciﬁcation language. AcPeg also translate from the RW to XACML. AcPeg has
implemented a three-level abstraction mechanism to handle large cases with a promising
computational performance. AcPeg’s methodology of abstraction using Counter-Example-
Guided Abstraction Reﬁnement (CEGAR) [26] techniques has improved the computa-
tional performance by keeping the model as compact as possible.
2.3.1.1 Strategy vs. guessing strategy
A strategy is a sequence of actions by which a coalition A of agents achieves a goal [122]. In
that mode, only the actions that the agent(s) in the coalition know they can perform can
be considered. This covers the scenario when trials to perform an illegal actions may be
recorded in a log ﬁle somewhere which will be audited. The agent(s), in that case, are not
welling to take the risk. A guessing strategy is similar to a strategy, except that it is not
required that the agent knows he can perform each action [122].In this case, the agent(s)
are willing to take a risk that the action will be denied. The RW algorithm will model
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the learning process for the coalition of agents to compute whether there is a strategy or
guessing strategy to achieve goal. An example of a guessing strategies produced by RW is
shown in Figure 2.1.
[ p=1 a=1]
Acting agents : [ 1 ]
Guessing s t r a t e gy : 1
i f ( z (1 ) i s t rue ) by 1 {
s e t z (1 ) to f a l s e by 1 ;
sk ip ;
} e l s e {
sk ip ;
}
Listing 2.1: An example of a guessing strategy found by RW for the XUYZ Example.
2.3.2 Margrave
Margrave [37] is a software suite to analyse role-based access-control policies. Margrave
has two components:
Verification system: given an access control policy written in XACML language and
a given property, Margrave’s veriﬁcation tool will determine whether the policy
satisﬁes the property or not. In case the property is not satisﬁed counter examples
will be yielded.
Change-Impact analysis system: given two policies, the system will list a set of
changes and summarise the diﬀerences between the two policies.
Margrave can process an access control policy if it is written in a restricted subset of
the XACML standard. Considering a unviersity access control policy for assigning and
accessing grades, the policy cen be speciﬁed by Roles, Resources and Actions only. The
desired users of Margrave, the administrators of the grading system, should be able to
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use Margrave to verify their XACML policy against a property like “there do not exist
members of Student who can Assign ExternalGrades”. The tool restricts the policy
to cases that permit assigning external grades, then check to see whether students
are enabled in the restricted policy. Margrave will yield the requests that lead to the
violation (counter-example) as an error report shown in Figure 2.5. In Figure 2.5, Line 13
1 > Pr_1: FAILED Pr_1
2 Counter-example:
3 1:/Resource, resource-class, ExternalGrades/
4 2:/Resource, resource-class, InternalGrades/
5 3:/Action, command, Assign/
6 4:/Action, command, View/
7 5:/Subject, role, Faculty/
8 6:/Action, command, Receive/
9 7:/Subject, role, Student/
10 8:/Subject, role, TA/
11 12345678
12 {
13 10100011
14 }
Figure 2.5: Margrave Error report
represents the set of requests that comprise the counter-example. To explain this output,
lines 3-10 list the subjects, resources and actions mentioned in the policy, while line 11
indexes the counter-example information against this header. The 1s in line 11 indicate
which subjects, resources and actions are present in the counter-example, while the 0s
indicate absence.
To elaborate on that example, the administrator saves a backup of the XACML policy
ﬁle and changes the policy to prevent the incidence. She tests the assigning external
grades property again and it passes. Now, she wants to check what impact that change
has made. Margrave consumes the two policy ﬁles and analyses, without specifying any
property, the diﬀerences between the two policies, which is output as a report shows in
Figure 2.6. Margrave is implemented atop of the CUDD package [107] and represents
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===== Pol_3 vs Pol_4 =====
1:/Subject, role, Faculty/
2:/Subject, role, Student/
3:/Resource, resource-class, ExternalGrades/
4:/Resource, resource-class, InternalGrades/
5:/Action, command, Assign/
6:/Action, command, View/
7:/Action, command, Receive/
8:/Subject, role, TA/
12345678
{
00010101 N->P
00011001 N->P
00100101 N->P
00101001 N->P
01010101 N->P
01011001 N->P
01100101 N->P
01101001 N->P
}
query: #f
Figure 2.6: Margrave Change-Impact report
the XACML policy as MTBDD [51] multi-terminal binary decision diagram. Each rule is
represented by a MTBDD then the MTBDD are combined using the parametrised general
algorithm Apply. Environmental constraints, like no faculty member is also a student are
represented as boolean conditions. Users can write queries and test cases, one per run,
using DrScheme [36], a programming environment for scheme. The Margrave language
does not allow deﬁning new types. This restriction makes the veriﬁcation for properties
like, “students can not write grades” un-representable in its formalism. The soundness
and completeness of Margrave, with Respect to the subset of XACML, is proved [40].
2.3.3 DyNPAL/SNP
DyNPAL [12] is a policy language and analysis method that specify dynamic authorisation
policy. DyNPAL is based on transaction logic [23, 22] which allow DyNPAL to express
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bulk assertion and retraction of authorisation facts to the system state. DyNPAL oﬀers
two analysis methods: a ﬁnite domain method using Fast Forward AI planner [52] and
automated theorem proving method for checking policy invariants.
In DyNPAL, a system state is expressed as a set of positive ground atoms. An atom is
a predicate assigned to the unsorted appropriate arty. Atoms that are not in the state set
are negative as DyNPAL uses negation by failure. Policy rules in DyNPAL are speciﬁed
in two steps:
• what pre-conditions the system state must satisfy to allow the execution of the
action ActionName.
• what the eﬀects of executing that action is. There are two types of eﬀect: a positive
eﬀect in which a set of atoms can be added to the state in the form of +Atom and
a negative eﬀect in which an atom is retracted from the state in the form of −Atom
DyNPAL also can express intermediate conditional eﬀect in the form of {±Atomi: Cj}
which mean add or remove the atoms in the form Atomi such that Cj holds. In the
context of conference management systems we can express the rule that a review can be
read if the user is the user is a PC chair or if she is a PC member who is a reviewer of
that paper and has already submitted her review. This rule is encoded in the following
statements:
canReadReview(p, a, b, u )←−
chair(u)
canReadReview(p, a, b, u )←−
pcmember(u), reviewer(p,u),∃c(submittedReview(p,u,c))
The head canReadReview can then be used in constructing other rules. Note that a and
b are constants that represent agents of the system. We can also express the rule that an
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agent can write a review of a paper if the agent is a PC chair or a PC member who is
assigned to review that paper. We can express this as following:
canSubmitReview(p, a, b, u )←−
chair(u),+submittedReview(p, a, b)
canSubmitReview(p, a, b, u )←−
pcmember(u), reviewer(p,u),+submittedReview(p, a, b)
DyNPAL is a minimalistic language. It lacks the ability to establish the association
between the action and the agent who executed that action and it does not handle the
readability of variables. One the other hand DyNPAL reachability analysis algorithm
considers a single path between two individual states an initial and a ﬁnal state. A
complimentary theorem proving method which check safety invariants based on ﬁrst-order
logic.
SMP [14], DyNPAL precursor, share the aim of DyNPAL but is less expressive as it
does not allow the use of quantiﬁed variables in the body of the rules or conditional bulk
update.
2.4 Setting the Scene (or Gap Analysis)
Most frameworks and systems agree on the importance of roles as the crucial concept to
get an appropriate level of abstraction in deﬁning access control policies. But there are
several open issues, including:
Issues in modelling access control:
• Centralised vs de-centralised. Web-based access control systems (e.g. Facebook or
EasyChair) are centralised, in the sense that everything happens on the server (we
can ignore the fact that the client is remote). But some researchers are interested in
inherently decentralised systems, in which there are many geographically distributed
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decision points and a request can involve several of them. Protocols can be used to
coordinate the access control decision.
• State-based (dynamic) vs stateless. If updates to the regular data maintained by a
system can aﬀect access control decisions, then we can consider it state-based (i.e.,
decision depends on state), or dynamic (i.e., decision changes with state). Facebook
access control is of that type. If there is not a dependency, then it’s stateless. An
operating system’s ﬁle system is of that type.
We can classify these systems as following:
Datalog-based frameworks (stateless / distributed) Datalog is a popular formalism
for writing access control rules DeTreville was the ﬁrst to propose a Datalog based
security language called Binder [32]. Then there was the RT family [71]; and later,
Microsoft’s SecPAL [10]. Researchers are mainly attracted to Datalog [77] as they
can start from a tractable and expressive language with the advantage of deducing
trust relations eﬀectively based on well developed logic programming concepts and
deductive databases. Unfortunately, access control policies deﬁned using Datalog
are stateless, although Cassandra [15], a Datalog-based language, has a separate
mechanism to maintain the authorisation state by inserting and retracting “hasAc-
tivated” facts according to the policy rules.
Decentralised authorisation languages (stateless / distributed) Gurevich et. al. in-
troduced Distributed Knowledge Authorisation Language DKAL [44] and DKAL2
[45] that extend SecPAL’s expressiveness (by allowing functions that can be nested
and mixed). The access control veriﬁcation software suite Margrave [37] addresses
the policy change-impact problem using Model-Checking techniques to compute the
changes between two policy ﬁles written in XACML. Cassandra, Margrave, SecPAL,
DKAL, DKAL2 and other authorisation languages lack the ability to express the
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dynamic aspect of access control where policies depend on and update the system
state like those we have in real-life web-based collaborative systems like EasyChair,
Facebook and LinkedIn. They, also, cannot express the eﬀect of actions as part of
the language and it has to be hard-coded in an ad-hoc way.
Dynamic authorisation languages (dynamic / towards distributed) More recently,
SMP [14] and its successor DyNPAL [12] aim to specify dynamic policies with the
ability to specify the eﬀect of executing these actions. DyNPAL allows conditional
bulk insertion and retraction of authorisation facts with transactional execution se-
mantics (either all or none are committed). However, DyNPAL’s declarative nature
and minimalistic approach make it hard to follow the control ﬂow of the actions.
Also the lack of parameter typing in DyNPAL does not allow us to establish the re-
lation between the agent who can execute an action and the action itself. SMP and
DyNPAL also tend to focus on answering the question “under what conditions can
an action be executed?” rather than “under what conditions can an agent execute
an action?” which is indeed necessary to enable us to deﬁne agent coalitions and
establish which agent is executing an action. It allows us to detect attacks where
we are interested in who can execute a set of actions rather than whether a set of
actions can be executed regardless of the actors involved.
RW-based systems (dynamic; centralised)
RW framework [120] can analyse the consequences of multi-agent multi-step actions
by performing temporal reasoning. RW is a model checking based framework.
However, RW does not allow us to express actions with multiple assignments needed
to preserve the integrity constraints of the modelled system.
X-Policy extends the the modelling language and algorithm of RW to express and
verify dynamic access control policies with compound actions with multiple assignments.
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2.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter provides a structured review of access control theories and techniques. Access
control models, logics and calculus for access control, decentralised trust management
languages, dynamic policy analysis and veriﬁcation frameworks are discussed. In the
following Chapter we introduce X-Policy language.
37
38
CHAPTER 3
X -Policy : Modelling Language
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a knowledge-based model checking veriﬁcation
framework to model and verify dynamic access control policies for real-life web-based
collaborative systems automatically. To fulﬁl this purpose we specify in this chapter the
X-Policy modelling language.
This chapter is structured as follows: ﬁrstly we introduce the X-Policy modelling
language. In Section 3.1, we begin by discussing the scope and design decision for X-
Policy modelling language. We overview the X-Policy modelling language is Section 3.2.
We then provide the syntax and the informal semantics of the modelling language of
X-Policy. Finally, we summarise this chapter.
3.1 Scope, Design Decisions and Discussion
The X-Policy modelling language uses propositional variables to represent data, relations
between data and permissions in an access control system. Rules in the access control
policy adopted by the system are expressed by logical formulas built from the deﬁned
variables.
We specify system operations as X-Policy write actions or read permissions. Write
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actions changes the state of the system. A write action in X-Policy can not read and
change the state of the system at the same time. Although this is formally a restriction,
most actions in collaborative web-based systems are indeed either a read or write and
rarely both. This is true for EasyChair in particular. We believe that this is a sensible
heuristic for modelling web-based systems. Users are only enabled to perform only one
operation per time. A read permission statement allows the user to know the value of a
ground proposition by returning the value of that proposition to the user who executed
the program.
Flexibility and simplicity. X-Policy is a simplistic language. It has the minimum num-
ber of constructs while at the same time it is ﬂexible enough to allows us to express
the behaviour of large and complex systems. Indeed, X-Policy has no predeﬁned
predicates or action names. This allows the users the freedom to model generic
systems.
Fine-grained conditional rules. X-Policy allows us to express access conditions as
propositional logic formulae using agent’s roles, system states and system conﬁgura-
tions. We choose to express the access control policy as a set of allowance conditions.
We also group the set of conditions an agent need satisfy to execute an action or
read a variable in a single statement to avoid redundancy and to help us express
the policy in terms of the system capabilities.
State-fullness and compound actions. In modelling access control policy, X-Policy
allow us to express permissions using the system state variables but at the same
time it allow us to express compound actions. These two properties allow X-Policy
to express two kinds of situations: permission about permissions and correcting
integrity constraints violations.
• Integrity constraints play a crucial role in expressing access control polices.
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Neglecting integrity constraints, as RW does, aﬀects its ability to capture the
real behaviour of the model system and may lead in some cases to produce
spurious strategies for the investigated properties. For example, when deleting
a reviewing assignment, all sub-reviewing requests should be deleted. However,
if that did not happen then a spurious strategy where a sub-reviewer is still
assigned to that paper can be produced. In addition, integrity constraints
increase the language expressiveness to capture essential concepts like: mutual
exclusivity, inheritance, and atomic actions.
• Permissions about permissions is an important aspect of dynamic access
control systems. When an agent executes an action, he may change the other
agent’s permissions. In the example of conference management system, a chair
can execute an action to assign another agent Alice to the role PC-member.
Consequently, Alice has gained access to the system as a PC member.
Readability and information flow Web-based collaborative systems generally provide
information to users using their web interface. For example, a GP doctor should be
able to ﬁnd out the height and weight of her patient. X-Policy allow us to model
the read permissions and the process of learning that the user can go through to
enquire about the system state.
In the following sections, we will illustrate the various aspects of the X-Policy language
with examples when appropriate. In this chapter we provide the language syntax and how
a model is constructed from the system using informal semantics and examples which allow
us to use this Chapter as a tutorial for the X-Policy language. However, we deﬁne formally
when the query is satisﬁed in Chapter 4 in the form of the model checking algorithm and
how we construct the knowledge states as in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
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3.2 X-Policy language specification
An X-Policy model consists of three parts: Access Control System, Access Control Model
and Security Property.
Access Control System. In this part, we deﬁne three components:
System types. These are the types of the subjects and objects in the modelled
system. In the example of conference system they can be Papers and Agents.
System predicates. These predicates could represent the role relationships, as-
sociation between subjects and agents or system decisions. These predicates
will be used to form ground propositions1.
Read permission statements. Each statement speciﬁes the conditions an agent
has to satisfy to read each of the ground propositions. A read action allows
the agent to know the value of a ground proposition by returning the value of
that proposition to the user who executed the program.
Write action execution rules. These rules are used to specify the set of variable
assignments for each action. These assignments detail the changes each action
makes to the system state. We also specify the set of conditions an agent has
to satisfy to execute each action. A write action allows the agent to change the
value of a set of ground propositions using assignment statements. An action
permission statement deﬁnes the conditions for an agent to execute an action.
These conditions are deﬁned as propositional logic formulae using the ground
propositions and logical connectors.
Access Control Model Once the access control system is deﬁned, we use it as a tem-
plate to build a concrete model to perform the model checking analysis. This is
1We will explain this process of forming the ground propositions in the following sections.
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done by specifying the model size which is deﬁned by the number of individuals of
each type.
Security Property We deﬁne security properties as a reachability query where we spec-
ify the initial state, goal state and the coalition agents. The tool will ﬁnd out whether
or not there is a strategy the coalition can derive to take the system from the initial
state to the goal state.
3.2.1 Access Control System
An access control system S is deﬁned as two sets of rules: read permission rules and
action execution rules.
Let T be a set of types, which includes a special type Agent for agents, also let Pred be
a ﬁnite set of predicates. Each n-ary predicate has a signature t1 × · · · × tn → {⊤,⊥},
where ti ∈ T . For example, in the case of a conference review system, T can include Paper
which we can deﬁne using type deﬁnition statement of the form:
Type Paper;
and Pred can include the predicate
Author : Agent × Paper → {⊤,⊥}.
Note that each system will require a diﬀerent list of predicates. We assume a set of
variables V , each with a type. If p ∈ Pred and −→x = x1, . . . , xq is a sequence of variables
of the appropriate type, then p(−→x ) is an atomic formula.
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3.2.1.1 Read Permission rules
These deﬁnitions allow us to deﬁne whether or not a user has permission to access the
truth value of an atomic formula and is of the form
p(−→y ) { read: formula; }
where p ∈ Pred and the variables in −→y occur in −→x . formula deﬁnes the conditions
for an agent user∈ Agent to read a system variable p(−→y ). formula is a logical formula
which is deﬁned using atomic formulae and logical connectors: ¬/˜ (negation), ∧/and
(conjunction), ∨/or (disjunction),→ (implication), ∃/E and ∀/A (existential and universal
quantiﬁcation over variables of the appropriate type). The variables that occur in formula
are required to be either in −→x or user. The formula deﬁnes the conditions for agents to
read these variables as functions on its state.
3.2.1.2 Action execution rules
An action execution rule allows the user to change the truth values of an atomic formula
and is of the form
Action Actionname(−→x ) :- {writebody } {formula}
where writebody is an expression formed from the following Backus−Naur Form (BNF):
writebody ::= assignment | for (v : t) { writebody }
| writebody writebody
where v is a variable of the type t and an assignment is of the form p(−→y ) := ⊤; or
p(−→y ) := ⊥;. We allow an atomic formula p(−→y ) to occur at most once at the left of
”:=” in an action to avoid ambiguity in computing the action eﬀect. The assignment
statements within the same action can be written in any order. All free variables in an
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assignment must be declared either in a surrounding for-statement or in Actionname
statement. Intuitively, a for-statement in an action is a ‘macro’ that is interpreted as
multiple assignment statements. formula deﬁnes the conditions for an agent user∈ Agent
to execute an action act ∈ Actions where Actions is a ﬁnite set of all the actions in the
deﬁned system. The formula deﬁnes the conditions for agents to execute these actions as
functions on its state.
3.2.2 Example: Expressing Dynamic Access Control Idioms
This Section expresses a number of access control idioms in X-Policy. The actions, vari-
ables and rules listed here are based on the EC model which Chapter 5 discusses in great
detail. We deﬁne for a,b of type Agent, p of type Paper, P which includes:
Author(p,a) Agent a is an author of paper p.
Chair(a) Agent a is the chair of the PC.
PCmember(a) Agent a is a PC member.
Reviewer(p,a) Paper p is assigned to PC member a for reviewing.
View-sub-by-chair-
permitted()
PC chairs can view the list of submissions.
View-sub-by-PCM-
permitted()
PC members can view the list of submissions.
A read permission rule then can be expressed in the Listing 3.1 which expresses the
permission rule for reading whether or not an agent a is a reviewer of a paper p which
allows only an agent user who is a PCmember and is not the author of the paper p.
Note that the agent user is a special agent that represents the user requesting access.
An action execution rule also can be deﬁned as in Listing 3.2, to assign an agent a
the role of PCmember. Only an agent who satisﬁes the predicate Chair can execute such
action. The Listing 3.3 expresses the action rule that only an agent who is acting as a
chair can allow who can access the submissions: chairs only, PCmembers and chairs or
no one. Using compound atomic actions, we can express a number of dynamic access
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Reviewer (p, a)
{
read : PCmember (user)&˜ Author (p, user);
}
Listing 3.1: An example of an read permission rule.
Action AddPCmember (a:Agent )
{
PCmember (a) := true;
}
{
Chair (user);
}
Listing 3.2: An example action rule AddPCmember to assign an agent a the role of
PCmember.
control idioms.
• Mutual exclusion of roles: for example we can express mutual exclusion between
two roles. “A chair of a conference can not be a PCmember” is an example of
such relation. We can specify this constraint in X-Policy in the form of the action
rules detailed in Listings 3.4. Any PC chair can appoint or delete PC chairs. A
PC chair can be demoted to become a PC member or the other way around. The
chair cannot delete herself. This restriction is introduced to prevent the Chair from
locking herself out of the system. Another example of such relation in the context
of course modules can be “A student can not be a lecturer for the same module”.
Special care should be taken in specifying the initial state of the model so it starts
from a state that satisﬁes the integrity constraints where no agent is PC chair and
PC member at the same time. In addition it is important to take extra care when
specifying the policy rules that other actions do not violate the role mutual exclusion
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Action viewSubmissions2Chair ()
{
View -sub -by -chair - permitted () :=T;
View -sub -by -PCM - permitted ():=F;
}
{
Chair (user);
}
Action viewSubmissions2All ()
{
View -sub -by -chair - permitted () :=T;
View -sub -by -PCM - permitted ():=T;
}
{
Chair (user);
}
Action viewSubmissions2None ()
{
View -sub -by -chair - permitted () :=F;
View -sub -by -PCM - permitted ():=F;
}
{
Chair (user);
}
Listing 3.3: Actions allowing the chair to control access to the submissions.
during the interaction of rules.
• Role inheritance and hierarchy constraints: for example “Once a PC member/Chair
is deleted her assignments will be deleted.” is expressed as the compound action
DeletePCmember in Listing 3.5. When a user a is deleted, the variables PCmember(a)
and Chair(a) will be changed to false. This also will change the value of all the
variables Reviewer(p,a) to false for all the papers.
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Action PromotePCmemberToPCchair (a)
{
PCmember (a) :=F ;
Chair (a):=T;
}
{
Chair (user) and PCmember (a) and user !=a;
}
Action DemotePCchairToPCmember (a)
{
PCmember (a) :=T ;
Chair (a):=F;
}
{
Chair (user) and Chair (a) and user !=a;
}
Listing 3.4: Actions that implement the mutual exclusion of roles: Chair and
PCmemeber.
Action DeletePCmember (a)
{
PCmember (a) :=F;
Chair (a):=F ;
for (paper p:Paper )
Reviewer (p,a)=F;
}
{
Chair (user) and PCmember (a) and user !=a;
}
Listing 3.5: The compound action DeletePCmember ensures that all reviewing
assignment of an agents are deleted once she is no longer a Chair or a PCmember.
3.2.3 Access Control Model
A system S described in the description part, as in section 3.2.1, is only a template.
To perform model-checking, a concrete instance based on the template needs to be con-
structed. This task is done through a run-statement. The syntax of the run-statement
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is:
RunStatement ::= run for NumberTypePair (“,” NumberTypePair ) *
NumberTypePair ::= d TypeName
where d is an integer. When a run-statement is executed, the tool creates a model M
which assigns each deﬁned type t to a ﬁxed number of elements σt as speciﬁed in the
run-statement. We deﬁne σ = σt1 ∪ · · · ∪ σtn as the set of all the individuals deﬁned
by M . We assume σt1 ∩ σt2 = ∅ whenever t1 and t2 are distinct. These elements are
then used to instantiate the relations deﬁned by the parametrised predicates and actions.
Once these two steps are ﬁnished, a concrete model with ﬁxed size is established, on
which model-checking is performed. If p ∈ Pred, act ∈ Actions, and −→α is a sequence of
individuals of the appropriate type then p(−→α ) is a ground atomic formula and act(−→α ) is
an instantiated action. The ﬁnite set of ground atomic formulae is P . Actions∗ is the
ﬁnite set of instantiated actions. Models of other sizes are not considered by the checking.
Although large models may contain errors that small models cannot display, small models
are still extremely useful for ﬁnding errors as in Alloy [54] and RW [121].
3.2.3.1 For-loops
We describe the semantics of for-loops in the context of a modelM , with σt = {v1, . . . , vk}
the set of all individuals in M of the type t which the run statement deﬁnes.
Let act ∈ Actions. We then transform each for-statement to its equivalent multiple
assignment statements. For example the following for-statement:
for (v : t) {p(−→γ1 , v,
−→γ2) := ⊥; }
is in the write action act(−→x ) where −→γ1 and
−→γ2 are subsequences of other parameters. This
for-statement is transformed to:
p(−→γ1 , v1,
−→γ2) := ⊥; . . . p(
−→γ1 , vk,
−→γ2) := ⊥;
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We apply this process repeatedly until we have no for-statement in our action. The
same process will applied to all actions.
3.2.3.2 Effect of Actions
Let act be a loop-free action in Actions and −→α a sequence of individuals of the appro-
priate type for act. We deﬁne the result of running the instantiated action act(−→α ). We
apply the functions: eﬀect+() and eﬀect−() which compute the positive and the negative
eﬀect of the instantiated loop-free action act(−→α ) as following:
eﬀect+(act(−→α )) = {p(
−→
β ) | p(
−→
β ):=⊤ occurs in act(−→α )}
eﬀect−(act(−→α )) = {p(
−→
β ) | p(
−→
β ):=⊥ occurs in act(−→α )}
where all the values of
−→
β are members of σ. eﬀect+(act(−→α )) and eﬀect−(act(−→α )) re-
turn two mutually exclusive sets for all act(−→α ) ∈ Actions∗ For example in a conference
management system model, one may want to use add elements to the model using the
following run statement.
run for 3 Paper, 4 Agent
The algorithm will assign three elements to the set Paper and four elements to the set
Agent when the statement gets executed. As a result, the set Paper becomes {p1, p2, p3},
and the set Agent becomes {a1, a2, a3, a4}. Then, all the deﬁned predicates are instan-
tiated. For example, the predicate Author(paper : Paper, agent : Agent) is instan-
tiated to twelve ground atomic formalas: from Author(p1, a1) to Author(p3, a4). Fi-
nally, all the deﬁned actions are instantiated the same way. For example, the action
DeletePCmember(agent : Agent) is instantiated to the four actions:
DeletePCmember(a1), DeletePCmember(a2), DeletePCmember(a3), DeletePCmember(a4)
Subsequently, eﬀect−(DeletePCmember(a1)) is the set:
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{PCmember(a1), Chair(a1), Reviewer(p1, a1), Reviewer(p2, a1), Reviewer(p3, a1) }
while eﬀect+(DeletePCmember(a1)) =∅.
3.2.4 Query
Following the run-statement, a query can be speciﬁed based on [121]. A query, taking the
form of
check { L || I → C1 : (G1 THEN C2 : (G2 . . . THEN Cn : (Gn) . . .))}
where L, deﬁnes a number of quantiﬁed variables used in I, Gi and Ci; I (optional) is a
list of conditions based on which the goal, deﬁned by Gi, is to be achieved; and Ci deﬁnes
a coalition of agents who work together, intending to achieve the goal. Its meaning is:
Are there strategies available for agents in C1, C2, . . ., and Cn, such that, if conditions
in I are true, the agents in C1 can achieve a state in which the goal G1 is satisﬁed, and
then (in that state) the agents in C2 can achieve the goal G2, . . ., and ﬁnally the agents
in Cn can achieve the goal Gn? What this nested goal describes is a sequencing of actions
performed by the agents in C1, C2, . . ., and Cn. The check statement goes through an
instantiation process where the quantiﬁed variable deﬁned in L and used in I, Gi and Ci
are replaced with the appropriate individuals from σ to conform with model similar to
the way we handle actions and atomic formulae in the previous example.
The syntax of L can be further speciﬁed as following:
V ::= v (,v)∗:t
L ::= (A | E ) [dist] V (,V)∗
where v is a variable name and t is a type. Remember that t must have been deﬁned
in the system before hand using type deﬁnition statment. For example we can deﬁne an
agent a of the type Agent. The keyword dist speciﬁes the way the query can be computed
and how to populate the query. When dist is used the algorithm will make sure that
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it excludes the rounds where diﬀerent variables deﬁned on the same type play the same
element. We discuss this in detail with an explanation of the computational rounds in
detail is Sction 6.5. V deﬁnes a number of agents of the type t. G can be:
a reading goal which takes the form of C :[p(−→y )] which means an agent or more in the
coalition C know that they can read the variable p(−→y ) where p(−→y )∈ P .
amaking goal which takes the form {p(−→y )}which means an agent or more in the coalition
C can reach a state where they know that they can write p(−→y ) to true where
p(−→y )∈ P .. making goal is distinguished by the brackets {}.
Ci is the set of agents involved in the coalition while I specify the intial state. I is a logical
formula constructed from the variables in P followed by either ‘!’ which means that these
variables in I are known to the agents in Ci. On the other hand variables followed by ‘*!’
mean that the coalition know the value of that variable but must not change that value
during the strategy. Note that variables used in Ci and
−→y have to be declared in L. We
revisit this notation when we discuss the representation of the initial knowledge state in
the next Chapter, Section 4.2.
Example: The following one level nested query
check {E dist a , b , c : Agent , p : Paper | |
Chair ( c ) ∗ ! & ˜Author (p , a ) ∗ ! and
Submitted−rev iew (p , b , c ) ∗ ! and
˜Submitted−rev iew (p , a , b ) ! and
PCmember( a ) ∗ ! and
˜Reviewer (p , a ) ! and
˜Subreviewer (p , b , a ) ∗ ! and
˜Subreviewer (p , c , a ) ∗ ! and
˜Subreviewer (p , a , a ) ∗ !
−> {a } : ( [ Review (p , b , c ) ] THEN {a , c } : ({ Submittedreview (p , a , b ) }) ) }
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represents the property that a reviewer a should not read the review of another reviewer
before she submits her own review for that paper. The variables followed by ‘!’ mean
that these variables in I are known to the agents in Ci, in this case agents a and c.
On the other hand variables followed by ‘*!’ mean that the coalition know the value of
that variable but must not change that value during the strategy. Similarly, we say that
G1=[Review(p,b,c)] is a reading goal which means agent a knows that she can read the
variable Review(p,b,c) while G2={Submittedreview(p,b,c)} means that agent a and
c can reach a state where they know that they can write Submittedreview(p,a,b) to
true as it is a making goal which we distinguish by the brackets {}.
More query examples are provided in Chapters 6 and 5.
3.2.5 Strategy
A strategy is a sequence of read or write actions where in each step, there is an agent in
σC who can execute an action.
Strategy::= null | a:act(−→α ); | Strategy Strategy
| if(p(−→α )){Strategy} else {Strategy}
where a ∈ σC, p ∈ Pred and act ∈ Actions and α is a sequence of individuals where
its members are in σ. Note that only one agent can act at a time as the agents perform
actions asynchronously which is a realistic assumption in computer systems.
3.3 Discussion and Summary
In this chapter we have introduced the syntax of X-Policy modelling language, its syn-
tax and informal semantics. We also provided examples and discussed the language
expressiveness by expressing dynamic access control policies idioms in X-Policy. We also
introduced the X-Policy query language and provided some examples.
In Section 3.2.2 a number of access control idioms are expressed in X-Policy like
mutual exclusivity, inheritance and atomic actions. However, X-Policy does not express
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other constrains (e.g. role cardinality constraints). For example, we can not deﬁne rules
where we say for example that each paper should have at least three reviews. In addition
X-Policy does not allow conditional bulk insertion where can specify dynamic conditions
for example delete all papers where the author is a PCmember. This requires the ability to
specify conditions over the for-loop. In the case where no read permissions for a variable
is explicitly speciﬁed in X-Policy, X-Policy will treat it as a prohibited variable where
no agent is allowed to read it. In the case of inconsistency, for example a variable read
permission is deﬁned twice, the algorithm will through an error as it only allow each
action execution rule and each variables read permission rule to be speciﬁed once.
In the next chapter we will discuss the model checking algorithm and how we analyse
X-Policy queries. In Chapter 5 we model and analyse a number of web-based conference
management systems.
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CHAPTER 4
X -Policy Model Checking
Chapter 3 introduced the X-Policy modelling language. X-Policy allows us to specify
a query Q, such as the one deﬁned in 3.2.4. The task of the X-Policy model-checking
algorithm is to ﬁgure out whether or not the strategies queried by Q exist, and if they
exist, output at least one of them. The algorithm performs a backward reachability search
to ﬁnd a strategy that can allow the coalition agents deﬁned in the query to go from the
initial state to the goal state. The algorithm uses agent’s knowledge about the system
state to analyse the system policy and make decisions to achieve the goal.
In this Chapter, the knowledge transition system is described in Section 4.1. In Sec-
tion 4.2 the agent’s knowledg representation of the initial state is illustrated while the
knowledge representation of the goal state is discussed in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 de-
scribes the backwards reachability computation where the process of computing the set
of states, generating strategies and the pseudo-code for the algorithm is detailed. In Sec-
tions sec:rwproof and 4.6 we argue about the algorithm correctness and the computational
complexity of the algorithm. A summary of the Chapter is included in Section 4.7.
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4.1 The transition system
The algorithm is built around the knowledge of the state of the system S that the con-
sidered coalition C has at each step of implementing its strategy. This is achieved by
extending the idea of [121] to handle complex executable actions instead of simple assign-
ments.
Obviously there is a set of knowledge states each of which is suﬃcient for C to regard
its goal as achieved. This is so when C knows that the formulae in some appropriate
combination of the involved making goals are true, or that enough is known to work out
the truth values of the formulae in the reading goals. We denote the set of the knowledge
states from which C can deduce that its goal is achieved by KG. Each step of a strategy
takes C from a knowledge state to a possibly richer one until a state in KG is reached. A
knowledge state combines knowledge of the initial state of the system, that is, the state
of the system at the beginning of executing a strategy, and knowledge of its current state.
Executing actions contribute the knowledge of the current values of the assigned variables,
which has been just given to them. This means that learning and changing the system
are done simultaneously. Reading steps or as we also call it sampling steps contribute
C’s knowledge on both the current and the previous value of the sampled variable before
the sampling. Overwriting a variable without knowing its value (i. e. reading it values
in advance) destroys the prospect to learn the original values of the variables before the
overwriting. Strategies are supposed to take C from its initial knowledge state kinit to
one in KG from which its goal is deemed as achieved.
To describe C’s knowledge on p(−→α ), we use four knowledge variables. For each p(−→α ) ∈
P , where P is the set of ﬁnite set of atomic formulae as deﬁned in Section 3.2.3, we then
56
have
v0p(−→α ) is true if C knows the original value of p(
−→α )
t0p(−→α ) is true if C knows the original p(
−→α ) is true
vp(−→α ) is true if C knows the current value of p(
−→α )
tp(−→α ) is true if C knows currently p(
−→α ) is true
When overwriting p(−→α ) to true, vp(−→α ) and tp(−→α ) both become true, but v0p(−→α ) and t0p(−→α ) do
not change, because overwriting does not contribute C’s knowledge on p(−→α )’s previous
value. When overwriting p(−→α ) to false, vp(−→α ) becomes true; tp(−→α ) becomes false; both
v0p(−→α ) and t0p(−→α ) do not change. When sampling p(
−→α ), v0p(−→α ) and vp(−→α ) both become
true and t0p(−→α ) and tp(−→α ) both become false if p(
−→α ) turns out to be false, or t0p(−→α ) and
tp(−→α ) both become true if p(
−→α ) turns out to be true.
The reason that the values of both t0p(−→α ) and tp(−→α ) are changed when reading the
current value to indicate that no change has occurred on that value which distinguish it
from the overwriting scenario. This is possible because we assume that the agents have an
exclusive access to the system during our analysis so the value of these variables does not
change unless one of the agents overwrites that variable. Since the contents of t0p(−→α ) and
tp(−→α ) are irrelevant when p(
−→α ) is unknown, and the initial value of a variable is known
only if the current value is known too, there are indeed only 7, and not 24 knowledge
states about each variable p. However it is easier to explain our algorithm in terms of
v0p(−→α ), t0p(−→α ), vp(−→α ) and tp(−→α ) as independent variables. The reason that the values of
both t0p(−→α ) and tp(−→α ) are changed when reading the current value to indicate that no
change has occurred on that value which distinguish it from the overwriting scenario.
This is possible because we assume that the agents have an exclusive access to the system
during our analysis so the value of these variables does not change unless one of the agents
overwrites that variable. Since the contents of t0p(−→α ) and tp(−→α ) are irrelevant when p(
−→α )
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is unknown, and the original value of a variable is known only if the current value is
known too, there are indeed only 7, and not 24 knowledge states about each variable p.
However it is easier to explain our algorithm in terms of v0p(−→α ), t0p(−→α ), vp(−→α ) and tp(−→α ) as
independent variables.
A knowledge state is given by the quadruple (V0, T0, V, T ), where V0 = {p(
−→α ) ∈
P | v0p(−→α ) is ⊤}, T0 = {p(
−→α ) ∈ P | t0p(−→α ) is ⊤}, V = {p(
−→α ) ∈ P | vp(−→α ) is ⊤}, and
T = {p(−→α ) ∈ P | tp(−→α ) is ⊤}.
4.2 Representation of kinit
kinit is the state where C knows nothing about the state of S, except on the values of
the variables marked by ‘!’ in the conditions deﬁned by I in the Query using the syntax
deﬁned in Section 3.2.4. This means that for all members of P which also occur in I and
are marked by ‘!’, C knows their values. However, for all the other members of P , C does
not know their values initially. Now for each variable p(−→α ) ∈ P , we have four knowledge
variables v0p(−→α ), t0p(−→α ), vp(−→α ) and tp(−→α ) to describe C’s original and current knowledge
about it. We use a boolean expression composed of the knowledge variables to represent
kinit. This boolean expression is then represented by a BDD in the course of the X-Policy
model-checking.
We divide members of P into three mutually-exclusive subsets. P+ is the set for
members of P which only occur positively in I and are marked by ‘!’ and by ‘*!’. P−
is the set for members of P which only occur negatively in I and are marked by ‘!’ and
by ‘*!’. P o is the set for all the other members of P . Now for each p(−→α ) ∈ P+, we use
(v0p(−→α ) ∧ t0p(−→α ) ∧ vp(−→α ) ∧ tp(−→α )) to represent C’s initial knowledge about p(
−→α ). In the
case that p(−→α ) ∈ P−, we use (v0p(−→α ) ∧ ¬t0p(−→α ) ∧ vp(−→α ) ∧ ¬tp(−→α )) to represent C’s initial
knowledge about it; and ﬁnally, if p ∈ P o, we use (¬v0p(−→α )∧¬vp(−→α )) to represent C’s initial
knowledge about it given that the value of tp(−→α )) and t0p(−→α ) are irrelevant when vp(−→α ) and
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v0p(−→α ) are false. Therefore, the representation of kinit by the knowledge variables is the
conjunction of all the representations of the above forms for members of P .
4.3 Representation of KG
Given a formula G describing the goal we want to produce the knowledge representation
of the goal states. G is a conjunction and disjunction combination of reading goals [l] and
making goals {l}, where l in each case is a boolean combination of members of P .
We want to represent G as a set of knowledge states, being those in which the goal
is known to be true. A set of knowledge states can be represented by a formula over the
propositions {v0p(−→α ), t0p(−→α ), vp(−→α ), tp(−→α ) | p(
−→α ) ∈ P}. Note that v0p(−→α ) is true in a state if
p ∈ V0, t0p(−→α ) is true if p(
−→α ) ∈ T0, and similarly for vp(
−→α ) and tp(−→α ).
Suppose an agent’s knowledge of the state of the system is represented by V, T . Then
a formula over {v0p(−→α ), t0p(−→α ), vp(−→α ), tp(−→α ) | p(
−→α ) ∈ P} expressing the agents ability to
determine that l is true may be constructed as follows:
• if vp(−→α ) is true, then substitute tp(−→α ) for p(
−→α ) in l. This covers the case that the
agent knows the value of p(−→α ).
• if vp(−→α ) is false, then replace l with a version in which ⊤ is substituted for p(
−→α )
and another in which ⊥ is substituted for p(−→α ). This covers the case that the agent
does not know p(−→α ).
Thus, the formula expressing the agent’s ability to determine that l is true is
(l[tp(−→α )/p(
−→α )] ∧ vp(−→α )) ∨ (l[⊤/p(
−→α )] ∧ l[⊥/p(−→α )] ∧ ¬vp(−→α ))
In the following deﬁnition, we generalise this formula to consider the eﬀect of all the
p(−→α ) ∈ P .
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Definition 4.3.1 Let V, T be the knowledge held by an agent, and l a formula over the
propositions P . The propositions vp(−→α ) and tp(−→α ) signify p(
−→α ) ∈ V and p(−→α ) ∈ T ,
respectively. The γV,T l is represented in the formula:
( ∧
S⊆P
l[(vp(−→α ) → p(
−→α ))/p(−→α ) | p(−→α ) ∈ S]
[(vp(−→α ) ∧ p(
−→α ))/p(−→α ) | p(−→α ) ∈ P \ S]
)
[tp(−→α )/p(
−→α ) | p(−→α ) ∈ P ]
γV,T l expresses the agent’s ability to determine that l is true. S is the set of all possible
subsets of P . Where
∧
S⊆P
is a loop over all the possible values of S ⊆ P . The S ⊆ P
produces all the possible combinations of ⊤ and ⊥ to substitute p(−→α )s such that vp(−→α ) is
false. Note that vp(−→α ) → p(
−→α ) is ⊤ when vp(−→α ) is false, and p(
−→α ) otherwise; similarly,
vp(−→α ) ∧ p(
−→α ) is ⊥ if vp(−→α ) is false and p(
−→α ) otherwise. Hence, S just enumerates all
the vectors of ⊤s and ⊥s for the p(−→α )s and vp(−→α ) → p(
−→α ) and vp(−→α ) ∧ p(
−→α ) are used to
restrict the effect of the substitution only to p(−→α )s such that vp(−→α ) is false.
Example 4.3.1 Let P = {p, q}, l = q ∧ ¬p and S ⊆ P and assuming that we have only
one coalition of one agent, then P \ S ∈ {{p, q}, {p}, {q}, {}}. The γV,T l in this case can
be produced first by computing the terms of the formula over possible values of S:
l[(vp(−→α ) → p(
−→α ))/p(−→α ) | p(−→α ) ∈ S][(vp(−→α ) ∧ p(
−→α ))/p(−→α ) | p(−→α ) ∈ P \ S]
as following:
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P = {p, q} S = {} (vq ∧ q ∧ ¬(vp ∧ p))
P = {q} S = {p} (vq ∧ q ∧ ¬(vp → p))
P = {p} S = {q} (vq → q ∧ ¬(vp ∧ p))
P = {} S = {p, q} (vq → q ∧ ¬(vp → p))
Now we apply the
∧
S⊆P
operation which will produce the following formula after the first
level of substitution:
(
vq ∧ q ∧ ¬(vp ∧ p) ∧ vq → q ∧ ¬(vp ∧ p) ∧ vq ∧ q ∧ ¬(vp → p) ∧ vq → q ∧ ¬(vp → p)
)
[tp(−→α )/p(
−→α ) | p(−→α ) ∈ P ]
We apply the substitution of p(−→α ) with tp(−→α ) for all p(
−→α ) ∈ P which produces:
(
vq ∧ tq ∧ ¬(vp ∧ tp) ∧ vq → tq ∧ ¬(vp ∧ tp) ∧ vq ∧ tq ∧ ¬(vp → tp) ∧ vq → tq ∧ ¬(vp → tp)
)
This can be then simplified to using Boolean identity:
vq ∧ tq ∧ ¬(vp ∧ tp) ∧ vq → tq ∧ ¬(vp → tp) ∧ ¬(vp → tp)
and finally it can be written as:
vq ∧ tq ∧ vp ∧ ¬tp
Where this formula evaluates whether the agent knows if l is true.
4.3.1 Substitution of reading goals
The knowledge states in which the reading goal [l] is known to be achieved are those in
which the knowledge held is suﬃcient to evaluate l in V0, T0. In order to do that, the agent
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needs to be able to determine that l is true, or that it is false. Thus, the appropriate
formula over {v0p(−→α ), t0p(−→α ), vp(−→α ), tp(−→α ) | p(
−→α ) ∈ P} is γV0,T0l ∨ γV0,T0(¬l).
Example 4.3.2 Similar to Example 4.3.1, if P = {p, q}, l = q ∧ ¬p and S ⊆ P and
assuming that we have only one coalition of one agent, then P \S ∈ {{p, q}, {p}, {q}, {}}.
The γV0,T0l ∨ γV0,T0(¬l) in this case will produce the following formula:
(v0q ∧ ¬t0q) ∨ (v0p ∧ t0p) ∨ (v0q ∧ t0p ∧ v0p)
which covers all the possible knowledge states in which the agents can evaluate the value
of the goal [l]:
• The agent knows that the value of the variable q is ⊥ and therefore she can deduce
that the value of [l] which is ⊥.
• The agent knows that the value of the variable p is ⊥ and therefore she can deduce
that the value of [l] which is ⊥.
• The agent knows that the value of the variable q is ⊤ and value of the variable p
and whether it is ⊤/⊥ and therefore she can deduce that the value of [l] which is
⊤/⊥ respectively.
4.3.2 Substitution of making goals
The knowledge states in which the making goal {l} is known to be achieved are those
in which the knowledge held is suﬃcient to evaluate that l is true in V, T . Thus, the
appropriate formula over {v0p(−→α ), t0p(−→α ), vp(−→α ), tp(−→α ) | p(
−→α ) ∈ P} is γV,T l.
Example 4.3.3 From Example 4.3.1 The γV,T l in this case is written as:
vq ∧ tq ∧ vp ∧ ¬tp
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which represents the knowledge state in which the agent has reached a state where the
value of the system variables satisfy the goal l.
The formula γV,T l is ﬁrst deﬁned by [42] and since has been used by RW [121], a
precursor of X-Policy. X-Policy uses the same deﬁnition. In this thesis we contribute an
illustration of that deﬁnition in the Examples 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.
4.4 Backwards reachability computation
4.4.1 Computing sets of states
This is a crucial step that shows how we deal with compound actions in our reachabil-
ity analysis. To ﬁnd strategies the algorithm starts from KG, searching for sets of the
knowledge states which transition into KG by reading a variable p(
−→α ) ∈ P ; sets of the
knowledge states which transition intoKG by executing a write action act(
−→α ) ∈ Actions∗;
Then for each newly found set, the algorithm continues to ﬁnd other sets of the knowl-
edge states which transition into the new set through either of the two kinds of transition
relations. During this process, if kinit is found in a set of knowledge states, the goal is
considered as reachable by following the operations represented by the transition relations
which connect the set in which kinit is found to KG. The operations along the path are
deemed as the steps of a strategy by the algorithm.
We also use γV,TX(act(
−→α ), a) = ⊤ and γV,Tr(p(
−→α ), a) = ⊤ to denote the conditions
under which a knows with Knowledge V , T that she is permitted to execute act(−→α ) and
read p(−→α ) respectively. The mapping X(act(−→α ), a) and r(p(−→α ), a) are boolean expres-
sions composed of members of P as deﬁned in the system policy. X(act(−→α ), a) deﬁnes
the condition under which a is permitted to execute act(−→α ). r(p(−→α ), a) deﬁnes the con-
dition under which a is permitted to read p(−→α ). For instance, to represent a’s current
knowledge on X(act(−→α ), a), we need to use the knowledge variables in V and T to replace
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every occurrence of variables in X(act(−→α ), a), because variables in V and T describes C’s
knowledge (a and C share the same knowledge) about the current state of the system.
The same applies to r(p(−→α ), a).
In order to formally describe the process of solving the reachability problem, we shall
ﬁrst deﬁne the concept of pre-sets. For any a ∈ C, p(−→α ) ∈ P and and act(−→α ) ∈ Actions∗,
where a given set of knowledge states Y .
- Pre∃,a
act(−→α )(Y ) is the set of the knowledge states in which a knows she is permitted to
execute act(−→α ) and which transition into Y by executing the action act(−→α ). Its
formal deﬁnition is:
{(V0, T0, V, T ) | (V0, T0, V ∪ eﬀect
+(act(−→α )) ∪eﬀect−(act(−→α )), T ∪ eﬀect+(act(−→α ))\
eﬀect−(act(−→α ))) ∈ Y , γV,TX(act(
−→α ), a) = ⊤}.
Note that in a write action Y diﬀers from the previous state as following:
V0 does not change as the agent knowledge about the original value of the variables
remains the same during a write action.
T0 does not change as the original values of the variables does not change during
a write action.
V includes all the variables mentioned in the action as the agent will know their
value given that the agent has an exclusive access to the system and is the one
executing the action.
T includes all the variables which are updated to ⊤ in the action and will omit all
the variables that are updated to ⊥.
- Pre∃,a
p(−→α )=⊤(Y ) is the set of the knowledge states in which a knows she is permitted
to read the value of the variable p(−→α ) and which transition into Y by returning the
value of p(−→α ) and ﬁnd out it is true (⊤). Its formal deﬁnition is:
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{(V0, T0, V, T ) | p(
−→α ) /∈ V0, p(
−→α ) /∈ V, (V0 ∪ {p(
−→α )}, T0 ∪ {p(
−→α )}, V ∪ {p(−→α )}, T ∪
{p(−→α )}) ∈ Y, γV,Tr(p(
−→α ), a) = ⊤}.
Note that when an agent reads a variable p(−→α ), Y diﬀers from the previous state
as following:
V0 and V include p(
−→α ) as the agent now knows its value and given that a read
operation does not change the value of the variable.
T0 and T include p(
−→α ) as the agent ﬁnds out that its value is ⊤
- Pre∃,a
p(−→α )=⊥(Y ) is the set of the knowledge states in which a knows she is permitted
to read the value of the variable p(−→α ) and which transition into Y by returning the
value of p(−→α ) and ﬁnd out it is false (⊥). Its formal deﬁnition is:
{(V0, T0, V, T ) | p(
−→α ) /∈ V0, p(
−→α ) /∈ V, (V0 ∪ {p(
−→α )}, T0 \ {p(
−→α )}, V ∪ {p(−→α )}, T \
{p(−→α )}) ∈ Y, γV,Tr(p(
−→α ), a) = ⊤}.
Note that when an agent reads a variable p(−→α ), Y diﬀers from the previous state
as following:
V0 and V include p(
−→α ) as the agent now knows its value and given that a read
operation does not change the value of the variable.
T0 and T omit p(
−→α ) as the agent ﬁnds out that its value is ⊥
4.4.2 Generating strategies
During the course of the computation, the algorithm maintains pairs (Y, s) consisting of
a set Y of knowledge states and a strategy s. The pair (Y, s) denotes the fact that s is a
strategy that enables C to reach KG from each state in Y . For Y = KG, the s is simply
‘skip;’, which means ‘do nothing’.
The algorithm starts with the pair (KG, skip;). The core of the algorithm works as
follows: Given the pair (Y, s), it adds the pairs (Pre∃,a
act(−→α )(Y ), (a:act(
−→α ); s)). For any
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two pairs (Y1, s1) and (Y2, s2) where Pre
∃,a
p(−→α )=⊤(Y1) ∩ Pre
∃,a
p(−→α )=⊥(Y2)= Y , it adds the pair
(Pre∃,a
p(−→α )=⊤(Y1) ∩ Pre
∃,a
p(−→α )=⊥(Y2), if (a : p(
−→α )) then s1 else s2). These two steps are
repeated repeatedly for all p(−→α ) in P , act(−→α ) ∈ Actions∗, and a ∈ C until the set of
strategies does not change any more.
The algorithm continues until no new pairs are generated. Now, all the pairs whose
set of knowledge states contains kinit contain the strategies we are looking for.
4.4.3 Pseudo-code for the algorithm
The algorithm for extracting strategies is described below in the form of pseudo-code.
It assumes as input the initial state kinit and the set of goal knowledge states KG. It
outputs at least a strategy if there is one which can derive the model going from kinit to
some state in KG. The algorithm works by backwards reachability from KG to kinit. It
maintains a set of states it has seen, called states seen, and a data structure storing the
pairs found so far, called strategies.
1 strategies := ∅ ;
2 states seen := ∅ ;
3 put (KG, skip;) in strategies ;
4 repeat until strategies does not change{
5 choose (Y1, s1) ∈ strategies ;
6 for each act(−→α ) ∈ Actions∗{
7 for each a ∈ C{
8 PXY := Pre∃,a
act(−→α )
(Y1) ;
9 i f ( (PXY 6= ∅) ∧ (PXY 6⊆ states seen) ) {
10 states seen := states seen ∪ PXY ;
11 axs1 := “a : act(
−→α ) ”+ s1 ;
12 strategies := strategies ∪ {(PXY, axs1)} ;
13 i f (kinit ∈ PXY)
14 output axs1 ;
15 }
66
16 }
17 }
18 choose (Y2, s2) ∈ strategies ;
19 for each va r i ab l e p(−→α ) ∈ P {
20 for each a ∈ C{
21 PRY := Pre∃,a
p(−→α )=⊤
(Y1) ∩ Pre
∃,a
p(−→α )=⊥
(Y2) ;
22 i f ( (PRY 6= ∅) ∧ (PRY 6⊆ states seen) ) {
23 states seen := states seen ∪ PRY ;
24 pss := “ i f (a : p(−→α )) then s1 e l s e s2 ” ;
25 strategies := strategies ∪ {(PRY, pss)} ;
26 i f (kinit ∈ PRY)
27 output pss ;
28 }
29 }
30 }
31 }
In practice, there is another way to compute the pairs, which is only slightly diﬀerent
from the one described above. We provide its pseudo-code in Appendix A, where we use
bold font to highlight the diﬀerences. We call the algorithm described here Algo-0 and the
one described in Appendix B A. When there are no strategies, both Algo-0 and Algo-1
ﬁnd none. Because in these cases, kinit will not be found in any set generated during the
pre-computations. When there are some strategies, both Algo-0 and Algo-1 ﬁnd some,
however, the strategies found by Algo-1 may diﬀer from the ones found by Algo-0. X-
Policy integrates both Algo-0 and Algo-1, so that the user can use either of them. Algo-1
has slightly better performance and similar memory usage compared to Algo-0. However,
because Algo-0 is easier to reason about than Algo-1, we present Algo-0 here and use it
as the basis for our analysis.
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The diﬀerences between Algo-0 and Algo-1 are the ways they treat those newly found
sets through the pre-computations. Algo-0 discards a newly found set if all the states in
this set have already in states seen. Algo-1 discards a newly found set if this set is a
subset of a set in strategies. Algo-0 adds a pair constructed from a newly found set to
strategies no matter kinit is in the set or not. Algo-1 adds a pair constructed from a
newly found set to strategies if kinit is not in the set.
4.5 Argument about correctness
Claim 4.5.1 The algorithm described in Section 4.4.3 will eventually terminate.
Argument. To prove the algorithm will terminate is equivalent to proving that the size of
strategies will not inﬁnitely grow. The set strategies only increases if we encounter
states not yet in states seen. As there are only ﬁnitely many states in the model, we
cannot go on encountering new states for ever. Note that we assume tat the size of
strategies is not shrinking as the algorithm only add to the strategies. 
Claim 4.5.2 If there exists a strategy s that drives the system from kinit to KG, then the
algorithm will produce at least one strategy (but not necessarily s).
Argument. The algorithm starts from KG and consider all the states which can lead to KG
by executing an action by an agent. This is done recursively until it covers all possible
actions and all possible agents. This operation is repeated over all the discovered states
until no new states are discovered. Which by deﬁnition means that the algorithm performs
an exhaustive backwards reachability and therefore will ﬁnd all states for which there is
a strategy to arrive at KG.
Since s is a strategy from kinit to KG, kinit will be in the set of states found and
therefore the algorithm will output a strategy from kinit to KG. As however the choice
operator is resolved, kinit will eventually be included in states seen, and therefore some
strategy will be generated. 
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Remark. The algorithm is non-deterministic thanks to the choice operator. We mean
by non-deterministic that it is not guaranteed to obtain the same s each time the algo-
rithm is run (as we state in the Claim above). The algorithm prevents any subset from
being added to strategies if all the states in that subset have already been found in
states seen. This condition guarantees the termination of the algorithm, however, at
the cost of eliminating the prospect of exploring some strategies. In all cases there is a
way of picking the choices so that s is output. 
Sub-claim 4.5.1 For all (Y, s) ∈ strategies, and for all y ∈ Y , s succeeds on y and
the result is in KG.
Argument. We look at all the ways that (Y, s) can be added to strategies. At the begin-
ning, (KG, skip;) is added in. The correctness of the sub-claim is self-evident for this case.
During the course of the algorithm, pairs are added in one of these two circumstances:
(i) (PXY, axs1)) is added, where, ∃ a ∈ A and act(
−→α ) ∈ Actions∗, such that PXY =
Pre
∃,a
act(−→α )(Y ), axs1 = “a : act(
−→α ) ”+ s1, and (Y1, s1) is in strategies.
The inductive hypothesis states that for all y1 ∈ Y1, s1 succeeds on y1 and result is
in KG. We know for all y ∈ PXY that a can execute act(
−→α ) and that the result of
that is in Y1, because that is the way we get PTY1 from Y1. Therefore axs1 succeeds
on all the states in PTY1 and the result is in KG.
(ii) (PRY, pss) is added, where, ∃ a ∈ A and p(−→α ) ∈ P , such that PSY = Pre∃,a(−→α )=⊤(Y1)
∩ Pre∃,a(−→α )=⊥(Y2), pss = “if (a : p(
−→α )) then s1 else s2” and (Y1, s1), and (Y2, s2) are
both in strategies.
The inductive hypothesis states that for all y1 ∈ Y1, s1 succeeds on y1 and result
is in KG, and y2 ∈ Y2, s2 succeeds on y2 and result is in KG. We also know for all
y ∈ PRY that a can read p(−→α ) and if it is ⊤, the result of that is in Y1. However, if
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it is ⊥, the result of that is in Y2. Therefore pss succeeds on all the states in PRY
and the result is in KG. 
Claim 4.5.3 If the algorithm outputs the strategy s then s succeeds on kinit and the result
is in KG.
Argument. From Sub-claim 4.5.1 we know that for all (Y, s) ∈ strategies and y ∈ Y ,
s succeeds on y and the result is in KG. Because if s gets output, there must exist a Y ,
such that kinit ∈ Y and (Y, s) ∈ strategies. Therefore, it follows that s succeeds on
kinit and the result is in KG. 
From the implication of Claim 4.5.3, we know that if there is no strategy s which
succeeds on kinit and results in KG, the algorithm will output none.
4.6 Computational complexity
We use K for the set of all the knowledge states, |K| for the total number of knowledge
states, |P | for the number of variables in P , |Actions∗| for the number of actions in
Actions∗ and |A| for the number of acting agents. We assume that |K| is equal to 24|P |
because for each variable in P , we use four knowledge variables to represent the coalition’s
knowledge about it. (This is an upper bound; |K| is actually less than 24|P | because not
all the knowledge variables are independent.)
Because the computations in our algorithm are done through operations between
BDDs, several remarks concerning the complexity of BDD operations should be made
in advance.
• For two BDDs B1 and B2, the complexity of the operation apply(and/or, B1, B2)
is determined by |B1||B2|, where |B1| and |B2| are the numbers of nodes in B1 and
B2 respectively.
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• Suppose X and Y are two subsets of K; BX and BY are the BDD representations of
X and Y respectively. The number of nodes in BX or BY is at most 24|P |. Therefore,
the complexity of the operation apply(and/or, BX , BY ) in the worst case is 28|P |.
• Suppose B→ is a BDD representing one of the transition relations presented in 4.4.1,
the number of nodes in of the combined B→ is at most 16|P |. B→ is obtained by
synthesising all the conditions in the formal deﬁnition Pre∃,a→ .
• The complexity of an existential quantiﬁcation over n variables in a BDD is 2n.
• Checking the equality of two BDDs takes constant time in all BDD implementations,
e.g., BuDDy. This is possible because every boolean function has a unique, canonical
BDD representation. As sharing of BDD nodes is enforced in BuDDy, equality of
two functions can be decided in constant time by checking for pointer equality [80].
In what follows, we discuss the complexity of the algorithm line by line, only omitting
those lines of which operations spend constant time.
Line 5 Because the conditions in Lines 9 and 22 prevent any subset whose elements
are already found from being added to strategies, and, in the worst case, the
subsets of K are just singletons, there are at most |K| (24|P |) pairs in strategies.
Therefore, this step repeats at most 24|P | times.
Line 6 This step repeats |Actions∗| times.
Line 7 This step repeats |A| times.
Line 8 According to the formula for computing Pre∃
act(−→α )(Y ) in 4.4.1, the operation
of this step involves the BDD computation apply(and, Bact(−→α ), BY ′
1
) followed by
an existential quantiﬁcation over all the V ′, T ′ variables on the resulting BDD of
the apply operation. The complexity of the apply operation in the worst case is
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16|P |24|P | and the complexity of the existential quantiﬁcation is 22|P |. The worse
one of the two is 16|P |24|P |. Therefore, the time spent on this step in the worst case
is determined by 16|P |24|P |.
Line 9 The time spent on this step is determined by the time spent on checking if PXY
is a subset of states seen. Checking if PXY is a subset of states seen can be
done by uniting PXY and states seen together and then seeing if the resultant
set is equal to states seen. Hence the time spent on this step in the worst case is
determined by 28|P |.
Line 10 The time spent on this step in the worst case is determined by 28|P |.
Line 18 This step repeats at most 24|P | times.
Line 19 This step repeats |P | times.
Line 20 This step repeats |A| times.
Line 21 The time spent on this step in the worst case is determined by 16|P |24|P |+1+28|P |.
Counting the larger one of the two, the time is determined by 28|P |.
Line 22 The time spent on this step in the worst case is determined by 28|P |.
Line 23 The time spent on this step in the worst case is determined by 28|P |.
Adding the time spent on each step together, we get 24|P | × (|Actions∗| × |A| ×
(16|P |24|P |+28|P |+28|P |)+24|P |×|P |×|A|×(28|P |+28|P |+28|P |)). Therefore, the complexity
of the algorithm in the worst case is asymptotically bounded above by 3 × 216|P |. This
is better than the time complexity of RW as the X-Policy algorithm. The compound
actions in X-Policy allow the algorithm to direct it search better rather than exploring
the possible values of the propositions. The is also conﬁrmed by the experimental data
in Table 6.1 show. It also shows the situation in practice is far better than this.
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In X-Policy as in RW , there are 7 knowledge states per proposition and therefore, an
access control system with n propositions contains 7n diﬀerent states. Which means that
veriﬁcation time and state space grow exponentially when more objects are added.
4.7 Chapter Summary
Chapter 4 discussed the model checking problem. Section 4.1 introduced the transitions
system and how the knowledge variables which model the agent’s knowledge of the system
states. The representation of the initial knowledge and ﬁnal knowledge, kinit and KG, are
discussed in Section 4.2 and 4.3 including the various goal types. Section 4.4 illustrates
the backward reachability computation and algorithm. Section 4.5 provides the proof of
correctness. Section 4.6 analyses the computational complexity of X-Policy algorithm.
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CHAPTER 5
Modelling Conference Management System
In this Chapter we discuss the modelling and analysing of conference management sys-
tems. We focus on the modelling of EasyChair as our case study. Our choice is motivated
by the fact that EasyChair [116] is one of the largest and most used cloud based conference
management system.
5.1 Overview and notes on modelling EasyChair CMS
EasyChair is a highly conﬁgurable web-based centralised conference management system
that host multiple conferences. According to its website, EasyChair hosted over 4500
conferences in 2011 [116].
Conference creation and configurations. The conference organiser can request that
the EasyChair administrator create a conference sub-system. When a conference creation
request is made, the EasyChair administrator will manually verify the request and create a
sub-system for that conference with a designated chair. EasyChair provides the conference
chair with an administration page at which she may specify conﬁguration settings for her
conference. Each conﬁguration setting aﬀects the system access control permissions in
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real time; for example the chair can open or close the submission to the conference which
determines whether users can submit a paper to the system or not. The chair also can
add/delete users to/from the system. The conference access control permissions also
depend on the system state; for example the system prevents a paper from being assigned
for reviewing to a PC member who has conﬂict of interest.
EasyChair account and user roles. Anyone can obtain an EasyChair account, user-
name and password, by registering her email address which will be used globally as her
identiﬁer. Once logged in to the EasyChair system, the user will have the choice of acting
as any of the roles she has been assigned to. A chair has to assign a user to be a chair
or a PC member while any user can participate in the conference as an author as long as
the conference submission is open. A user can only be a chair or PC member in any given
conference but not both. Furthermore, within the conference system, there are three user
roles: chair, PC-member or author. The EasyChair supports and manages the following
processes that the conference system can go through:
• Paper submission: the system, in this process, collects submissions from authors.
Anyone who has an account on EasyChair can submit to the conference. The
submitter of the paper must be one of the paper authors. A paper can have more
than one author. An author can add or delete one or more of her co-authors but
not herself, whether the submission system is open or closed. The submissions
can have two modes: abstract only or abstract and full text depending on whether
the submission attachment is mandatory or not. The chair can view the list of the
submissions and PC members if the settings allow it. At any point, the chair and/or
the PC members can add any conﬂict of interest they might have with a certain
paper. Only the chair can remove an already declared conﬂict of interest.
• Paper bidding and assignment: PC members, in this process, register their pref-
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erence on which paper they like to review, often using the title and the abstract to
guide their decision. Once the bidding process is done, the chair can start assigning
papers for review. Once a paper is assigned to a PC member, the PC member if
the reviewing menu is enabled, can view the paper. She will also receive an email
message to notify her with the assignment.
• Reviewing: A PC member, when the system is open for reviewing, can submit her
review of a paper assigned to her. PC members or the chair can request a review
from someone else to subreview the paper. The reviewer cannot see other reviews
on a paper assigned to her unless she submits her own review. Once she submits
her review she can view other reviewers’ reviews. She might also amend her review.
The system will email the paper reviewers when there is a change to their review
or when another review on their paper has been submitted. When all the reviews
are submitted, the PC chair will ask the reviewers to start the discussion phase. In
this phase, reviewers will be commenting on each other’s review to try to come to
a conclusion on whether to accept the paper or reject it. Only the PC chair can
delete a review or a comment. The PC chair checks the conclusion of the reviewing
process and then submits the decision to the system. At some point, the PC chair
might decide to inform the authors of the results and email them the reviewers’
feedback. The chair can always change the decision, maybe as a result of a rebuttal
discussion.
The PC chair decides when to start or stop each process. One or more processes can
happen at the same time. However, it is usually done in the order presented above.
5.2 Modelling conventions for EasyChair system
In this section, we discuss a number of modelling conventions we have followed in con-
structing EC . The model EC is based on our understanding of a fragment of EasyChair.
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We restrict EC to a single conference system. These conventions can be adopted to model
other web-based systems.
5.2.1 System policy as set of read and write actions.
Using X-Policy, we specify EC as X-Policy actions which can be either write actions that
change the state of the system or read actions that give the user/agent knowledge about
the state of the system. A read action is allowed to retrieve the value of a single model
variable. Actions cannot read and change the state of the system at the same time. This
appears to be the way EasyChair is built. Actions are either to query the system state,
or to change it, but not both. Users are only enabled to perform one operation per time.
Such an assumption results in making the actions’s eﬀects independent from the state of
the system and has the same eﬀect all the time.
In EasyChair, there are some cases in which it appears that EasyChair performs a
mix of read and write operations are executed in a single request. For example is when
a PC member requests an agent to subreview a paper and before the agent accepts or
rejects the subreviewing request, the agent can read the submission. While this seems as
a combined action, it is actually two separate steps: one where the agent is read the paper
and another where the agent decide to accept or reject the subreviewing assignment.
In this Chapter we discus the relevant rules in details and we include the full model in
[90]. The fact that the agent has read the submission is recorded. This case is modelled
in EC as two separate actions, reading the submission and recording the read. We link
the two actions by allowing the sub-reviewer to read the submission if she recorded the
read in advance. This is a sensible heuristic for modelling web-based systems. We also
restrict our model to the system states and do not consider any possible logging system
as part of our model.
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5.2.2 System read operations that return multiple system val-
ues.
In systems like EasyChair, there are often forms that return multiple variables, i.e. the
administrator page that return all the access options for the reviewing process etc. This
page performs a number of read operations at once. We model each of these operations
W as a set of actions W1, . . . ,Wn. Each action Wi returns one of the values returned by
W . The execution rights of Wi are the same as W . For example: EasyChair operation
ShowReviews(p) which will return all the reviews on the paper p is modelled as the set of
the read actions ShowReview(p,a1). . . ShowReview(p,an) which returns the review of agent
a1 . . . an on paper p.
Modelling web forms. We choose to model the ﬁelds that aﬀect the access control
policy only. For example, we do not model the operation that updates a PC member
aﬃliation. If a page allows the user to set several ﬁelds that are mutually independent we
model it as several actions. For example, whether or not the submission is closed or open
and whether or not the list of submissions can be viewed by PC chairs only, PC chairs
and PC members or nobody. While these two ﬁelds are related to the same subject, their
values are mutually independent. There are some cases where a ﬁeld can take more than
two values like who is allowed to view the list of submission. In this case it can have one of
the three values: PC chairs only, PC chairs and PC members, or nobody. We model such
a ﬁeld in our system as two variables: one to represent if PC chairs are allowed and the
other to represent if PC members are allowed to view the list. To maintain the integrity
of the model, we update these two variables together in an atomic action so their values
are consistent with the real system behaviour. We also use atomic actions to maintain
roles exclusivity, where a user for example can either be a PC chair or a PC member but
not both.
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Modelling paper submission and authorship management operations. Wemodel
these operations as a number of actions: SubmitPaper(Paper p,Agent a), AddAuthor(Paper
p,Agent a), DeleteAuthor(Paper p,Agent a) and WithdrowSubmission(Paper p). SubmitPa-
per(Paper p,Agent a) models the operation of submitting the paper p for the author a by
setting Author(p,a) and Submitted-paper(p,a) to true. The submitter of the paper p may
or may not be the author herself, in this case agent a. We do not distinguish between
the author and the author-submitter as the system treats all the authors equally once the
authorship relation is established. AddAuthor(Paper p,Agent a) and DeleteAuthor(Paper
p,Agent a) will establish/destroy the authorship relation between a paper p and an author
a. DeleteAuthor(Paper p,Agent a) can be executed as long as the paper p has more than
one author. WithdrowSubmission(Paper p) will destroy the authorship association between
p and all the agents. A chair can delete a paper submission which removes it from the
list of submission and list of reviews. She can also un-delete the submission which will
restore it with its reviews to the lists.
5.2.3 Modelling EasyChair “log in as another pc member” func-
tionality.
In EasyChair, the system allows the PC chair to act on behalf of another PC member using
“log in as another pc member”. For example a PC chair can submit a review for a paper
assigned for another PC member to review. The actions executed on the PC member’s
behalf are indistinguishable from the ones that are executed by the PC member herself.
Nevertheless, EasyChair restricts the PC chair from changing the PC member account
details or accessing/editing her sub-reviewing requests. We model these actions in EC by
conjoining the conditions agent user has to satisfy to act as another PC member - in this
case being a chair - and the conditions that the PC member has to satisfy to execute that
action. One might also consider using relations like “CanActAs”, as in [10, 45]. However,
80
when we say A CanActAs B then we mean that A is capable of performing all the actions
that B can perform which is not applicable in this case.
5.2.4 Intermediate condition.
In some cases, the system checks some intermediate conditions during an update operation
like validation conditions or maintenance conditions to preserve an integrity constraint.
For example, EasyChair insures that a conﬂict of interest is respected when a chair assigns
reviewers to a paper. We express these intermediate conditions as execution preconditions.
Where the checking operations reveal a system value by an error message, this value is
readable by the agent requesting the operation.
5.2.5 Conference configuration settings.
We model the conference conﬁguration settings as 0-ary atomic formulae. The value
of these settings aﬀects the conference permissions globally. In specifying the system
execution policy if the user can learn about the system conﬁguration settings from the
behaviour of the system even though she cannot read the settings directly, we consider
her to be able to read that variable. For example an author can learn the value of
submission conﬁguration settings by checking if she is presented with a link to submit a
new paper. She is able to infer that using her knowledge of the system policy. In this case
the author knows the value of the setting variable that controls whether the submission
system is open or closed which is only accessible directly by the administrator. The
agents use their knowledge of the system policy combined with observations of the system
behaviour to evaluate the value of these variables. In some cases the user might learn
partial information about a single conﬁguration variable. For example when the list of
submissions can only be viewed by PC chairs only or nobody, the PC member learns that
she is not allowed to see the list of the submissions but she cannot distinguish between
the two possibilities. We model this case in EC by designating a variable that represents
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the fact that the PC member can read the list of submissions. The PC-member can infer
the value of that variable by using the system.
5.3 EC model in X-Policy formalism
In this Section we express the EC model in X-Policy formalism. We ﬁrst deﬁne T =
{Agent,Paper}. To model relations between these two types, we need a number of predi-
cates, P , as follows:
For a,b of type Agent, p of type Paper, P includes:
Chair-review-en() Review menu is enabled for Chair. It enables Chair(s) to manage
the reviews of submitted papers.
Chair-status-en() Status menu is enabled for Chair. It enables Chair(s) to manage the
status of submitted papers.
PCM-access-reviews-en() PC members can access (view) other papers reviews.
PCM-review-editing-en() PC members can add/modify reviews.
PCM-review-menu-en() Review menu is enabled for PC members. It enables PC members
to manage paper reviews.
PCM-status-en() Status menu is enabled for PC members. It enables PC members to
manage paper status.
Review-assig-enabled() Review assignments enabled.
Show-reviewer-name() Reviewer’s name is readable by other PC members.
Sub-anonymous() Submissions are anonymous. The name of authors are obscured.
Sub-open() Submission system is open and accepts new papers.
View-sub-by-chair-
permitted()
PC chairs can view the list of submissions.
View-sub-by-PCM-
permitted()
PC members can view the list of submissions.
View-sub-title-
permitted()
PC members can view the submission title for papers not assigned
to them.
View-sub-txt-permitted() PC members can view the submission text for papers not assigned
to them.
Author(p,a) Agent a is an author of paper p.
Chair(a) Agent a is the chair of the PC.
Conf-of-interest(p,a) Agent a has a conflict of interest with the paper p.
Decided-subrev(p,a,b) Agent b has decided whether to accept or reject the subreviewing
request for paper p issued by agent a.
PCmember(a) Agent a is a PC member.
Requested-subrev(p,a,b) Agent a has requested agent b to be his subreviewer for paper p.
Reviewer(p,a) Paper p is assigned to PC member a for reviewing.
Submitted-paper(p,a) Paper p is submitted by agent a.
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Submitted-review(p,a,b) Agent b’s review of paper p has been submitted by agent a.
Subreviewer(p,a,b) Agent b has accepted the subreviewing request for paper p issued by
agent a.
Updated-review(p,a,b) Agent b’s review of Paper p has been updated by PC member a.
We now deﬁne the set of actions Actions and their execution permissions using the
formula exec(act, user) for each action act ∈ Actions. The execution permission statements
deﬁne whether or not user of type Agent is allowed to execute such an action and in what
state. We also deﬁne the read permissions rules using the formula r(prop,user) for each
prop ∈ P . In the following, we list a sub-set of EC actions and their permission statements
which are used in our properties analysis in X-Policy:
1- When the review menu is enabled and the submitted paper is not deleted: (a) A PC
chair can read all the paper reviews. (b) A PC member can read a review for a
paper p if she is a reviewer of that paper and has submitted her review. (c) A
PC member can read a review for a paper to which she is not assigned, when PC
members are permitted to access the titles and reviews of submitted papers. She
also must have no conﬂict of interest with that paper.
r(Submitted-review(p, a, b), user)⇋



 Chair(user) ∧ Chair-review-en()
∧∃d : Agent . Submitted-paper(p, d)


∨


PCmember(user) ∧ Reviewer(p, user)
∧PCM-review-menu-en()
∧∃ c : Agent . Submitted-review(p, user, c)
∧∃d : Agent . Submitted-paper(p, d)
∧¬Conf-of-interest(p, user)


∨


PCmember(user) ∧ ¬Reviewer(p, user)
∧PCM-review-menu-en()
∧View-sub-title-permitted()
∧PCM-access-reviews-en()
∧¬Conf-of-interest(p, user)
∧∃d : Agent . Submitted-paper(p, d)




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Note that we don’t need to check that user! = d and ¬Author(user) to prevent the
author from submitting a review for the paper given that she has to be assigned to be
the reviewer of that paper. In EasyChair, the Chair or the PC-members are expected to
declare conﬂict of interest by themselves manually which prevent the PC member from
becoming reviewers of their own paper. This is included in the rule as we check for conﬂict
of interest.
2- When the review menu is enabled and the submitted paper is not deleted: (a) A PC
chair can submit a review for any paper as himself. (b) A PC chair can submit a
review for a paper as another PC member using “log in as another pc member” if
the PC member is allowed to submit a review for that paper. (c) A PC member
can review a paper if she is assigned to review that paper. (d) A PC member can
review a paper to which she is not assigned when PC members are permitted to
access the titles and reviews of submitted papers. She also must have no conﬂict of
interest with that paper.
Action Add-Review(p,a,b):-
{
Submitted-review(p,a,b):= ⊤;
}
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exec(Add-Review(p, a, b), user))⇋ 


 Chair(user) ∧ Chair-review-en()
∧a = user ∧ ∃d : Agent . Submitted-paper(p, d)


∨


(a = user ∨ Chair(user))
∧∃c : Agent . Submitted-paper(p, c)
∧




PCmember(a) ∧ Reviewer(p, a)
∧PCM-review-menu-en()
∧PCM-review-editing-en()


∨


PCmember(a) ∧ ¬Reviewer(p, a)
∧PCM-review-menu-en()
∧View-sub-title-permitted()
∧PCM-access-reviews-en()
∧¬Conf-of-interest(p, a)








3- Given that paper assignments are enabled, a PC chair can assign/de-assign a submitted
paper to a PC member or a PC chair for reviewing, when she has no conﬂict of
interest with that paper.
Action Add-Reviewer-Assignment(p,a)
{
Reviewer(p,a) := ⊤;
}
exec(Add-Reviewer-Assignment(p, a), user)⇋


Chair(user) ∧ (PCmember(a) ∨ Chair(a))
∧Review-assig-enabled()
∧¬Conf-of-interest(p, a)
∧∃c : Agent . Submitted-paper(p, c)


4- When the review menu is enabled and the submitted paper is not deleted: (a) A
PC chair can request another agent to subreview any paper. (b) A PC member
can invite another agent to subreview a paper: (1) if she is the reviewer of the
paper or (2) if the system is conﬁgured to give PC members access to the paper
submission titles and reviews. The invited agent can decide whether to accept or
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reject the reviewing request as long as the paper has not been withdrawn. A PC
member cannot cancel the subreviewing request but can accept or reject the request
on behalf of the invited agent. Once the decision is made, only the PC member can
change the decision.
Action Request-Reviewing(p,a,b)
{
Requested-subrev(p,a,b):= ⊤;
}
Action Accept-Reviewing-Request(p,a,b)
{
Decided-subrev(p,a,b):=⊤;
Subreviewer(p,a,b):=⊤;
}
Action Reject-Reviewing-Request(p,a,b)
{
Decided-subrev(p,a,b):=⊤;
Subreviewer(p,a,b):=⊥;
}
exec(Reject-Reviewing-Request(p, a, b), user)⇋


Requested-subrev(p, a, b)
∧∃c : Agent . Submitted-paper(p, c)
∧
(
¬Decided-subrev(p, a, user) ∨ user = a
)


exec(Accept-Reviewing-Request(p, a, b), user)⇋


Requested-subrev(p, a, b)
∧∃c : Agent . Submitted-paper(p, c)
∧
(
¬Decided-subrev(p, a, user) ∨ user = a
)


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exec(Request-Reviewing(p, a, b), user)⇋



 Chair-review-en() ∧ Chair(user)
∧∃c : Agent . Submitted-paper(p, c)


∨


PCmember(user) ∧ Reviewer(p, user)
∧PCM-review-menu-en()
∧∃c : Agent . Submitted-paper(p, c)


∨


PCmember(user) ∧ ¬Reviewer(p, user)
∧PCM-review-menu-en()
∧View-sub-title-permitted()
∧PCM-access-reviews-en()
∧¬Conf-of-interest(p, user)
∧∃c : Agent . Submitted-paper(p, c)




We include the full model of EC at [90].
5.4 Analysis of EC security properties using X-Policy
In this Section, we will present three security properties in EC . We have discovered these
issues while using EasyChair. In each case, we show an attack strategy to achieve an
undesirable state. These attacks are derived using EC and X-Policy and have succeeded
on EasyChair as of 1st of September 2009. Perior to the publication of these attacks, the
developers and administrators of EasyChair were notiﬁed about the discussed attacks on
the 10th of April 2009 and on the 1st May 2009. Despite our best eﬀort to contact them,
no response has been given. We are unable to repeat these attacks given that experiments
on the live system is prohibited in the current license.
In the following, we report the results of each attack and make some suggestions on
how to ﬁx the system. During the process of analysing EC a number of other properties
that holds in EC . For example, EC satisfy the property that a Chair cannot assign a
PC-member to review a paper if she has a conﬂict of interest with it. Another property
that EC holds is the fact that a reviewer cannot read another reviewer’s review of a paper
assigned to her before she submits her review of the paper if the Chair choose to restrict
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the viewing of the paper submissions to the relevant PC-members.
For our EC model, we create the following conﬁguration:
1. The system has ﬁve agents: Alice, Bob, Eve, Carol and Marvin. The system has two
submitted papers: p1 and p2.
2. Alice is the Chair of PC. Bob and Carol are PC members. Paper p1 is submitted by
the author Marvin while p2 is submitted by the author Eve.
The conﬁguration and the attacks’ detailed derivation of the model EC has been discussed
in [92]. We also describe the X-Policy queries that represent these properties. For space
restriction, readability and presentation purposes, we describe an optimal strategy that
explains the attack for each property as the tool-generated strategies can be complex.
5.4.1 Property 1: A single subreviewer should not be able to
determine the outcome of a paper reviewing process by
writing two reviews of the same paper.
We show that we can derive an attack against EC involving 4 agents: Alice, Bob, Carol,
and Eve. We explain the attack scenario as a sequence of actions executed by these agents
as follows:
1. Alice acts as chair. She executes the actions: Add-Reviewer-Assignment(p1,Bob) to as-
sign Bob to review the paper p1. She also executes Add-Reviewer-Assignment(p1,Carol)
to assign Carol to review the paper p1.
2. Bob and Carol both assign Eve as their sub-reviewer for paper p1 by executing the
actions Request-Reviewing(p1,Bob,Eve) and Request-Reviewing(p1,Carol,Eve) respec-
tively.
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3. Eve accepts the two paper subreviewing requests and sends Bob and Carol two
similar reviews using Accept-Reviewing-Request(p1,Carol,Eve) and Accept-Reviewing-
Request(p1,Bob,Eve).
4. Bob and Carol receive Eve’s reviews and submit them to the system using Add-
Review(p1,Bob,Eve) and Add-Review(p1,Carol,Eve).
X-Policy query that represent this property is:
run for 2 Paper , 5 Agent
check {E dist p1 , p2 :Paper , Al ice , Carol , Bob , Marvin , Eve : Agent | |
Chair ( A l i c e ) ! and PCmember(Bob) ! and PCmember( Carol ) !
and Author (p1 , Marvin ) ! and Author (p2 , Eve ) !
and PCmember−review−ed i t ing−enabled ( ) !
and View−submiss ion−by−cha i r−permitted ( ) !
and Chair−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and PCmember−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and Submission−anonymous ( ) !
and Review−Assignment−enabled ( ) !
−> {Alice , Carol , Bob } : ( {Submitted−rev iew (p1 , Bob , Eve ) }
THEN {Alice , Carol , Bob} :{ Submitted−rev iew (p1 , Carol ,
Eve ) }) }
EasyChair fails this property and allows Eve to submit two reviews for the same pa-
per. One possible ﬁx for this attack is as follows. Every time an agent a invites
another agent b to subreview a paper, EasyChair should check whether agent b has
been invited by another agent to subreview the same paper. We conjoin the condi-
tion ¬∃ d : Agent . Requested-subrev(p, d, b) to the permission statement exec(Request-
Reviewing(p,a,b),user). Carol cannot execute Request-Reviewing(p1,Carol,Eve) as Requested-
subrev(p1,Bob,Eve) is in the previous state.
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5.4.2 Property 2: A paper author should not review her own
paper.
As before, we explain the attack scenario as a sequence of actions executed by the agents
Alice, Bob and Eve:
1. Alice acts as Chair and assigns Bob, who is a PC member, to review the paper p2
submitted by Eve by executing the action Add-Reviewer-Assignment(p2,Bob).
2. Bob executes the action Request-Reviewing(p2,Bob,Eve) to assign Eve as his sub-
reviewer as she is a good researcher in the ﬁeld.
3. Eve accepts the request using Accept-Reviewing-Request(p2,Bob,Eve).
4. Bob submits the review using Add-Review(p2,Bob,Eve).
We represent this property in X-Policy as the following check statement
run for 2 Paper , 5 Agent
check {E dist p1 , p2 :Paper , Al ice , Carol , Bob , Marvin , Eve : Agent | |
Chair ( A l i c e ) ! and PCmember(Bob) ! and PCmember( Carol ) !
and Author (p1 , Marvin ) ! and Author (p2 , Eve ) !
and PCmember−review−ed i t ing−enabled ( ) !
and View−submiss ion−by−cha i r−permitted ( ) !
and Chair−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and PCmember−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and Submission−anonymous ( ) !
and Review−Assignment−enabled ( ) !
−> {Alice , Carol , Bob , } : {Submitted−rev iew (p2 , Bob , Eve
) } }
In this case, EasyChair fails the property and allows Eve to review her own paper. Note
that the names of the authors and other reviewers are not known to the PC members.
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One possible ﬁx for this attack is that every time an agent a invites another agent b to
subreview a paper, EasyChair should check whether agent b is actually an author of that
paper. We add the condition ¬Author(p, a) to the permission statement exec(Request-
Reviewing(p,a,b),user). In this case Bob cannot execute Request-Reviewing(p2,Bob,Eve).
5.4.3 Property 3: Users should be accountable for their actions.
This property is violated in several ways, all of which involve the use of ”log in as another
pc member”. For example, the system should not allow the chair to submit a review for
a paper as another PC member without making it clear that it is actually the chair who
has submitted the review and not the PC member. The following attack scenario involves
Alice and Bob:
1. Alice is the chair. She executes Add-Reviewer-Assignment(p1,Bob) to assign Bob to
review the paper p1.
2. Bob submits his review using Add-Review(p1,Bob,Bob).
3. Alice reads Bob’s review of paper p1 by executing Show-Review(p1,Bob,Bob).
4. Alice submits a review for the paper p1 as if she is Carol who is a very famous and
sought after academic by executing Add-Review(p1,Carol,Carol).
We represent this property in X-Policy as the following check statement
run for 2 Paper , 5 Agent
check {E dist p1 , p2 :Paper , Al ice , Carol , Bob , Marvin , Eve : Agent | |
Chair ( A l i c e ) ! and PCmember(Bob) ! and PCmember( Carol ) !
and Author (p1 , Marvin ) ! and Author (p2 , Eve ) !
and PCmember−review−ed i t ing−enabled ( ) !
and View−submiss ion−by−cha i r−permitted ( ) !
and Chair−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and PCmember−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
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and Submission−anonymous ( ) !
and Review−Assignment−enabled ( ) !
−> {Alice , Bob } : {Submitted−rev iew (p1 , Carol , Carol ) } }
Note that Carol is not part of the coalition. EasyChair fails this property and allows the
chair to read another reviewer’s review for a paper and then submits a review for that
paper as another PC member without being detected by the other PC members or the
other chairs. This attack is possible because the system does not register the name of
the user who updated the review. It will appear to others as if Carol has submitted the
review herself. One possible ﬁx for this attack is for Add-Review() to have an additional
parameter. Alice would then need to execute the action Add-Review(p,a,b,c) where agent
a is the chair acting on behalf of b who is the PCmember submitting the review written
by agent c. The predicate Submitted-review() also has to be changed accordingly.
One of the strategies output by X-Policy for the EC model verifying the property
no. 3 is available in the Listing 5.1. The full output ﬁle is available online at the URL:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/˜hxq/xpolicy/ec.x.
Assignment : [ p1=1 p2=2 Al i c e=1 Carol=2 Bob=3 Marvin=4 Eve=5]
Strategy : 1 . 3
Coa l i t i on : [ 1 , 3 ]
Execute the ac t i on AddReview (1 , 2 , 2 ) by agent 1 ;
sk ip ;
The goa l i s r eachab l e . Number o f Strategy found : 1
Listing 5.1: The X-Policy output ﬁle for EC ﬁle verifying property no. 3.
5.5 Chapter Summary
Chapter 5 presented the process of modelling and verifying the access control policy
of EasyChair conference management system. Section 5.1 provided some background
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information of conference management systems and overview of the conventions used in
the constructing the model is discussed in Section 5.2. The description of EC access
control policy in X-Policy is discussed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 provided an analysis of
number of security properties and suggested a number of changes to the access control
policy when appropriate. In Chapter 6 we evaluate the software implementation of X-
Policy tool.
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CHAPTER 6
X-Policy Tool: Implementation and Evaluation
Chapter 3 introduced X-Policy modelling language for modelling dynamic access control
policies with compound actions. X-Policy allow us to express access control policies by
building a model based on propositional variable. Users of X-Policy can then express
security properties they want to verify using X-Policy query language. In Chapter 4, we
discussed the model checking algorithm and how we analyse X-Policy queries using user
knowledge and how the algorithm searches for strategies. We also discussed the agents’
knowledge representation.
In this Chapter we present the implementation of X-Policy tool. We start by describ-
ing the structure of the tool and the its main components in Section 6.1 which also discuss
languages and packages used for implementing various components. Section 6.2 explains
the tool usage usage information. The source code structure and overview are discussed
in Section 6.3. The semantic checking implementation is discussed and the detailed se-
mantics rules applied to X-Policy script are listed in Section 6.4. We explain the notion
of computational rounds in Section 6.5.
In Section 6.6, we evaluate the X-Policy framework. In Section 6.6.1 we introduce
a running example where we explore the tool working from encoding the policy into X-
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Policy code to generating the strategy and we explain how to use the resulted strategy
to ﬁx the policy. In Section 6.6.2, the X-Policy tool as a product is evaluated and the
performance analysis of the tool is analysed with a comparison against similar tools where
possible. We summarise this chapter in Section 6.7.
This Chapter is designed to enable and facilitate the use and the incremental de-
velopment of the software tool. The scope of this chapter covers the tool design and
implementation including the tool performance, results and examples.
6.1 Implementation Overview
Figure 6.1: The X-policy working ﬂow-chart.
X-Policy tool is a Java-based open-source
software implementation of the X-Policy
model checking algorithm. The tool allows
the user to input a policy model written in
X-Policy modelling language as a script ﬁle
which must also contain the security prop-
erty (goal) written in X-Policy query the
users wish to verify. The tool, then, carries
out the parsing and the syntax and seman-
tic checking on the X-Policy script ﬁle as
we can see in Figure 6.1. During this step
input data needed for the model checking
algorithm is collected. The model check-
ing is then curried out and the tool then
outputs strategies if found. During these
various steps if an error occurs (e. g. syn-
tax or semantics error), the software may
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throw an error and terminate.
The X-Policy tool is written in Java.
The X-Policy parser is written using JavaCC [57] and JJTree [29]. The X-Policy model
checking algorithm handles Binary Decision Diagram operations using JavaBDD package
[118]. JavaBDD is a Java library for manipulating BDDs which provides an interface for
the BDD native packages written in C: Buddy [28] and Cudd [107].
The source code, documentation and executable builds are available for download
on-line from the author website1. JavaBDD binaries and Buddy libraries for Windows
and Linux are included in X-Policy package. As JavaBDD uses some native packages
for CUDD and Buddy, X-Policy inherently has platform dependency. X-Policy is run
and tested using Java 1.6, JavaCC 5 and JavaBDD 1.0. X-Policy executable builds are
available for Windows and Linux. The coding style used follows the guidelines summarised
in [104].
6.2 Usage Information
This section illustrate the usage information for the tool. X-Policy is available for ex-
ecution as a JAR ﬁle: xpolicy.jar. For example, the command below will make
the tool model check the script conference and output any strategy found to the ﬁle
output/strategy.acc in current folder.
java -jar xpolicy 1rp examples/conference.x output/strategy.acc (1)
In the command line as in Command 1, the position between java -jar xpolicy and
the script path and ﬁle name examples/conference.x is reserved for arguments that will
determine the behavior of X-Policy.
We summarise the usage of these arguments in the following list.
1The tool is available at: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/˜hxq/xpolicy
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Figure 6.2: The structure of the X-Policy package.
0/1 The argument ‘0’ is for telling X-Policy to run using the algorithm Algo-0, whereas ‘1’
is for telling X-Policy to run using the algorithm Algo-1. They are mutual-exclusive
in the command line. Algo-0 is the algorithm discussed in the section 4.4.3 while
Algo-1 is an alternative algorithm to Alog-0 which we discuss in Appendix A where
we also explain the diﬀerent way each Algorithm handle newly found states.
p It is used to tell X-Policy to output the strategies found during the checking. If it
is presented in the argument list, before each round of a checking starts, X-Policy
prompts a question, asking whether strategies found in this round should be output.
If it is absent, X-Policy does not prompt the question at the beginning of each round,
but only returns an answer “yes” or “no” for this round of checking. The concept
of rounds is discussed in Section 6.5
r It is used to tell X-Policy to run every round of a checking. If it is absent, X-Policy
prompts a question before the starting of each round, asking whether this round
should be running.
6.3 Source-code package structure
X-Policy Java package, as illustrated in ﬁgure 6.2, contains two components:
• SimpleJava, a Java package that deals with input and output, written by Jim
McGregor, developed at School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham.
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• xpolicy which is the top-level package and contains a number of sub-packages to
handle the various aspect of X-Policy implementation:
xpolicy.parser which contains classes to process the command line arguments
as discussed in the previous Section and X-Policy compiler ﬁles generated by
JavaCC and JJTree.
xpolicy.semantics which contains the methods for semantics checking which is
detailed in Section 6.4.
xpolicy.error which contains the classes that handle the various exceptions thrown
out when errors occur during the execution of the tool.
xpolicy.common which contains a number of constants and variables that are ac-
cessed commonly by more than one class.
xpolicy.dataparcel which contains the classes used to represent various data
structures like Predicate, Parameter, Goal Coalition pairs.
xpolicy.utility which provides a number of classes to handle and manipulate
data structures used by other classes like: arraylists, parsed-trees and BDD-
trees.
xpolicy.checker that contains the implementation of the model checking algo-
rithm.
6.4 The semantic checking
6.4.1 The three methods in xpolicy.semantic.SemanticChecker
The semantic checking proceeds side by side with the parsing. This is made possible
by JavaCC. It allows the Java code to be embedded throughout the syntax deﬁnition in
the JJTree script. When a token is (about to be) read from the inputting stream, the
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appropriate methods in xpolicy.semantic.SemanticChecker are invoked to perform
relevant processing or checking on the token. There are three major methods in the class
for these purposes. They are:
• onEnterChecking(. . .), doing preparing work before a token is checked, such as
initialising variables;
• checkToken(. . .), checking a token against certain semantic rules after it is read;
• onExitChecking(. . .), checking a token against certain semantic rules when the
parser is about to ﬁnish parsing the grammatical unit that contains the token.
The structure of the three methods are very similar. In checkToken(. . .) and onExit-
Checking(. . .), the code for checking are wrapped by the try block of a try-catch
statement. If any semantic error is found by the code in the try block, an exception of
the type xpolicy.error.XpolicyException is thrown out and subsequently caught by
the code in the catch block. After that, error messages are printed out on the screen and
the program terminates. Inside the try block there is a switch statement. Each case
branch of the switch statement is an entrance point for the block of code that is used to
check certain grammatical unit of X-Policy language. Whenever the methods are invoked
from xpolicy.parser.XPparser, an int variable is passed to the methods as one of the
arguments, whose value is used for picking an appropriate case branch in the method
invoked. In onEnterChecking(. . .), there is no such try-catch statement, but only a
switch statement like the other two methods.
The three classes, xpolicy.parser.XPparser, xpolicy.semantic.SemanticChecker,
and xpolicy.error.XpolicyException, interact when preforming the semantic checking
on an X-Policy script. Using an example Figure 6.3 illustrates that.
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Figure 6.3: A working ﬂow illustration about the three classes when doing the semantic checking.
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6.4.2 Rules applied in the semantic checking and some imple-
mentation notes
6.4.2.1 Names for the grammatical units
Before writing down the semantic rules applied to the semantic checking, we shall properly
name the grammatical units that comprise an X-Policy script so that we can refer to them
later. The names are summarised in Figure 6.4.
6.4.2.2 Semantic rules and some implementation notes
In type definition section:
• Type name must be unique.
• Type name must start with an upper case letter.
• The type Agent is pre-deﬁned.
In predicate definition section:
• Predicate name must be unique.
• Parameter name must start with a lower case letter.
• Parameter type must be one of the deﬁned type names.
• Parameter name in a predicate definition must be unique.
Note:
• If a predicate definition is marked by ‘!’ at the end, the predicate becomes a constant
predicate. Only one propositional variable among all propositional variables built
from such a predicate can have the boolean value true. The user should explicitly
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Figure 6.4: Names for the grammatical units that comprise an X-Policy script.
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point out the variable whose value should be true by using a positive credential in
the check statement.
On the target predicate of a read rule block:
• Predicate name must have already been deﬁned in the predicate definition section.
• The number of the parameters must agree with the number of parameters of the
deﬁned predicate.
• Parameters may not be unique.
On the target action of an action rule block:
• Parameter name must start with a lower case letter.
• Parameter type must be one of the deﬁned type names.
• The pair of the action name and the parameter list must be unique.
Notes:
• At this point, in xpolicy.semantic.SemanticChecker, a parameter list is created.
The list will not be created again until the parser comes out of the rule block. The
list is for storing parameters and later for retrieving.
• At this point, each parameter is assigned an appropriate type according to the
parameter type that appears at the parameter’s position in the predicate definition.
This applies to any rule block whether it is an action rule or a reading rule. In addition,
in a rule block:
For an Action body:
• Predicate name must have already been deﬁned in the predicate definition section.
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• The number of the parameters must agree with the number of parameters of the
deﬁned predicate.
• Parameters may not be unique.
• All parameters appearing in the action body must be deﬁned in the surrounding
for-loop or in the target action deﬁnition.
• parameters declared in for-loop must not been used before in enclosing for-loop,
user or the action parameters.
• The parameter user is pre-deﬁned.
For an Action rule block and Read rule block:
• The number of parameters of a predicate must agree with the number of the deﬁned
predicate.
• The parameter user is pre-deﬁned.
• Parameter other than agent must already been deﬁned, either as one of the param-
eters of the target predicate/action, or in a quantified parameter definition.
• The type of a parameter must agree with the type of the position where it appears.
• Both terms of an equivalent formula must already been deﬁned.
• Both terms of an equivalent formula must be of the same type.
• In a quantified parameter definition, each quantified parameter must not have been
deﬁned already.
• The type in a quantified parameter definitionmust be one of the deﬁned type names.
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• A quantified formula creates its own name space. Quantified parameters deﬁned
inside are invisible from outside.
For run-for statement:
• Type name must have already been deﬁned in the type definition section.
• One type name can only be populated once. (The term populate refers to the
assigning of elements to a type, here, denoted by a type name.)
• All the deﬁned type names must be populated.
In check statement:
• All parameters appearing in credentials and in goal must be deﬁned in quantified
parameter definition.
• For quantified parameter definition, the same semantic rules apply as for quantified
parameter definition in formula.
• For distinct parameters deﬁned on a type, their number must be no greater than
the number of elements assigned to the type in the run-for statement.
• For positive credentials and negative credentials, the same semantic rules apply as
for parameterised predicates in formula.
• For parametrised predicates appearing in goal, the same semantic rules apply as for
parameterised predicates in formula.
• In a coalition, an agent must have already been deﬁned in the quantified parameter
definition as an Agent. An agent cannot appear more than once in a coalition.
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6.5 Computation rounds
A computational round is a particular running of the algorithm when each quantiﬁed
variable deﬁned in the query is instantiated by an element in the class on which the
variable is deﬁned. In the query deﬁned in the following:
check {E dist a,c:Agent,p:Paper|| chair(c)*!->{c}:{reviewer(p,a)}} (2)
preceded by the run statement:
run for 3 Paper, 4 Agent (3)
there are three quantiﬁed variables: a, c (disjointed) are deﬁned on the set Agent, and p is
deﬁned on the set Paper. The set Agent is populated to four elements – {a1, a2, a3, a4} –
and the set Paper to three elements – {p1, p2, p3} – by the execution of the run-statement.
Therefore the possible values that a can have is four, the possible values for c is four, and
the possible values for p is three. The total number of combinations of the values of a, c
and p is forty-eight. Each of the combinations, if run by the algorithm, becomes a round.
However, to obtain the overall result for checking a query, not every round is executed
by the tool. The use of the keyword dist excludes those rounds where diﬀerent quantiﬁed
variables deﬁned on the same class play the same element. Moreover, for an existential
(universal) variable deﬁned on a class, a round in which the checking result returned is
true (false) excludes the necessity of running those rounds where only this variable is
instantiated diﬀerently.
However, the computation can be further simpliﬁed. In the cases that all quantiﬁed
variables are made distinct using the keyword dist, every round returns the same result,
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and therefore the result returned by any round is the same as the overall result. This is so
because in the cases that all quantiﬁed variables play diﬀerent elements, the model built
by the tool is symmetric.
Alternatively, we can write queries where we would like to consider situations where c
and a refer to the same object as in the following query:
check {E a,c:Agent,p:Paper|| ¬chair(c)*!->{c}:{reviewer(p,a)}} (4)
When running the tool, we leave the decision of running which round to the user as
discussed in Section 6.2 . In the following discussions, all the experimental results on
computational time and memory usage are the results obtained from running just one
round.
6.6 Evaluation
In Section 6.6.1 we introduce a running example where we explore the tool working from
encoding the policy into X-Policy code to generating the strategy and we explain how to
use the resulted strategy to ﬁx the policy. The X-Policy tool as a product is evaluated
and the performance analysis of the tool is analysed with a comparison against similar
tools where possible.
6.6.1 On the end product: a running example
In this Section, we introduce a running example to evaluate the tool. We start by dis-
cussing the construction of the input ﬁle and we then illustrate the tool running as well
as its output. We will use a running example (based loosely on the example discussed in
2.3.1) to illustrate the working of X-Policy and explain the input and output of the tool
and how we can interpret these results.
In Listing 6.1 we explore a simple example where there are a number of variables, x(p),
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AccessControlSystem xyuz example
Type P;
Pred i cate u(p : P) , x (p : P) , y (p : P) , z (p : P) ;
u (p) {read : y (p) ;}
x (p) {read : t rue ;}
y (p) {read : t rue ;}
z (p) {read : x (p) or ˜y (p) ;}
Action X2T(p :P) {x (p) := true ;}{˜u(p) ;}
Action X2F(p :P) {x (p) := f a l s e ;}{˜u(p) ;}
Action Y2T(p :P) {y (p) := true ;}{u(p) ;}
Action Y2F(p :P) {y (p) := f a l s e ;}{u(p) ;}
Action U2T(p :P) {u(p) := true ;}{ x (p) ;}
Action U2F(p :P) {u(p) := f a l s e ;}{ t rue ;}
Action Z2T(p :P) {z (p) := true ;}{ x (p) or y (p) ;}
Action Z2F(p :P) {z (p) := f a l s e ;}{ x (p) or y (p) ;}
End
run for 1 P, 1 Agent
check{E p : P, a : Agent | | {a } : ({˜ u(p) } AND {a } : ( [ z (p) ] ) ) }
Listing 6.1: The X-Policy input ﬁle for the XYUZ example.
y(p), u(p) and z(p) on which the user can read and perform actions. The following X-
Policy code speciﬁes the actions and read and execution permissions. In the Query we
ask whether or not there is a strategy for an agent a to execute so that he can reach the
goal of changing the value of u(p) to false and read the value of z(p).
We then run the X-Policy tool giving the ﬁle in the Listing 6.1 as an input. The tool
performs the model checking algorithm and outputs, in this case, a number of strategies.
We include one of these strategies in Listing 6.2 where the agent has built her knowledge
of the system by reading the model variables and decided which actions to execute based
on the value of these variables. This can be useful for analysing and determining the
dependencies between variables in the access control policy. The next Section evaluates
the X-Policy tool against similar tools. We discuss our methodology, experiments, results
and the examples we used in the evaluation.
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Strategy : 1 . 1
Coa l i t i on : [ 1 ]
i f ( y (1 ) i s t rue ) by 1 {
i f (u (1 ) i s t rue ) by 1 {
Execute the ac t i on Y2F(1) by agent 1 ;
i f ( z (1 ) i s t rue ) by 1 {
Execute the ac t i on U2F(1) by agent 1 ;
sk ip ;
} e l s e {
Execute the ac t i on U2F(1) by agent 1 ;
sk ip ;
}
} e l s e {
Execute the ac t i on X2T(1) by agent 1 ;
i f ( z (1 ) i s t rue ) by 1 {
sk ip ;
} e l s e {
sk ip ;
}
}
} e l s e {
i f ( z (1 ) i s t rue ) by 1 {
Execute the ac t i on U2F(1) by agent 1 ;
sk ip ;
} e l s e {
Execute the ac t i on U2F(1) by agent 1 ;
sk ip ;
}
}
The goa l i s r eachab l e . Number o f Strategy found : 1
Listing 6.2: The X-Policy output ﬁle for the XYUZ example.
6.6.2 Evaluation of X-Policy against similar tools.
In this Section, we evaluate X-Policy against similar tools that have been used to model
and analyse dynamic access control policies. This section also discusses issues resulting
from the translation process. We evaluate a number of access control systems with a num-
ber of properties. In Section 6.6.3 we evaluate X-Policy against RW (X-Policy precursor)
and DyNPAL runtime performance.
During this evaluation we will use a number of access control systems ﬁrst introduced
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by [121] and later used for evaluating DyNPAL in [12], as discussed in Section 6.6.3:
Employee information system (EIS) is used to enforce authorisation rules on bonus
allocation among the employees of a department. A bonus package with a ﬁxed
number of options, such as a free day oﬀ work, is available for all employees. The
director of the department chooses options from the package to give to all employees.
She can also read the information about the distribution of options. The director
can promote an employee to be a manager. Managers can read and set ordinary
employees’ bonuses, but not bonuses of other managers or the director. An employee
can appoint another employee to be his advocate, and have read access to his bonus
information – for example, this might be useful if he needs help from a trade union.
We detail this model in X-Policy in the Section D.1.
Student information system (SIS) is a system which enforces authorisation rules for
accessing students’ marks of a particular module. The following rules apply:
1. Whether an agent is a student is readable by all the agents.
2. Whether an agent is the lecturer of the module is readable by all the agents.
There is only one lecturer.
3. Whether a student’s year is higher than another student’s is readable by all
the agents.
4. Whether a student is a demonstrator of another student is readable by all the
agents.
5. The lecturer can appoint a student in a higher year to be a demonstrator of a
student in a lower year.
6. Whether a student can write another student’s mark is readable by the former.
7. The lecturer can give writing permissions to a demonstrator.
111
We include the SIS model in X-Policy in Section D.2.
Conference review system (CRS) which describes the access control policy regard-
ing the process of submitting and reviewing papers in a small conference which is
encoded in the X-Policy script in Section D.3. This is diﬀerent from EC which we
discussed in Chapter 5 as RW does not support modelling of compound actions.
6.6.3 Performance analysis of X-Policy
In this section we compare the performance analysis of X-Policy against similar tools.
We use a version of RW that does not support guessing strategies, and DYNPAL. For
DYNPAL, we use the performance data provided in [12] as the tool is not available for
public use. The queries described in Section 5.4 cannot be veriﬁed by RW as it does
not support compound actions. However, in order to compare performance, we take 4
queries from [121] that can be handled by both tools and DYNPAL. Note that DYNPAL
diﬀers from RW and X-Policy as it does not consider an agent’s knowledge in its system
representation, search algorithm and state transitions. This table demonstrates that
while the X-Policy tool uses Binary Decision Diagrams which are prone to state explosion
problem, it still manages to have a reasonable evaluation time. The query evaluation
time for RW is diﬀerent from those in [121, 12] as we are using a version of RW that
does not support guessing strategies. In order to compare the performance of X-Policy
against RW , the access control policies written in RW must be translated to X-Policy.
Each of the overwriting rules in RW is mapped to their equivalent action rules. Each
variable over-writing rule is split into two actions (write to true and write to false) with
the appropriate permission statement based on the access policy similar to the example
discussed in Section 6.6.1 which is a corresponding model the RW model discussed in
Section 2.3.1.
run run for 3 Paper , 4 Agent
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check {E dist a , c :Agent , p :Paper | |
cha i r ( c ) ∗ !
−>{c } :{ r ev i ewer (p , a ) }}
Listing 6.3: X-Policy Query 4.2 for conference review system.
We run the Query 4.2 which is expressed using X-Policy in Listing 6.3 for the CRS
with 7 objects (3 papers and 4 agents that looks for strategies which an agent can promote
herself to become a reviewer of a paper.
run run for 3 Paper , 4 Agent
check {E dist a , b , c : Agent , p : Paper | |
cha i r ( c ) ∗ ! & ˜author (p , a ) ∗ ! and submittedreview (p , b) ∗ !
and ˜ submittedreview (p , a ) ! and pcmember ( a ) ∗ !
and ˜ rev i ewer (p , a ) ! and ˜ subrev iewer (p , b , a ) ∗ !
and ˜ subrev iewer (p , c , a ) ∗ ! and ˜ subrev iewer (p , a , a ) ∗ !
−> {a } : ( [ rev iew (p , b) ]
THEN {a , c } : ({ submittedreview (p , a ) }) ) }
Listing 6.4: X-Policy Query 4.3 for conference review system.
Query 4.3 as expressed in Listing 6.4 for CRS which is a nested query that asks if a
reviewer can submit her review for a paper while she has read the review of someone else
before.
run for 3 Bonus , 3 Agent
check{E dist a1 , a2 : Agent , b : Bonus | |
˜ d i r e c t o r ( a1 ) ∗ ! and ˜ d i r e c t o r ( a2 ) ∗ !
and manager ( a1 ) ! and manager ( a2 ) !
and ˜bonus ( a1 , b) !
−> {a1 , a2 } : ({ bonus ( a1 , b) }) }
Listing 6.5: X-Policy Query 6.4 for EIS system.
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Query 6.4 as in Listing 6.5 with 6 objects for EIS which evaluates if two managers can
collaborate to set a bonus for one of them and Query 6.8 as in Listing 6.6 for SIS with 10
objects that asks if a lecturer can assign two students as the demonstrator of each other.
run for 10 Agent
check{E dist l , a1 , a2 : Agent | |
l e c t u r e r ( l ) ∗ ! and student ( a1 ) ∗ !
and student ( a2 ) ∗ ! and h igher ( a1 , a2 ) ∗ !
−> { l } :{ demonst rator o f ( a1 , a2 ) and demonst rator o f ( a2 , a1 ) }}
Listing 6.6: X-Policy Query 6.6 for SIS system.
These examples cover a number of scenarios and allow us to express and verify a
number of properties concerning each policy.
Figure 6.1 shows a reduction in time by the X-Policy algorithm compared RW. As
expected, the veriﬁcation time1 and state space grow exponentially when more objects
are added. However, X-Policy seems to perform better than RW in that sense. X-Policy
seems to perform the model checking algorithm in a reasonably acceptable time. In Table
Table 6.1: Query evaluation time in s.
Query(from [121] ) X-Policy DYNPAL RW
Query 4.2 0.254 0.120 0.447
Query 4.3 0.286 0.125 0.782
Query 6.4 0.780 0.120 0.892
Query 6.8 0.360 0.120 0.945
6.3, we record the number of variables, performance time for X-Policy and RW in relation
to the number of agents and papers for the Query 4.4 of the CRS with ﬁve-level nested
queries that checks if an agents can be assigned as a pcmember by the chair and then
resign her membership. As expected, we can see in Figure 6.5 that the number of variables
1total time for the rounds
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Table 6.2: X-Policy and RW performance in relation to the number of agents and papers
for Query 4.4 .
Number of papers 1 2 3 4 5
Number of agents 3 4 5 6 7
Number of state variables 270 720 1450 2520 3990
X-Policy (time in s) 0.498 1.259 4.889 15.86 134.822
RW (time in s) 0.434 1.354 13.307 48.758 157.352
in the model state (size of the model) and the performance time increases exponentially.
However, X-Policy still performs better than RW in that respect.
Figure 6.5: Relation between no. of agents and the performance time for X-Policy and
RW .
The computer used for these checks is a PC running Linux Centos (kernel 2.6.18)
and Java Runtime Environment 1.6.0 21 with heap size of 2GB on an Intel Core 2 Quad
2.33GHz with 2GB RAM.
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The time needed to verify EC for the properties discussed in 5.4 are as following1:
Table 6.3: X-Policy performance (all time in sec) when verifying EC against the proper-
ties discussed in 5.4
Property Minimum time (s) Maximum time (s) Average time (s)
Property 1 4.939 7.954 7.2
Property 2 3.883 1.576 1.9
Property 3 0.751 2.840 1.8
6.7 Chapter Summary
In this Chapter we presented the implementation of X-Policy tool. We also discussed
structure of the tool and the its main components. We followed by explaining the tool
usage usage information. The source code structure and overview are discussed in Section
6.3. The semantic checking is discussed in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 explains the notion
of computational rounds. We also discussed in detail the tool performance, results and
examples. We detail our evaluation of X-Policy against RW and DyNPAL. Section 6.6.2
includes the performance analysis where we compare the runtime of X-Policy against
other tools. It also analyse the relation between the size of the model and the runtime
needed for X-Policy analysis.
1Note that due to the space complixy of the algorithm as discussed in Section 4.6 and some imple-
mentation issues caused by the garabage collection for the JVM, the tool terminate after a number of
runs when the memory used reachs a maximum of 3GB on Linux. The number of runs before the it
terminates vary, however, in the worst case scenario at least 10 computational runs where done before it
terminated while verifying property 2.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis has presented X-Policy framework. The motivation for X-Policy is to provide
a simple modelling language and an automated veriﬁcation tool to give policy designers
and system managers the ability to specify and analyse collaborative system dynamic
policies. X-Policy framework is designed to model the dynamic execution permissions of
large web-based collaborative systems. We use knowledge-based methods to model the
multi-agent, centralised and collaborative aspect of these systems.
Access control policies is where three very interesting and fast developing ﬁelds meet:
software engineering, security engineering and computer science [5, 108]. The require-
ments and nature of software systems evolve and vary as the focus shift from one tech-
nology to another. Often, research in these ﬁelds are done in parallel to anticipate or
respond to the advances in the other ﬁelds. This is certainly true in the case of access
control. While the development of the early access control models were taking place as
part of the development of the early operating systems, the base of advances to relevant
technologies including grid, cloud and service oriented computing has created a new set
of problems to be solved.
Security concepts in on-line systems are hard to understand.
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On-line systems do not enjoy the physical systems’ checks. The ability to have a
concert understanding of access control concept of physical systems working makes it
easier to understand and analyse these systems. Procedures like keeping the money in
a vault or storing patients’ record into the clinic archive are easy to understand by the
interested parties: patients, doctors and the medical professionals.
The design of access control policies for on-line systems is an an error-prone and
inherently diﬃcult process. A general purpose and simple modelling language and an
automated analysis tool to model, study and analyse these policies can aid the design
process of the access control policy greatly. The modelling language has to be expressive
enough to model the concepts of the modelled systems. It also has to be simple enough
that users are able to learn and use easily to express concepts in a clear way. This thesis
proposed a modelling language and veriﬁcation tool X-Policy that is expressive enough
to model real life web-based collaborative systems like EasyChair.
The process of modelling and analysing of access control policies, similar to other se-
curity analysis ﬁelds [64, 62], depends on the ability to specify the system formally. Model
checking-based access control analysis tools like RW and X-Policy oﬀer us the ability to
model the users behaviour and knowledge as well as the working of the system policy.
The ability of X-Policy to model agents knowledge of the systems state when the user of
the system executes compound actions or read variables allows us to distinguish between
the legitimate access by the legitimate users and the illegitimate access by attackers. It
also allows us to understand the access control policy of the system from the point view
of the users. This is often hard as access control policies are developed as part of the
system in an ad-hoc fashion.
The ability of the X-Policy tool to handle various system sizes in a reasonable time
is crucial in our ability to analyse large systems. As Section 6.6.3 show, X-Policy tool
manages to analyse the access control systems in a reasonably acceptable time compared
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to other model checking based tools. However, the state size increases exponentially as
we increase the number of variables or agents in the model. The need to represent agents’
knowledge is responsible to a great extent for that fast growth of the state. However, the
state explosion problem can be improved by using model checking abstraction techniques
[26, 27, 68]. More speciﬁcally, [63] proposes a method that reduces the size of the model by
detecting the eﬀective variables in the model which are relevant to the attacker’s strategy.
The method ﬁrst ﬁnds the strategy then apply certain checks to ensure that this strategy
satisﬁes the knowledge constraints using the eﬀective variables. This method reduces the
number of variables needed and thus reduces the eﬀect of the state explosion problem.
The lack of real-life examples for access control policies formally speciﬁed is an issue
acknowledged by [11, 15, 16, 121]. This thesis models and analyses the access control
policy of EasyChair. We discuss a number of attacks that I discovered as detailed in
Chapter 5. These attacks show that simple properties like the author of a paper should
not review her own paper can be overlooked while designing and implementing a system
and show the need for tools like X-Policy. The ability to specify the access control policy
in X-Policy can simplify this process.
Furthermore, the process of building the speciﬁcation of an up and running system
is labour intensive and requires a lot of patience and experience to get right. While
having access to the source code of the system can be intuitive, the actual complexity
of the code and the working of the system limits the use of the code in understanding
the access control policy. The success and applicability of X-Policy to model and verify
real-life web-based collaborative systems like EasyChair are demonstrated by modelling
and analysing the access control policies for real life web-based collaborative systems like
the ones discussed in Chapter 5. X-Policy query language allow us to express security
properties involving a number of coalitions and nested goals as we discuss in Chapters
3 and 6. Furthermore, our analysis of these systems is aided by the use of X-Policy
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software implementation. We illustrate the implementation of the tool in Chapter 6. The
evaluation of our approach against other tools and approaches is discussed in Chapter 6.
The process of modelling analysing EC showcase the need to give a considerable
attention to the design of the access control policy of the system. The attacks found
show that simple implementation ﬂows can occur in the process of developing the system
and that can cause some unintended consequences. During the production of this thesis,
one of the most interesting reactions to those discovery has been that these attacks are
obvious and we may not require the use of automated tool to analyse and discover them.
This reaction can be expected for a various of reasons:
• It is often the case for practitioners of a certain ﬁeld to see the advantages of new
methods [115]. Indeed, non-functional requirement like security are often more
abstract in their nature and can be hard to explain to project managers
• Security analysis requires a certain way of thinking and expertise. The puzzle like
nature of the attack analysis makes the discovery of the attack is where the diﬃculty
lies rather than the nature of the attack itself. This is certainly true in many cases
of security attacks [75, 96] and has been attributed to the way we reason about
problems based on its representation [117].
• The users of the conference management systems are generally academics and thus
they are inclined to preserve their integrity and avoid wrong doing, this argument
indeed discounts the human nature. However, the concepts developed in this thesis
and tool can be used to model other systems. For example, Moodle [110] is a course
management system that is used to provide on-line courses to various audiences.
In one particular case, Moodle is used to deliver courses to prisoners [103]. This is
indeed one of the cases where ensuring the security of the system is sacrosanct. A
security failure of Moodle in this scenario has the potential of not only aﬀecting the
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system integrity but the security of the community at large.
Crucially, the approach combines the knowledge acquired by multi-agent coalition
using the system with the dynamic behaviour of the compound actions. Our use of model
checking algorithm produces attack strategies in when the security property fail. These
strategies can help the policy designers understand and ﬁx the policy. X-Policy, with its
ability to establish the relation between an action and the agent who is executing it, allows
us to analyse security properties that require collaboration between a speciﬁc set of agents
who are allowed to act to achieve an attack on the system. X-Policy’s ability to specify
read and write actions also allows us to reason about pieces of data being read as part of
the attack. Unlike many other tools and languages, the approach allows the expression
of reading permissions and reasoning about “under what conditions can an agent execute
an action?” rather than on answering the question “under what conditions can an action
be executed?”. X-Policy parameter typing allows us to establish the relation between the
agent who can execute an action and the action itself. This is indeed necessary to enable
us to deﬁne agent coalitions and establish which agent is executing an action. It allows
us to detect attacks where we are interested in who can execute a set of actions rather
than whether a set of actions can be executed regardless of the agents involved.
The design of X-Policy is guided by the use of real life examples and case studies.
This proposes a number of modelling conventions for web-based conference management
systems which can be applied to other web-based systems. We use EasyChair as our
central example for its wide use and importance. We build a model EC based on our
understanding of the policy of EasyChair. The full EC model is available at [90]. It
contains 49 actions and permission statements. This is relatively concise given the size
and complexity of EasyChair. The way the system functionality is split into actions is
decided by our understanding of how the system is actually designed. The ability to
specify multi-assignment actions enables us to maintain the integrity constraint so that,
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for example, when a PC-member is deleted, her reviewing assignments are also deleted.
Using X-Policy, we can reason about the security properties of our model. We presented
a case study of three security properties for EasyChair and described the possible attacks
on these properties as well as ways the system could be changed to prevent these attacks.
We have informed the developer of EasyChair of our ﬁndings.
7.1 Summary of Contribution
The main contribution of this thesis is the development of X-Policy framework and the
analysis of real life large scale systems like EasyChair. More speciﬁcally, this thesis provide
the following contributions:
• It proposes a novel, simple, parametrised and typed propositional logic-based proce-
dural-like modelling language to model multi-agent dynamic access control policies
with the ability to express readability permissions and compound actions.
• It devises a knowledge-based multi-agent model checking algorithm to analyse se-
curity properties as reachability queries expressed in X-Policy query language.
• It provides the area of verifying dynamic access control policies with the a number
of large-scale real-life web-based collaborative systems case-studies.
• It introduces a number of conventions for modelling large scale real life web-based
collaborative systems.
• It expresses the access control policy of the modelled systems in X-Policy and
analysing a number of security properties of these systems.
• It reports the discovery of a number of security ﬂaws in the studied systems and
proposing ways to ﬁx these systems.
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• It describes the implementation of the software tool for X-Policy framework and
testing it with a number of case studies.
• It evaluates the X-Policy software tool performance and compare it against similar
tools.
• It discusses the results of our analysis and the lessons learned from the case study.
While other related approaches try to solve diﬀerent aspects of the problems of ex-
pressing and verifying state-based dynamic access control policies like DYNPAL [12, 14]
and RW [120, 121, 122], the method in thesis thesis combines the knowledge-based rea-
soning which is diﬀerent from DYNPAL and the simple modelling language to express
compound actions which RW lack. Lo et. al. [74, 87] analyse the security features of
Web Submission and Review Software WSAR [46]. They study the security properties
like the system password strength and storage, its resistance to SQL injection, forced
browsing and browser caching. However, their analysis does not include the access con-
trol policy of the system. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the ﬁrst to model
and analyse dynamic access control policy for a large web-based collaborative system with
atomic actions like EasyChair. This is signiﬁcant as we discussed in Chapters 2, 5 and 6.
While X-Policy provides a simple modelling language with simple constructs, users
of X-Policy has to decide the appropriate level of abstraction when building the system
model. It might be more suitable to abstract some of the actions and variable to let the
policy designers target a speciﬁc property or issue. While the result of the veriﬁcation
of a model is speciﬁc to that certain model and property, the process of building and
analysing the model allows for a better understanding and gives the ability to abstract
the access control policy in a more eﬀective and uniform way.
X-Policy is best suited for modelling and analysing control-intensive systems like con-
ference management systems. In other applications, such as Facebook, Google+, and
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Linkedin, X-Policy is able to model relations and actions like forming friendship relations
or sharing and commenting on photos. However, the system model of these systems al-
lows other applications to authenticate users credentials to third party services. It also
allows these services to access the user’s information with the consent of the users. The
combination of the authentication process and the dynamic aspect of the access control
policy of these services seems interesting. While this is an interesting issue, it falls outside
the scope of this thesis.
7.2 Future Work
This thesis should only be seen as another step towards modelling and analysing access
control policies in complex real-life systems. This thesis could be extended or build-upon
in various directions. Some of the future work can go to address limitations or issues
outside the scope and the assumptions of this thesis.
This thesis focuses on web-based collaborative systems is justiﬁed by the sustained
increase and wide acceptance of centralised highly conﬁgurable cloud-based singular proﬁle
systems to manage various aspect of out life like the one discussed in Chapter 5. However,
other aspects can be considered within the cloud computing model. Cloud computing
services attract many users and organisations for its ease of use and operational cost saving
beneﬁts. A number of laws exist to regulate data usage and storage one these systems. For
example, companies operating in the United Kingdom which collect and store personal
data of costumers are required by law to comply with the UK Data Protection Act 1999.
Still, cloud computing systems still equally vulnerable as other computing systems as
they represent highly prized target as they accumulate massive centralise amount of data.
Customers’ emails and addresses were stolen as a result of phishing attacks [82]. Our
ability to understand these systems is still limited. It is certainly diﬃcult to reason about
the trade-oﬀ between security and usability in these systems. We still exploring the use
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of emerging technologies like trusted computing and TPM devices [106] to ensure certain
security properties and establish trust between the system and its users. A wide ranging
and diverse approaches, proposals and techniques to analyse and facilitate the design of
security requirements of these systems are developed [61, 113, 31, 3, 6, 112]. Many security
concerns remain unsolved.
Another aspect of access control policy is temporal constraints[18] and temporal rea-
soning [59]. For example, we may want to model an access control system for a conference
system that uses an actual time as as the deadline for the paper of review submission sys-
tem. X-Policy does not support these constraints at the moment. However, one way to
model that is by deﬁning a an agent of the type timer where treat that agent as our
clock. We may also need to extend X-Policy to deﬁne temporal variables that represent
a state of the time. This will be interesting issue to attack as an extension to X-Policy
in the future. At the moment the X-Policy query language allows temporal reasoning in
the fact that it can deﬁne nested query. However, a more expressive temporal reasoning
properties can help us analyse these systems where time is critical.
In the case of web-based collaborative systems discussed in this thesis, it will be
interesting to explore ways to analyse the side eﬀects of the combination between various
systems under diﬀerent administrators? For example, EasyChair hosts various conference
management system simultaneously. The case-studies considered in this thesis analyse
the policy across a singular system i.e. a single conference. However, the use of cloud
systems allows the users to act in various roles in a number of systems at the same time.
A number of questions seems appropriate: can an agent acting in various capacities in
a number of conferences gain access to certain information that violate the integrity of
one or more of these conferences? Can the EasyChair developers provide guarantees that
certain properties regarding information collection and storage are preserved? StatVerif
[6] is a process calculus-based tool to verify protocols that aﬀect the global state of the
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system which applies to web-based systems and TPM-based systems. There is a need for
further research to establish the extend in which our method can be extended to model
these properties.
This thesis contributes an analysis algorithm and its implementation as X-Policy tool.
As we show in Chapter 6 the performance of X-Policy is relatively acceptable compared
to similar approaches. However, this can be improved. [63] proposed the use of eﬀective
variables to reduce the variables considered in the model checking algorithm. Other
abstraction techniques [26, 27, 68] can be used to reduce the state variables and increase
the size of systems studied. Another possibility is to try a depth-ﬁrst recursive search
in the backward reachability computation. Currently the algorithm for ﬁnding strategies
uses something like a breadth-ﬁrst search. However, if we use a depth-ﬁrst recursive
search it may improve the performance of the algorithm in ﬁnding strategies. However, a
recursive algorithm is more diﬃcult to analyse. Although many challenges remain ahead
before we are able to fully understand security requirements for large complex systems
like the one discussed in this thesis, the contribution of this work and others facilitate
and simplify the process of modelling, studying and analysing these systems
So little done, so much to do.
Alexander Graham Bell [1847–1922]
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APPENDIX A
Algo-1
The diﬀerences between Algo-0 and Algo-1 are the ways they treat those newly found
sets through the pre-computations. Algo-0 discards a newly found set if all the states in
this set have already in states seen. Algo-1 discards a newly found set if this set is a
subset of a set in strategies. Algo-0 adds a pair constructed from a newly found set to
strategies no matter kinit is in the set or not. Algo-1 adds a pair constructed from a
newly found set to strategies if kinit is not in the set.
When there are no strategies, both Algo-0 and Algo-1 ﬁnd none. When there are some
strategies, both Algo-0 and Algo-1 ﬁnd some, however, the strategies found by Algo-1 may
diﬀer from the ones found by Algo-0. The pseudo-code of Algo-1 is:
1 strategies := ∅ ;
2 states seen := ∅ ;
3 put (KG, skip;) in strategies ;
4 repeat until strategies does not change{
5 choose (Y1, s1) ∈ strategies ;
6 for each act(−→α ) ∈ Actions∗{
7 for each a ∈ C{
8 PXY := Pre∃,a
act(−→α )
(Y1) ;
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9 i f ( (PXY 6= ∅) ∧ (PXY 6⊆ any set of the pairs in strategies) ) {
10 axs1 := “a : act(
−→α )” + s1 ;
11 i f (kinit ∈ PXY)
12 output axs1 ;
13 e l s e
14 strategies := strategies ∪ {(PXY, axs1)} ;
15 }
16 }
17 }
18 choose (Y2, s2) ∈ strategies ;
19 for each va r i ab l e p(−→α ) ∈ P {
20 for each a ∈ C{
21 PRY := Pre∃,a
p(−→α )=⊤
(Y1) ∩ Pre
∃,a
p(−→α )=⊥
(Y2) ;
22 i f ( (PRY 6= ∅) ∧ (PRY 6⊆ any set of the pairs in strategies) ) {
23 pss :=“ i f (a : p(−→α )) then s1 e l s e s2 ” ;
24 i f (kinit ∈ PRY)
25 output pss ;
26 e l s e
27 strategies := strategies ∪ {(PRY, pss)} ;
28 }
29 }
30 }
31 }
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APPENDIX B
Step-by-Step derivation of the attacks in Chapter 5
In this Chapter we will provide the step by step derivation the attacks on EC discussed
in Chapter 5. We have discovered these issues while using EasyChair. In each case, we
show an attack strategy to achieve an undesirable state by hand.
For the purpose of this analysis we consider the EC model as deﬁned in Chapter 5.
We introduce a number of restrictions to simplify our proof. We restrict our analysis to
the system states and we prove a single strategy which is an execution sequence of read
and write actions which takes the model from an initial state m0 to a goal state mg. A
strategy still can be executed by more than one agent where agents collaborate to reach
the goal. We show that these strategies work on our model and reach the goal state.
The EC model deﬁnes the sets T , P , Actions∗ and permission statements. It also
deﬁnes, for each type t, a ﬁnite set of individuals σt. We deﬁne σ = σt1 ∪ · · · ∪ σtn as the
set of all the individuals deﬁned by EC . We assume σt1 ∩ σt2 = ∅ whenever t1 and t2 are
distinct. If p is a predicate and −→α is a sequence of individuals of the appropriate type
then p(−→α ) is a ground atomic formula. State m of the model M is a valuation of the
ground atomic formulae. In the rest of this Chapter we identify each state with the set of
ground atomic formulae which are true in the state. We also treat the for-loop statements
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and calculate the actions eﬀect similarly which we include here for completion.
For loops. We describe the semantics of for-loops in the context of a model EC , with
σt = {v1, . . . , vk} the set of individuals in EC of the type t. Let act ∈ Actions. We
then transform each for-statement to its equivalent multiple assignment statements. For
example the following for-statement:
for (v : t) {p(−→γ1 , v,
−→γ2) := ⊥; }
is in the write action act(−→x ) where −→γ1 and
−→γ2 are subsequences of other parameters. This
for-statement is transformed to:
p(−→γ1 , v1,
−→γ2) := ⊥;
...
p(−→γ1 , vk,
−→γ2) := ⊥;
We apply this process repeatedly until we have no for-statement in our action. We call
the resulted loop-free action: act∗(−→x ).
Effect of Actions. Let act ∈ Actions and −→α a sequence of individuals of the appropriate
type for act. We deﬁne the result of running the instantiated action act(−→α ). We ﬁrst
compute act∗(−→α ), as above. We then apply the functions: eﬀect+() and eﬀect−() which
compute the positive and the negative eﬀect of the instantiated loop-free action act∗(−→α )
as following:
eﬀect+(act∗(−→α )) = {p(
−→
β ) — p(
−→
β ):=⊤ occurs in act∗(−→α )}
eﬀect−(act∗(−→α )) = {p(
−→
β ) — p(
−→
β ):=⊥ occurs in act∗(−→α )}
where all the values of
−→
β are members of σ.
The action eﬀect then will be applied to the model state. Executing a write action
will transfer the model from a pre-execution state mi in which the action is executed
at to a post-execution state mi+1. It adds the set of ground atomic formulae which are
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updated to true to the state mi. It also subtracts the set of ground atomic formulae that
are updated to false from the state mi. All the other ground atomic formulae in the state
mi will remain unchanged. Let’s say that the model M is in the state mi when an agent
u executes the write action act(−→α ), then the model will be transformed from the state
mi to the state mi+1 where mi+1 = mi\eﬀect
−(act∗(−→α )) ∪ eﬀect+(act∗(−→α )). Note that
eﬀect−(act∗(−→α )) ∩ eﬀect+(act∗(−→α ))=∅. Therefore, adding and subtracting can be done
in any order. Read actions do not change the model state. However, read actions can be
part of an attack strategy as we will see in Section 5.4.
We deﬁne a number of individuals of types Agent and Paper and use these individuals
to deﬁne an initial state which we refer to as m0. For our EC model, we create the
following conﬁguration:
1. The system has ﬁve agents: Alice, Bob, Eve, Carol and Marvin. The system has two
submitted papers: p1 and p2. We express the conﬁguration as following: σPaper =
{p1, p2} and σAgent = {Alice, Bob, Carol, Eve, Marvin}.
2. Alice is the Chair of PC. Bob and Carol are PC members. Paper p1 is submitted by
the author Marvin while p2 is submitted by the author Eve. Reviewers’ names are
obscured from each other by enabling the anonymous reviewing option. Authors’
names are obscured from the PC members and the reviewers. The conference sub-
mission is conﬁgured in the anonymous submission mode. The list of submissions
can be viewed by PC chairs only. Non-chairs do not have access to reviews of papers
not assigned to them. In this case, we choose an up-and-running state of EC to
keep our proof to a minimum. However, we can derive the system from an earlier
state. We express these settings in the following X-Policy conﬁguration:
m0 = { Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Author(p2,Eve),
PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(),
Chair-review-en(), PCM-review-menu-en(), Sub-anonymous(), Review-assig-enabled()}
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Now that we have deﬁned the initial state m0, we can analyse the following prop-
erties. Each of these properties will start from m0 and derive the model using a
strategy Si to reach the goal state mSig .
B.1 Proof for the attack on property 1
In the following, we use Alice:Add-Reviewer-Assignment(p1,Bob) to denote that the agent
Alice executes the action Add-Reviewer-Assignment(p1,Bob). Starting from m0 we show
how the model state evolves through the attack strategy. At each step, we explicitly list,
when appropriate, the list of ground atomic formulae that has to be absent or present to
execute the following action from the model state:
Alice:Add-Reviewer-Assignment(p1,Bob);
requires the presence of Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), Review-assig-enabled().
requires the absence of Conf-of-interest(p1,Bob).
mS11 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Sub-anonymous(),
Author(p2,Eve), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(),
Chair-review-en(), PCM-review-menu-en(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p1,Bob)}
Alice:Add-Reviewer-Assignment(p1,Carol);
requires the presence of Chair(Alice), PCmember(Carol), Review-assig-enabled().
requires the absence of Conf-of-interest(p1,Carol).
mS12 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Sub-anonymous(),
Author(p2,Eve), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(),
Chair-review-en(), PCM-review-menu-en(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p1,Bob), Reviewer(p1,Carol)}
Bob:Request-Reviewing(p1,Bob,Eve);
requires the presence of PCmember(Bob), Reviewer(p1,Bob), PCM-review-menu-en().
mS13 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Sub-anonymous(),
Author(p2,Eve), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(),
Chair-review-en(), PCM-review-menu-en(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p1,Bob), Reviewer(p1,Carol),
Requested-subrev(p1,Bob,Eve)}
Carol:Request-Reviewing(p1,Carol,Eve);
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requires the presence of PCmember(Carol), Reviewer(p1,Carol), PCM-review-menu-en().
mS14 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Sub-anonymous(),
Author(p2,Eve), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(),
Chair-review-en(), PCM-review-menu-en(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p1,Bob), Reviewer(p1,Carol),
Requested-subrev(p1,Bob,Eve), Requested-subrev(p1,Carol,Eve)}
Eve:Accept-Reviewing-Request(p1,Bob,Eve);
requires the presence of Requested-subrev(p1,Bob,Eve).
mS15 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Sub-anonymous(),
Author(p2,Eve), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(),
Chair-review-en(), PCM-review-menu-en(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p1,Bob), Reviewer(p1,Carol),
Requested-subrev(p1,Bob,Eve), Requested-subrev(p1,Carol,Eve), Decided-subrev(p1,Bob,Eve),
Subreviewer(p1,Bob,Eve)}
Eve:Accept-Reviewing-Request(p1,Carol,Eve);
requires the presence of Requested-subrev(p1,Carol,Eve).
mS16 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Sub-anonymous(),
Author(p2,Eve), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(),
Chair-review-en(), PCM-review-menu-en(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p1,Bob), Reviewer(p1,Carol),
Requested-subrev(p1,Bob,Eve), Requested-subrev(p1,Carol,Eve), Decided-subrev(p1,Bob,Eve),
Subreviewer(p1,Bob,Eve), Decided-subrev(p1,Carol,Eve), Subreviewer(p1,Carol,Eve)}
Bob:Add-Review(p1,Bob,Eve);
requires the presence of PCmember(Bob), Reviewer(p1,Bob), PCM-review-menu-en(),
PCM-review-editing-en().
mS17 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Sub-anonymous(),
Author(p2,Eve), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(),
Chair-review-en(), PCM-review-menu-en(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p1,Bob), Reviewer(p1,Carol),
Requested-subrev(p1,Bob,Eve), Requested-subrev(p1,Carol,Eve),
Decided-subrev(p1,Bob,Eve), Subreviewer(p1,Bob,Eve), Decided-subrev(p1,Carol,Eve),
Subreviewer(p1,Carol,Eve), Submitted-review(p1,Bob,Eve)}
Carol:Add-Review(p1,Carol,Eve);
requires the presence of PCmember(Carol), Reviewer(p1,Carol),PCM-review-menu-en(),
PCM-review-editing-en().
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mS18 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Sub-anonymous(),
Author(p2,Eve), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(),
Chair-review-en(), PCM-review-menu-en(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p1,Bob), Reviewer(p1,Carol),
Requested-subrev(p1,Bob,Eve), Requested-subrev(p1,Carol,Eve),
Decided-subrev(p1,Bob,Eve), Subreviewer(p1,Bob,Eve), Decided-subrev(p1,Carol,Eve),
Subreviewer(p1,Carol,Eve), Submitted-review(p1,Bob,Eve), Submitted-review(p1,Carol,Eve)}
In this case the model state mo has evolved during the scenario to the goal state m
S1
8 . The
ground atomic formulae Submitted-review(p1,Bob,Eve) and Submitted-review(p1,Carol,Eve)
are in mS18 . This means that Eve has managed to write two reviews for the same paper
and get them submitted to the system. Similarly, Eve could have written all the reviews
of that particular paper. Consequently, EasyChair fails the property as a single reviewer
can determine the outcome of a paper.
B.2 Proof for the attack on property 2
We now show how the model state evolves through the attack strategy. At each step, we
explicitly list, when appropriate, the list of ground atomic formulae that has to be absent
or present to execute the following action from the model state:
Alice:Add-Reviewer-Assignment(p2,Bob);
requires the presence of Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), Review-assig-enabled().
requires the absence of Conf-of-interest(p2,Bob).
mS21 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Author(p2,Eve),
Conf-of-interest(p1,Alice), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(), Chair-review-en(),
PCM-review-menu-en(), Sub-anonymous(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p2,Bob)}
Bob:Request-Reviewing(p2,Bob,Eve);
requires the presence of PCmember(Bob), Reviewer(p2,Bob), PCM-review-menu-en().
mS22 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Author(p2,Eve),
Conf-of-interest(p1,Alice), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(), Chair-review-en(),
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PCM-review-menu-en(), Sub-anonymous(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p2,Bob),
Requested-subrev(p2,Bob,Eve)}
Eve:Accept-Reviewing-Request(p2,Bob,Eve);
requires the presence of PCmember(Bob), Reviewer(p2,Bob), PCM-review-menu-en().
mS23 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Author(p2,Eve),
Conf-of-interest(p1,Alice), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(), Chair-review-en(),
PCM-review-menu-en(), Sub-anonymous(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p2,Bob),
Decided-subrev(p2,Bob,Eve), Subreviewer(p2,Bob,Eve)}
Bob:Add-Review(p2,Bob,Eve);
requires the presence of PCmember(Bob), Reviewer(p2,Bob), PCM-review-editing-en(),
PCM-review-menu-en().
mS24 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Author(p2,Eve),
Conf-of-interest(p1,Alice), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(), Chair-review-en(),
PCM-review-menu-en(), Sub-anonymous(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p2,Bob),
Decided-subrev(p2,Bob,Eve), Subreviewer(p2,Bob,Eve), Submitted-review(p2,Bob,Eve)}
In this case the model has evolved to the goal state where ground atomic formula Submitted-
review(p2,Bob,Eve) is in mS24 . This means that Eve has managed to submit a review for
her own paper p2. EasyChair fails this property as it allows a paper’s reviewers to submit
a review written by the paper’s author herself.
B.3 Proof for the attack on property 3
We show how the model state evolves through the attack strategy:
Alice:Add-Reviewer-Assignment(p1,Bob);
requires the presence of Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob)Review-assig-enabled().
requires the absence of Conf-of-interest(p1,Bob)
mS31 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Author(p2,Eve),
Conf-of-interest(p1,Alice), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(), Chair-review-en(),
PCM-review-menu-en(), Sub-anonymous(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p1,Bob)}
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Bob:Add-Review(p1,Bob,Bob);
requires the presence of PCmember(Bob), Reviewer(p1,Bob), PCM-review-menu-en(),
PCM-review-editing-en().
mS32 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Author(p2,Eve),
Conf-of-interest(p1,Alice), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(), Chair-review-en(),
PCM-review-menu-en(), Sub-anonymous(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p1,Bob),
Submitted-review(p1,Bob,Bob)}
Alice:Show-Review(p1,Bob,Bob);
requires the presence of Chair(Alice), Chair-review-en().
mS33 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Author(p2,Eve),
Conf-of-interest(p1,Alice), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(), Chair-review-en(),
PCM-review-menu-en(), Sub-anonymous(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p1,Bob),
Submitted-review(p1,Bob,Bob)}
Alice:Add-Review(p1,Carol,Carol);
requires the presence of Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), Reviewer(p1,Carol),
PCM-review-menu-en(), PCM-review-editing-en().
mS34 = {Chair(Alice), PCmember(Bob), PCmember(Carol), Author(p1,Marvin), Author(p2,Eve),
Conf-of-interest(p1,Alice), PCM-review-editing-en(), View-sub-by-chair-permitted(), Chair-review-en(),
PCM-review-menu-en(), Sub-anonymous(), Review-assig-enabled(), Reviewer(p1,Bob),
Submitted-review(p1,Bob,Bob), Submitted-review(p1,Carol,Carol)}
We can see that mS34 is the goal state m
S3
g as chair Alice has managed to submit a
review to the paper p1 as if she were the PC member Carol.
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APPENDIX C
Syntax of the X-policy language
Here we use standard symbols for syntax deﬁnition. (A)∗ means A repeats zero or more
than zero times. [A] means A is optional. A|B means a choice between A and B.
Characters quoted by “ ” is a string. All the grammatical units are enclosed by 〈 and 〉.
〈Model〉 ::= 〈System〉 [〈RunStatement〉] [〈Specification〉]
〈System〉 ::= “AccessControlSystem” 〈SystemName〉 〈Body〉 “End”
〈Body〉 ::= [〈TypeDefSection〉] 〈PredicateDefSection〉 〈Rules〉
〈TypeDefSection〉 ::= “Type” 〈TypeName〉 (“,” 〈TypeName〉)* “;”
〈PredicateDefSection〉 ::= “Predicate”〈PredicateDef〉 (“,” 〈PredicateDef〉)* “;”
〈PredicateDef〉 ::= 〈PredicateName〉((“(”“)”)|(“(” 〈ParameterName〉 “:” 〈ClassName〉
(“,” 〈ParameterName〉 “:”〈ClassName〉)* “)”))[“!”]
〈Rules〉 ::= 〈ReadRules〉 〈ActionRules〉
〈ReadRules〉 ::= 〈ReadRule〉 (〈ReadRule〉)*
〈ActionRules〉 ::= 〈ActionRule〉 (〈ActionRule〉)*
〈ReadRule〉 ::= 〈AccessPattern〉 “{” [〈ReadStatement〉] “}”
〈AccessPattern〉 ::= 〈PredicateName〉 “(”〈FormalParameter〉 (“,” 〈FormalParameter〉)* “)”
〈ReadStatement〉 ::= “read” “:” 〈Formula〉 “;”
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〈ActionRule〉 ::= 〈ActionName〉 〉((“(”“)”)|(“(” 〈ParameterName〉 “:” 〈ClassName〉
(“,” 〈ParameterName〉 “:”〈TypeName〉)* “)”))
“{” [〈WriteSubroutine〉] “}”
“{” [〈ActionStatement〉]“}”
〈WriteSubroutine〉::=[〈SingleAssignment〉 ]|[〈MultiAssignment〉]
(〈MultiAssignment〉)*(〈SingleAssignment〉)*
〈SingleAssignment〉::=〈SinglePredicate〉 “:=”(“true”|“false”)“;”
〈MultiAssignment〉::=“for(” 〈LocalVariable〉 “:” 〈TypeName〉 “)”
“{”〈SingleAssignment〉 (〈SingleAssignment〉)*“}”
〈ActionStatement〉 ::= 〈Formula〉 “;”
〈Formula〉 ::= “true” | 〈ConditionalFormula〉
〈ConditionalFormula〉 ::= 〈ImplicationFormula〉
〈ImplicationFormula〉 ::= 〈OrFormula〉 (〈implies〉 〈OrFormula〉)*
〈OrFormula〉 ::= 〈AndFormula〉 (〈or〉 〈AndFormula〉)*
〈AndFormula〉 ::= 〈OtherFormula〉 (〈and〉 〈OtherFormula〉)*
〈OtherFormula〉 ::= 〈AtomicFormula〉 | “(”(〈ConditionalFormula〉)*“)”
| 〈negation〉 〈OtherFormula〉 | 〈QuantifiedFormula〉
〈AtomicFormula〉 ::= 〈SinglePredicate〉 | 〈EquivalentFormula〉
〈SinglePredicate〉 ::= 〈PredicateName〉 “(”〈FormalParameter〉 (“,” 〈FormalParameter〉)* “)”
〈EquivalentFormula〉 ::= 〈Term〉 “=” 〈Term〉
〈Term〉 ::= 〈FormalParameter〉 | 〈QuantifiedVariable〉
〈QuantifiedFormula〉 ::= “E”|“A” 〈QuantifiedVariablesDef〉 (“,” [“E”|“A”]
〈QuantifiedVariablesDef〉)* “[”〈ConditionalFormula〉“]”
〈QuantifiedVariablesDef〉 ::= [“dist”§] 〈QuantifiedVariable〉 (“,” 〈QuantifiedVariable〉)*
“:” 〈TypeName〉
〈ModelName〉 ::= 〈Id〉
〈TypeName〉† ::= 〈Id〉
〈PredicateName〉 ::= 〈Id〉
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〈ParameterName〉‡ ::= 〈Id〉
〈FormalParameter〉 ::= 〈Id〉
〈QuantifiedVariable〉 ::= 〈Id〉
〈LocalVariable〉::= 〈Id〉
〈implies〉 ::= “implies” | “→”
〈or〉 ::= “or” | “|”
〈and〉 ::= “and” | “&”
〈negation〉 ::= “∼”
〈Id〉 ::= 〈Letter〉 (〈Letter〉 | 〈Digit〉 | “ ” | “-”)*
† 〈TypeName〉 must start with an upper case letter.
‡ 〈ParameterName〉 must start with a lower case letter.
§ The keyword “dist” can only be used on quantified variables defined in 〈CheckStatement〉
The precedence is: “=” > “∼” > “&” > “|” > “→”
〈RunStatement〉 ::= “run for” 〈NumberClassPair〉 (“,” 〈NumberClassPair〉)*
〈NumberClassPair〉 ::= 〈Integer〉 〈ClassName〉
〈Specification〉 ::= 〈CheckStatement〉
〈CheckStatement〉 ::= “check” “{” 〈QuantifiedVariablesList〉 “||”
[〈Conditions〉 “→”] 〈Coalition〉 “:” 〈Goal〉 “}”
〈QuantifiedVariablesList〉 ::= “E”|“A” 〈QuantifiedVariablesDef〉
(“,” [“E”|“A”] 〈QuantifiedVariablesDef〉)*
〈Conditions〉 ::= 〈Condition〉 (〈and〉 〈Condition〉)*
〈Condition〉 ::= 〈PositiveCondition〉 | 〈NegativeCondition〉
〈PositiveCondition〉 ::= 〈PredicateName〉 “(”〈FormalParameter〉
(“,” 〈FormalParameter〉)*“)” “*” | “!” | “*!”
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〈NegativeCondition〉 ::= 〈negation〉 〈PredicateName〉 “(”〈FormalParameter〉
(“,” 〈FormalParameter〉)*“)” “!” | “*!”
〈Goal〉 ::= [“(”] 〈OrGoal〉 [〈SubGoal〉] [“)”]
〈SubGoal〉 ::= “AND” 〈Coalition〉 “:” “(”〈OrGoal〉 (〈SubGoal〉)* “)”
〈OrGoal〉 ::= 〈AndGoal〉 (〈or〉 〈AndGoal〉)*
〈AndGoal〉 ::= 〈AtomicGoal〉 (〈and〉 〈AtomicGoal〉)*
〈AtomicGoal〉 ::= 〈ReadingGoal〉 | 〈MakingGoal〉 | “(”〈Goal〉“)”
〈ReadingGoal〉 ::= “[”〈GoalExpression〉“]”
〈MakingGoal〉 ::= “{”〈GoalExpression〉“}”
〈GoalExpression〉 ::= 〈OrGoalExpression〉 (〈implies〉 〈OrGoalExpression〉)*
〈OrGoalExpression〉 ::= 〈AndGoalExpression〉 (〈or〉 〈AndGoalExpression〉)*
〈AndGoalExpression〉 ::= 〈BasicGoalExpression〉 (〈and〉 〈BasicGoalExpression〉)*
〈BasicGoalExpression〉 ::= 〈AGoalPredicate〉 | 〈negative〉 〈BasicGoalExpression〉
| “(”〈GoalExpression〉“)”
〈AGoalPredicate〉 ::= 〈SinglePredicate〉
〈Coalition〉 ::= “{” 〈Id〉 (“,” 〈Id〉)*“}”
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APPENDIX D
Models used to evaluate X-Policy against similar
tools.
In this Section, we illustrate the models used to evaluate X-Policy against similar tools in
Section 6.6.2. In Chapter 6 we used commonly used examples of access control systems as
ﬁrst introduced by [121] and later used for evaluating DyNPAL in [12]. In the following
we list the X-Policy script for each system and we detail the Queries used as speciﬁed in
X-Policy.
D.1 Employee information system (EIS)
Employee information system (EIS) describes the access control policy regarding the pro-
cess of allocating bonuses to employees by managers and directors. It also allows union
representatives to advocate for other employee. The X-Policy script for the employee
information system is given in Listing D.1.
AccessControlSystem EmployeeInformationSystem
Type Bonus ;
Pred i cate bonus ( employee : Agent , bonus : Bonus ) ,
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manager ( employee : Agent) ,
d i r e c t o r ( employee : Agent) ,
advocate ( appo inter : Agent , appointee : Agent) ;
bonus (a , b) {
read : (user=a or d i r e c t o r (user ) )
or (manager (user ) and ˜manager ( a ) and ˜ d i r e c t o r ( a ) )
or ( advocate ( a , user ) ) ; }
manager ( a ) { read : t rue ; }
d i r e c t o r ( a ) { read : t rue ; }
advocate ( a1 , a2 ) {read : t rue ; }
Action Setbonus ( a :Agent , b : Bonus )
{bonus (a , b ) := true ;}
{(manager (user ) and ˜manager ( a ) and ˜ d i r e c t o r ( a ) )
or d i r e c t o r (user ) ;}
Action UnSetbonus ( a :Agent , b : Bonus )
{bonus (a , b ) := f a l s e ;}
{(manager (user ) and ˜manager ( a ) and ˜ d i r e c t o r ( a ) )
or d i r e c t o r (user ) ;}
Action Setmanager ( a :Agent)
{manager ( a ) := true ;}
{( d i r e c t o r (user ) and (user=a and manager ( a ) and ˜ d i r e c t o r ( a ) ) ) ;}
Action UnSetmanager ( a :Agent)
{manager ( a ) := f a l s e ;}
{( d i r e c t o r (user ) and (user=a and manager ( a ) and ˜ d i r e c t o r ( a ) ) ) ;}
Action Setadvocate ( a1 :Agent , a2 :Agent)
{ advocate ( a1 , a2 ) := true ;}
{user=a1 or (user=a2 and advocate ( a1 , a2 ) ) ;}
End
Listing D.1: X-Policy script for the employee information system.
D.2 Student information system (SIS)
Student information system (SIS) which describes the access control policies for the pro-
cess of allocating marks to students for a given course. Each course has a lecturer and a
number of demonstrators who can be students as long as they are in a higher year than
the students taking that course which we detail in Listings D.2.
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AccessControlSystem StudentInformationSystem
Pred i cate l e c t u r e r ( agent : Agent) ! , s tudent ( agent : Agent) ,
demonst rator o f ( demonstrator : Agent , s tudent : Agent) ,
h igher ( s e n i o r : Agent , j un i o r : Agent) ,
mark ( student : Agent) ;
l e c t u r e r ( l ) { read : t rue ; }
student ( s ) { read : t rue ; }
higher ( s , j ) { read : t rue ; }
demonst rator o f (d , s ) { read : t rue ; }
mark( a ) { read : user=a ; }
Action SetMark ( a :Agent)
{mark( a ) := true ;}
{ l e c t u r e r (user ) | demonst rator o f (user , a ) ;}
Action AssignDem of (d : Agent , s : Agent)
{ demonst rator o f (d , s ) := true ;}
{ ( l e c t u r e r (user ) & higher (d , s ) )
or ( demonst rator o f (d , s ) & user=d) ; }
Action De−ass ignDem of (d : Agent , s : Agent)
{ demonst rator o f (d , s ) := f a l s e ;}
{( l e c t u r e r (user ) & higher (d , s ) )
or ( demonst rator o f (d , s ) & user=d) ;}
End
Listing D.2: X-Policy script for the student information system.
D.3 Conference review system (CRS)
Conference review system (CRS) describes the access control policy regarding the process
of submitting and reviewing papers in a conference which is encoded in the X-Policy script
in Listings D.3.
AccessControlSystem Conference
Type Paper ;
Pred i cate author ( paper : Paper , agent : Agent) ,
pcmember ( agent : Agent) ,
cha i r ( agent : Agent) ! ,
r ev i ewer ( paper : Paper , agent : Agent) ,
subrev iewer ( paper : Paper , appo inter :Agent , appointee :Agent) ,
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submittedreview ( paper : Paper , agent : Agent) ,
rev iew ( paper : Paper , agent : Agent) ;
author (p , a ) { read : t rue ; }
cha i r ( a ) { read : t rue ; }
pcmember ( a ) { read : t rue ; }
r ev i ewer (p , a ) { read : pcmember (user )&˜author (p , user ) ;
}
subrev iewer (p , a , b ) { read : ( pcmember (user )&˜author (p , user ) )
or user=b or user=a ; }
submittedreview (p , a ) { read : pcmember (user )&˜author (p , user ) ;
}
rev iew (p , a ) {
read : pcmember (user )&˜author (p , user )&submittedreview (p
, a )&
( ( ( r ev i ewer (p , user ) −> submittedreview (p , user ) ) and (E
b : Agent [ subrev iewer (p , b , user ) ]
−> submittedreview (p , user ) ) ) | user=a ) ;
}
Action EditeReview (p : Paper , a : Agent)
{ rev iew (p , a ) := true ;}
{user=a&((E b : Agent [ subrev iewer (p , b , user ) ] ) | r ev i ewer (p , a ) ) &
˜ submittedreview (p , user ) ;}
Action SubmitReview (p : Paper , a : Agent)
{ submittedreview (p , a ) := true ;}
{(user=a )&((E b : Agent [ subrev iewer (p , b , user ) ] )
or r ev i ewer (p , user ) ) and ˜ submittedreview (p , user ) ;}
Action AssignSubreviewer (p : Paper , a : Agent , b : Agent)
{ subrev iewer (p , a , b ) := true ;}
{ ( r ev i ewer (p , a )&˜author (p , b)&user=a&˜(E d : Agent [ subrev iewer (p
, a , d ) or subrev iewer (p , d , b ) ] ) ) ;}
Action DeAssignSubreviewer (p : Paper , a : Agent , b : Agent)
{ subrev iewer (p , a , b ) := f a l s e ;}
{( subrev iewer (p , a , b )&˜submittedreview (p , b)&user=b) ;}
Action AssignReviewer (p : Paper , a : Agent)
{ r ev i ewer (p , a ) := true ;}
{( cha i r (user )&pcmember ( a )&˜author (p , a ) ) ;}
Action DeAssignReviewer (p : Paper , a : Agent)
{ r ev i ewer (p , a ) := f a l s e ;}
{ ( ( ( pcmember (user )&user=a&rev i ewer (p , user ) )&˜(E b :Agent [
subrev iewer (p , user , b ) ] ) ) ) ;}
Action AssignPCmember ( a :Agent) {pcmember ( a ) := true ;}{ cha i r (user ) ;}
Action DeassignPCmember ( a :Agent) {pcmember ( a ) := f a l s e ;}{ ( pcmember (
a ) and a=user ) ;}
End
Listing D.3: X-Policy script for conference review system.
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APPENDIX E
EC full model in X-Policy
In the following, we include the EC model discussed in Chapter 5 encoded in X-Policy
AccessControlSystem EC
Type Paper;
Predicate Author(p:Paper,a:Agent),
Chair-review-menu-enabled(),
Chair-status-menu-enabled(),
Chair(a:Agent),
Conflict-of-interest(p:Paper,a:Agent),
Decided-subreviewing(p:Paper,a:Agent,b:Agent),
PCmember-access-reviews-enabled(),
PCmember-review-editing-enabled(),
PCmember-review-menu-enabled(),
PCmember-status-menu-enabled(),
Accessed-subreviewing(p:Paper,a:Agent, b:Agent),
PCmember(a:Agent),
Requested-subreviewing(p:Paper,a:Agent,b:Agent),
Review-Assignment-enabled(),
Reviewer(p:Paper,a:Agent),
Show-reviewer-name() ,
Submission-anonymous(),
Submissions-open(),
Submitted-review(p:Paper,a:Agent, b:Agent) ,
Subreviewer(p:Paper,a:Agent,b:Agent),
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Updated-review(p:Paper,a:Agent, b:Agent),
View-submission-by-chair-permitted(),
View-submission-by-pcmember-permitted() ,
View-submission-title-permitted(),
View-submission-txt-permitted();
Conflict-of-interest(p,a)
{read:(Chair(user)) or (a=user and PCmember(user)
and Reviewer(p,user)
and Conflict-of-interest(p,a));}
PCmember(a){
read:Chair(user);
}
Submitted-review(p,a,b)
{
read:((Chair(user) and Chair-review-menu-enabled())
or(PCmember(user) and Reviewer(p,user)
and PCmember-review-menu-enabled()
and E c: Agent [Submitted-review(p,user,c)])
or(PCmember(user) and ˜ Reviewer(p,user)
and PCmember-review-menu-enabled()
and View-submission-title-permitted()
and PCmember-access-reviews-enabled()
and ˜ Conflict-of-interest(p,a)));}
Author(p,a){
read: (Chair(user) or(˜ Submission-anonymous() and PCmember(user)
and(Reviewer(p,user) or View-submission-title-permitted()) )
or Accessed-subreviewing(p,a,user) );}
Chair(a) {
read : Chair(user);}
PCmember-review-editing-enabled(){read: Chair(user) or PCmember(user);}
Action ShowSubmissionTitleandText()
{
View-submission-title-permitted():=true;
View-submission-txt-permitted():=true;
}
{ Chair(user) ;
}
Action ShowSubmissionNone() // do not show PCs submission text and title.
{
View-submission-title-permitted():=false;
View-submission-txt-permitted():=false;
}
{
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Chair(user) ;
}
Action ShowSubmissionTitle() // show PCs submission title only.
{
View-submission-title-permitted():=true;
View-submission-txt-permitted():=false;
}
{ Chair(user) ;}
Action ShowSubmissions2Chair() // show all submissions to chair only.
{
View-submission-by-chair-permitted():=true;
View-submission-by-pcmember-permitted() :=false;
}
{Chair(user) ;}
Action ShowSubmissions2All() // show all submissions to chair + PC-member.
{
View-submission-by-chair-permitted():=true;
View-submission-by-pcmember-permitted() :=true;
}
{Chair(user);}
Action ShowSubmissions2None() // show all submissions to no-one.
{
View-submission-by-chair-permitted():=false;
View-submission-by-pcmember-permitted() :=false;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action EnableStatusM4Chair() // enable status menu for chair.
{
Chair-status-menu-enabled():=true;
PCmember-status-menu-enabled():=false;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action EnableStatusM4All() // enable status menu for PC-chair+ PC members
{
Chair-status-menu-enabled():=true;
PCmember-status-menu-enabled():=true;
}
{ Chair(user);}
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Action EnableStatusM4None()// enable status menu for No-one.
{
Chair-status-menu-enabled():=false;
PCmember-status-menu-enabled():=false;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action EnableReview4Chair() // enable review menu for chair only.
{
Chair-review-menu-enabled():=true;
PCmember-review-menu-enabled():=false;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action EnableReviewMenu4All() // enable review menu for chair+PCs.
{
Chair-review-menu-enabled():=true;
PCmember-review-menu-enabled():=true;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action EnableReviewMenu4None() // enable review menu for no-one.
{
Chair-review-menu-enabled():=false;
PCmember-review-menu-enabled():=false;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action ShowReviewerName() // show other PC members other reviewers name.
{
Show-reviewer-name():=true;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action HideReviewerName() // hide reviewers name from other PC members.
{
Show-reviewer-name():=false;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action EnableReviewEditting() // enable non-chairs to add or modify reviews.
{
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PCmember-review-editing-enabled():=true;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action DisableReviewEditting() // disable non-chairs to add or modify reviews.
{
PCmember-review-editing-enabled():=false;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action EnableOtherReviewsAccess() // enable PCs to view other papers reviews.
{
PCmember-access-reviews-enabled():=true;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action DisableOtherReviewsAccess() // disable PCs to view other papers reviews
{
PCmember-access-reviews-enabled():=false;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action EnableAnonymousSubmission() // Hide the submissions authors.
{
Submission-anonymous():=true;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action DisableAnonymousSubmission() // Show the submissions authors.
{
Submission-anonymous():=false;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action OpenSubmission() // open the system to accept other submissions.
{
Submissions-open():=true;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action CloseSubmission() // close the submissions system.
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{Submissions-open():=false;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action EnableAssignment() // enable chair to(de-)assign papers to PCs.
{
Review-Assignment-enabled():=true;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action DisableAssignment() // disable chair to(de-) assign papers to PCs.
{
Review-Assignment-enabled():=false;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action AddPCmember(a:Agent)
{
PCmember(a):=true;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action AddChair(a:Agent)
{
Chair(a):=true;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action PromotePCmemberToPCchair(a:Agent)
{
PCmember(a) :=false ;
Chair(a):=true;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action DemotePCchairToPCmember(a:Agent)
{
PCmember(a) :=true ;
Chair(a):=false;
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action DeletePCmember(a:Agent)
{
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PCmember(a) :=false;
Chair(a):=false ;
for(p:Paper){ Reviewer(p,a):=false;}
}
{ Chair(user);}
Action AddConflictofInterest(p:Paper,a:Agent)
{
Conflict-of-interest(p,a):=true;
Reviewer(p,a):=false;
}
{( (Chair(user) and a=user) or(a=user and PCmember(a)
and(Reviewer(p,a) or View-submission-title-permitted())
and ˜ Conflict-of-interest(p,a)));}
Action RemoveConflictofInterest(p:Paper,a:Agent)
{
Conflict-of-interest(p,a):=false;
}
{ Chair(a) and Conflict-of-interest(p,a);}
Action DeleteReviewerAssignment(p:Paper,a:Agent)
{
Reviewer(p,a):=false;
for(b:Agent) {Subreviewer(p,a,b):=false;}
}
{Chair(user) and Reviewer(p,a);}
Action DeleteReview(p:Paper,a:Agent)
{
Submitted-review(p,a):=false;
}
{ Chair(user) and Submitted-review(p,a);}
Action AddReview(p:Paper,a:Agent,b:Agent)
{
Submitted-review(p,a,b) :=true;
}
{((Chair(user)
and Chair-review-menu-enabled())
((a=user or Chair(user)) and
((PCmember(user) and Reviewer(p,user)
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and PCmember-review-menu-enabled()
and PCmember-review-editing-enabled())
or( PCmember(user) and ˜ Reviewer(p,user)
and PCmember-review-menu-enabled()
and View-submission-title-permitted()
and PCmember-access-reviews-enabled()
and ˜ Conflict-of-interest(p,a)))))
;}
Action Updatereview(p:Paper,a:Agent,b:Agent)
{
Updated-review(p,a,b):=true;
}
{(Submitted-review(p,a,b) and
((Chair(user)
and Chair-review-menu-enabled())
((a=user or Chair(user)) and
((PCmember(user) and Reviewer(p,user)
and PCmember-review-menu-enabled()
and PCmember-review-editing-enabled())
or( PCmember(user) and ˜ Reviewer(p,user)
and PCmember-review-menu-enabled()
and View-submission-title-permitted()
and PCmember-access-reviews-enabled()
and ˜ Conflict-of-interest(p,a))))));}
Action RequestReviewing(p:Paper,a:Agent,b:Agent)
{
Requested-subreviewing(p,a,b):=true;
}
{((Chair-review-menu-enabled()
and Chair(user) and E c:Agent [ Author(p,c)])
or(PCmember(user)
and Reviewer(p,user)
and PCmember-review-menu-enabled())
or(PCmember(user)
and ˜ Reviewer(p,user)
and PCmember-review-menu-enabled()
and View-submission-title-permitted()
and PCmember-access-reviews-enabled()
and ˜ Conflict-of-interest(p,a)));}
Action AcceptReviewingRequest(p:Paper,a:Agent,b:Agent)
{
Decided-subreviewing(p,a,b):=true;
Subreviewer(p,a,b):=true;
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}{(Requested-subreviewing(p,a,b) and E c:Agent [ Author(p,c)]
and(˜ Decided-subreviewing(p,a,user) or user = a));}
Action RejectReviewingRequest(p:Paper,a:Agent,b:Agent)
{
Decided-subreviewing(p,a,b):=true;
Subreviewer(p,a,b):=false;
}{ (Requested-subreviewing(p,a,b) and E c:Agent [ Author(p,c)]
and(˜ Decided-subreviewing(p,a,user) or user = a));}
Action AccessReviewingRequest(p:Paper,a:Agent,b:Agent)
{
Accessed-subreviewing(p,a,b):=true;
}
{ (Requested-subreviewing(p,a,b)
and E c:Agent [ Author(p,c)]
and(˜ Decided-subreviewing(p,a,user) or user = a));}
Action SubmitPaper(p:Paper,a:Agent)
{
Author(p,a):=true;
}
{ user=a;}
Action AddAuthor(p:Paper,a:Agent)
{
Author(p,a):=true;
}
{ Author(p,user);}
Action DeleteAuthor(p:Paper,a:Agent)
{
Author(p,a):=false;
}
{Author(p,user) and ˜(a=user);}
Action WithdrowSubmission(p:Paper)
{
for(a:Agent){ Author(p,a):=false;}
}
{Author(p,user);}
Action AddReviewerAssignment(p:Paper,a:Agent)
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{Reviewer(p,a):=true;
}
{Chair(user) and(PCmember(a) or a=user)
and E c:Agent [ Author(p,c)] and ˜ Conflict-of-interest(p,a);}
End
The Queries tried on EC are:
- Property 1: A single subreviewer should not be able to determine the outcome of a
paper reviewing process by writing two reviews of the same paper.
run for 2 Paper , 5 Agent
check {E dist p1 , p2 :Paper , Al ice , Carol , Bob , Marvin , Eve : Agent | |
Chair ( A l i c e ) ! and PCmember(Bob) ! and PCmember( Carol ) !
and Author (p1 , Marvin ) ! and Author (p2 , Eve ) !
and PCmember−review−ed i t ing−enabled ( ) !
and View−submiss ion−by−cha i r−permitted ( ) !
and Chair−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and PCmember−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and Submission−anonymous ( ) !
and Review−Assignment−enabled ( ) !
−> {Alice , Carol , Bob } : ( {Submitted−rev iew (p1 , Bob , Eve ) }
THEN {Alice , Carol , Bob} :{ Submitted−rev iew (p1 ,
Carol , Eve ) }) }
- Property 2: A paper author should not review her own paper.
run for 2 Paper , 5 Agent
check {E dist p1 , p2 :Paper , Al ice , Carol , Bob , Marvin , Eve : Agent | |
Chair ( A l i c e ) ! and PCmember(Bob) ! and PCmember( Carol ) !
and Author (p1 , Marvin ) ! and Author (p2 , Eve ) !
and PCmember−review−ed i t ing−enabled ( ) !
and View−submiss ion−by−cha i r−permitted ( ) !
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and Chair−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and PCmember−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and Submission−anonymous ( ) !
and Review−Assignment−enabled ( ) !
−> {Alice , Carol , Bob , } : {Submitted−rev iew (p2 , Bob , Eve ) }
}
- Property 3: Users should be accountable for their actions.
run for 2 Paper , 5 Agent
check {E dist p1 , p2 :Paper , Al ice , Carol , Bob , Marvin , Eve : Agent | |
Chair ( A l i c e ) ! and PCmember(Bob) ! and PCmember( Carol ) !
and Author (p1 , Marvin ) ! and Author (p2 , Eve ) !
and PCmember−review−ed i t ing−enabled ( ) !
and View−submiss ion−by−cha i r−permitted ( ) !
and Chair−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and PCmember−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and Submission−anonymous ( ) !
and Review−Assignment−enabled ( ) !
−> {Alice , Bob } : {Submitted−rev iew (p1 , Carol , Carol ) } }
- Property 4: Chair cannot assign a PC-member to review a paper if she has a conﬂict
of interest with it.
run for 2 Paper , 5 Agent
check {E dist p1 , p2 :Paper , Al ice , Carol , Bob , Marvin , Eve : Agent | |
Chair ( A l i c e ) ∗ ! and PCmember(Bob) ! and PCmember( Carol ) ∗ !
and Author (p1 , Marvin ) ! and Author (p2 , Eve ) !
and PCmember−review−ed i t ing−enabled ( ) !
and Con f l i c t−of−i n t e r e s t (p1 , Carol ) ∗ ! ,
and View−submiss ion−by−cha i r−permitted ( ) !
and Chair−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
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and PCmember−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and Submission−anonymous ( ) !
and Review−Assignment−enabled ( ) !
−> {Al i c e } : {Reviewer (p1 , Carol ) } }
- Property 5: a reviewer cannot read another reviewer’s review of a paper assigned to
her before she submits her review of the paper if the Chair choose to restrict the
viewing of the paper submissions to the relevant PC-members..
run for 2 Paper , 5 Agent
check {E dist p1 :Paper , Al ice , Carol , Bob , Marvin , Eve : Agent | |
Chair ( A l i c e ) ! and PCmember(Bob) ! and PCmember( Carol ) !
and Author (p1 , Marvin ) !
and PCmember−review−ed i t ing−enabled ( ) !
and View−submiss ion−by−cha i r−permitted ( ) !
and Chair−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and PCmember−review−menu−enabled ( ) !
and Submission−anonymous ( ) !
and Reviewer (p1 , Bob)
and Submitted−rev iew (p1 , Carol , Carol )
and Review−Assignment−enabled ( ) !
−>{Bob } : ( [ Submitted−rev iew (p1 , Carol , Carol ) ] AND {Bob ,
A l i c e } : ({ Submitted−rev iew (p1 , Bob , Bob) }) ) }
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